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RISS 인기검색어
- 검색키워드
- 저자 : Doruk ˙Iris (검색결과 6 건)
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Cournot duopoly and tacit collusion under fairness and reciprocal preferences
Doruk ˙Iris 한국계량경제학회 2017 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS Vol.28 No.4
This paper studies the impact of fairness and reciprocity on collusion between firms competing in quantities in infinitely repeated games. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (destructive reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (constructive reciprocity). The paper shows that when firms are reciprocal, collusive quantity profiles are easier to sustain for reasonable perceptions of fair quantities of rivals. However, if only very low quantities deemed as fair, then sustaining collusion could be more difficult when the firms have fairness concerns.
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( Doruk Iris ),( ?pek Ozkal Sanver ) 한국응용경제학회 2014 응용경제 Vol.16 No.1
We consider a two-sided many-to-one matching model where universities offer scholarships to students. We show that every stable matching rule is manipulable by a university via destroying and predonating endowments under a fairly wide class of scholarship rules. We also show that the student- and university-optimal matching rules are non-manipulable under the class of scholarship rule, where the universities give some of their endowments only to their most preferred student as scholarship. Furthermore, we show that the set of Nash equilibria of the destruction game and the set of stable matchings may be disjoint. We also show that there exists a stable allocation which is manipulable by a university via destroying as well as via predonating endowments whenever the scholarships are determined endogenously in the model.
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Loss Aversion in International Environmental Agreements
( Doruk Iris ),( Alessandro Tavoni ) 한국환경경제학회·한국자원경제학회(구 한국환경경제학회) 2018 자원·환경경제연구 Vol.27 No.2
We study the impact of loss-aversion and the threat of critical damages from insufficient pollutant abatement, which we jointly call threshold concerns, on the outcome of international environmental agreements. We aim to understand whether concerns for a critical level of damages induce cooperation among countries faced with the well-known free-riding problem, and yield sufficient emission reductions to avoid exceeding the threshold. Specifically, we focus on loss-averse countries negotiating under the threat of either high or low environmental damages. Under symmetry, when countries display identical degrees of threshold concern, we show that such beliefs have a positive effect on reducing the emission levels of both signatories to the treaty and non-signatories, leading to weakly larger coalitions of signatories than in the absence of reference dependence. We then introduce asymmetry, by allowing countries to differ in the degree of concern about the damages. We show that stable coalitions are mostly formed by the countries with higher threshold concerns. When enough countries exhibit standard preferences, the coalition size may diminish, regardless of the degree of concern by the others.
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Cournot duopoly and tacit collusion under fairness and reciprocal preferences
Iris Haydar Doruk 한국계량경제학회 2017 계량경제학보 Vol.28 No.4
This paper studies the impact of fairness and reciprocity on collusion between firms competing in quantities in infinitely repeated games. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (destructive reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (constructive reciprocity). The paper shows that when firms are reciprocal, collusive quantity profiles are easier to sustain for reasonable perceptions of fair quantities of rivals. However, if only very low quantities deemed as fair, then sustaining collusion could be more difficult when the firms have fairness concerns.
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Loss Aversion in International Environmental Agreements
Iris, Doruk,Tavoni, Alessandro Korean Resource Economics Association 2018 자원·환경경제연구 Vol.27 No.2
We study the impact of loss-aversion and the threat of critical damages from insufficient pollutant abatement, which we jointly call threshold concerns, on the outcome of international environmental agreements. We aim to understand whether concerns for a critical level of damages induce cooperation among countries faced with the well-known free-riding problem, and yield sufficient emission reductions to avoid exceeding the threshold. Specifically, we focus on loss-averse countries negotiating under the threat of either high or low environmental damages. Under symmetry, when countries display identical degrees of threshold concern, we show that such beliefs have a positive effect on reducing the emission levels of both signatories to the treaty and non-signatories, leading to weakly larger coalitions of signatories than in the absence of reference dependence. We then introduce asymmetry, by allowing countries to differ in the degree of concern about the damages. We show that stable coalitions are mostly formed by the countries with higher threshold concerns. When enough countries exhibit standard preferences, the coalition size may diminish, regardless of the degree of concern by the others.
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( Doruk Iris ) 한국산업조직학회 2018 産業組織硏究 Vol.26 No.3
타인을 대표할 때는 책임감과 남들을 실망시킬 수 있다는 두려움(사회적 후회)이 뒤따른다. 이 논문에서는 이론적 모형을 이용하여 위험을 감수하는 행동에서의 개인과 집단 간의 불연속성을 설명하는 심리학적 관점을 제시한다. 대표자는 자신의 결정에 따른 결과와 집단 구성원으로부터 얻은 비선택적 조언을 각 상황별로 비교한다. 사회적 후회회피 성향은 극단적인 효용 차이를 두드러지게 함으로써 모험적 이행과 보수적 이행이 모두 가능하도록 만든다. Representing others brings responsibility and fear of letting others down (social regret). We incorporate these phenomena in a theoretical model and provide a psychological perspective to explain the individual-group discontinuity in risk-taking activities. A representative makes a state-wise comparison of the consequences of her decision and an unchosen advice given by a group member. Social regret-aversion renders extreme utility differences salient and allows both risky and cautious shifts.
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