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Modeling Inter-Korean Economic Integration
Noland, Marcus,Robinson, Sherman,Liu, Ligang 세종대학교 국제경제연구소 1998 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.13 No.3
We construct the Korean Integration Model (KIM), a two-country computable general equilibrium (CGE) model linking the North and South Korean economies. Using KIM, we simulate the impact of a customs union and a monetary union of the two economies both in the presence and absence of crossborder factor mobility. Factor mobility is of critical importance. If factor markets do not integrate, the macroeconomic impact on South Korea of economic integration with the North is relatively small, while the effects on North Korea are large. With a monetary union and factor market integration, there is a significant impact on the south Korean income and wealth distribution. If investment flows from South to North and labor flows from North to South, there is a shift in the South Korean income distribution toward capital, and within labor toward urban high skill labor, suggesting growing income and wealth inequality in the South. (JEL Classification: F15, O53, P33)
The Future of North Korea`s Economic Reform
( Marcus Noland ) 한국국방연구원 2002 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.14 No.2
This paper attempts to sketch out how internal and external forces may shape outcomes in North Korea over the next several years. The examples of China and Vietnam have demonstrated the possibility of introducing reforms into centrally planned economies while maintaining regime stability for extended periods of time. Of course in economic terms North Korea is dissimilar from China and Vietnam in important respects and, politically, it must deal with the divided country issue, which could pose a difficult ideological challenge to would-be reformers in the North. Given the political and economic difficulties of implementing reforms in the North, a more cautious "muddling through" outcome is a possibility in essence a continuation of the status quo. A third possibility could be generated by the unsuccessful implementation of economic reforms. In this case, deteriorating economic and political conditions could spur a Romanian-style intra-elite coup in which new leadership takes control in an attempt to save the regime. A final possibility is regime collapse. Mass mobilization, presumably in response to deteriorating economic conditions, would be a prerequisite for this to occur. This could occur in response to failed implementation of economic reform, or it might occur more or less spontaneously, if after a period of improvement in economic conditions North Korea were to experience another downturn. Given North Korea`s aid dependency, particularly for food consumption, the behavior of foreign actors could be quite critical in this scenario.
( Marcus Noland ) 한국국방연구원 2005 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.17 No.1
The past decade has witnessed the rupture of the traditional North Korean social compact, embodying its governing norms, thereby necessitating a reinterpretation of the ideological doctrine of juche, or self-reliance, to legitimate reforms and justifies the departure from the country`s socialist tradition. This had taken the form of an intensification of the "military first" campaign, elevating the military above the proletariat in the North Korean political pantheon. As the military waxes while the commitment to socialism wanes, North Korea appears to be evolving toward some kind of unique post-communist totalitarian state-not the sort of classically fascist regime that its propaganda excoriates, but rather a strange revival of dynastic feudalism in the form of a non-socialist, patrimonial state, but with a more efficient state apparatus than for example Iraq under Saddam Hussein. The central issue is whether the regime can manage this internal change while confronting economic stress, the implicit legitimization challenge posed by prosperous, democratic South Korea, and diplomatic tensions emanating from its nuclear weapons programs. This paper presents evidence derived from formal statistical models of the determinants of regime stability and the likelihood of regime transformation in North Korea under alternative scenarios.