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        전략적 반덤핑정책과 최적관세

        이동생(Dong-Sheng Li),이종민(Jong-Min Lee) 한국관세학회 2015 관세학회지 Vol.16 No.3

        Dumping actions and anti-dumping policies were still on the political agenda in many developed countries. In this paper, we consider the incentives that the existence of an AD duties provides for strategic behaviour on the part of duopoly firms selling in each other’s segmented markets. We view dumping as a sign of price discrimination across national markets, and consider a world composed of two country markets ,with one firm located in each. Firms are Cournot competitors or Stackelberg leader-follower, producing an homogeneous goods which they sell in both markets, which differ in terms of size. In free trade the country with the larger market has the higher price and the firm located in that country ‘dumps’ on the other market. The objectives of this research are first to derive the optimal AD duties which maximize an importing country’s national welfare based on the competition types between firms, and then to explore comparative statics of the optimal AD duties by changes in economic parameters. Also, the results of the simulation show how the optimal AD duties and the welfare of importers change when the market share changes.

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