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외국인 투자기업의 조세회피에 관한 연구 -해외 관계사 내부거래를 중심으로-
이영한 ( Young Han Lee ),손성규 ( Sung Kyu Sohn ),최원욱 ( Won Wook Choi ) 한국회계학회 2006 회계학연구 Vol.31 No.3
본 연구는 외국인 투자기업에 의해 행해지는 이전가격을 이용한 조세회피행태를 분석하였다. 이전가격 조세회피행태를 분석하기 위해 해외 관계사 내부거래 비중과 매출총이익률 괴리도와의 관련성을 분석하였다. 매출총이익률 괴리도는 매출총이익률에서 독립된 제3자간 거래 적용 매출총이익률을 차감한 것으로 이때 독립된 제3자간 거래 적용 매출총이익률은 표본기업과 동일 산업에 속하는 기업들의 매출총이익률 중위수로 설정하였다. 분석결과 해외 관계사 내부거래 비중과 매출총이익률 괴리도는 유의한 음의 관련성을 보였다. 그리고 외국인 투자기업의 조세회피 정도는 정상가격의 파악가능성에 따라 차이가 있을 것으로 예상되어 제조업 외국인 투자기업과 도소매업 외국인 투자기업의 조세회피 정도를 비교분석한 결과 제조업 외국인 투자기업의 경우 이전가격 조세회피의 정도가 더 큰 것으로 나타났다. 또한, 단기투자수익 극대화를 목적으로 하는 금융기관 투자자가 투자한 외국인 투자기업과 경영전략적 차원에서 해외자회사를 설치하는 연관산업 투자자는 조세회피 정도에 차이가 있을 것으로 생각되어 분석을 시행한 결과 연관산업 투자자가 투자한 외국인 투자기업의 경우가 이전가격 조세회피의 정도가 더 큰 것으로 나타났다. Tax avoidance or tax evasionin international transactions have occupied the attention of the tax authorities for along time. Furthermore, the recent increase in the international transaction volume makes it more important than ever before. However preceding empirical studies on this issue are rare in Korea. This is an empirical study onthe tax avoidance of Foreign-controlled companies (hereafter FCCs). The analysis covers the tax avoidance history of FCCs from 2001 to 2004 when the Enforcement Decree of the Adjustment of International Taxes Act was validated and after the regulation on foreign direct investment was abolished. We analyzed FCCs` tax avoidance behavior by transfer price. FCCs tend to reduce their taxable income by manipulating the transfer price in internal transactions with overseas affiliates because generally FCCs had heavy internal transactions with overseas affiliates. We analyzed the relationship between the internal transaction weight and the gross margin alienation degree(DIFGR) to observe FCCs` tax avoidance behavior. The gross margin alienation degree(DIFGR) is a measurement where the gross margin of sample FCC is subtracted by the arm`s length transaction margin. The arm`s length transaction margin is applied by the median gross margin of firms which were in the same industry as the sample FCCs. The result showed that the internal transaction weight negatively relates to gross margin alienation degree. Table 5 provides a comparison of profitabilities by offshore related party sale portions in total sale. Consistent with our expectations, The FCCs with heavier internal sale transactions show the lower gross margin and DIFGR. but in thecase of internal purchase transactions, it didn`t show a clear result. We also examined whether FCCs` tax avoidance behavior using transfer price would vary according to the industry of FCCs and foreign investor type. We expected that the tax avoidance behavior of FCCs hich functioned as a manufacturing base of multinational enterprises (hereafter MNEs) would be different from that of FCCs which functioned as sales and marketing bases of MNEs. Therefore,I compared the tax avoidance degree between FCCs in the manufacturing industry and the wholesale & retail industry. The result showed that FCCs in the manufacturing industry showed more tax avoidance behavior than in the wholesale and retail industry. The regression estimates in Table 8 present evidence consistent with our expectation. We find the RSALERATIO (Offshore Internal Transaction Sale / Total Sale) and RPURCHRATIO (Offshore Internal Transaction Purchase / Total Cost of Good Solds) coefficients are negative and significantly less than zero in the manufacture FCCs group. But those coefficients aren`t negative in the wholesale & retail group. In addition, we expected that FCCs invested in by financial institution investors who focus on short-term maximum gain have different tax incentives from FCCs invested in by related industry investors. Because FCCs investedin by related industry investors establish their oversea ffiliates for total company strategy. Therefore, we compared the tax avoidance degree between FCCs invested in by financial institution investors and FCCs invested inby related industry investor. The result showed that FCCs invested by financial institution investors showedless tax avoidance behavior than FCCs invested in by related industry investor. The regression estimates in Table 9 also present evidence consistent with our expectation. We find the RSALERATIO and RPURCHRATIO coefficients are negative and significantly less than zero in FCCs invested by related industry investor group. but that coefficient is not negative in FCCs invested by financial institution investor. We look forward to these findings providing useful information on understanding tax avoidances of FCCs and FCCs characteristic effects on tax avoidance behaviors.