2차 세계대전과 소련정부의 교회정책

신동혁(Shin Dong Hyug) 한국슬라브유라시아학회 2004 슬라브학보 Vol.19 No.2

The purpose of this article is to review the reason of the change of Stalin's Church Policy in connection with the Second World War. In other words, Why Stalin organized the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church(CAROC). Anti-religious persecution in the Soviet Union came to an informal halt after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. The Russian Orthodox Church played in important propaganda role and earned recognition as an element of Soviet society. The most important turning-point in state-church relations was a meeting on 4-5 September 1943 where Stalin, Molotov and Metropolitans Sergi, Nikolai and Aleksi met and discussed the concessions that the church needed from the state in order to become a substantial force once more in the Christian world. There were several reasons why the government timed the meeting as it did: one most important reason of them was a recognition of the foreign policy potential of the Russian Orthodox Church as an instrument that would influence not only other Christian World, especially the British, but also other Orthodox and Slavic peoples in Eastern Europe. The notable thing was that Stalin in particular could recognize the value of Church as an instrument. The plan of Stalin was showed in an interesting archive document. As a result, the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church was organized. However, the change of church policy in Soviet Union made a serious result for the Church, even though the government didn't plan it. At once, the Church got a chance to restore the ruined church. Consequently, would say that this study provides a significant clue for understanding how the Russian Orthodox Church could survive in atheistic state, Soviet Union.

현대 러시아에서 정교회의 사회적 역할

신동혁(Shin Dong Hyug) 한국슬라브유라시아학회 2012 슬라브학보 Vol.27 No.3

This articles is an attempt to understand the social role of the Russian Orthodox Church(ROC) in the last decade (2000-2012). ROC’s social service is basically one of the church’s religious activities, but it also serves as a key barometer to gauge its social role. Given the fact that ROC has regained the status of the state religion since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it is crucial to examine if ROC has been taking the social responsibilities to meet the status in the post-Soviet era. To do so, this article attempts to examine ROC’s social activities. The article has a couple of specific research agenda which are related but distinct. First, it examines ROC-sponsored mega forums and academic conferences. Second, the article traces ROC’s practical social services, such as charities. The first activities are regarded as “macro social services,” as they publicize social problems, seek an alternative to them, and present policy options, whereas the second ones are defined as “micro social services” because they represent on-site and face-to-face social activities. The article concludes that ROC’s social role is evolving from the one in the level of broad and vague declaration to the one in the level of systematic practices. Especially for the last two to three years, ROC’s leadership has been making tremendous efforts to expand the scope and scale of its social activities. Probably, we see a bigger social role of ROC in the future Russia. However, ROC needs to do more than just relying on its spiritual and moral/ethic dimension in order to increase its social role in current Russia. As indicated by various surveys on the church-social relations, one of which shows that while ROC enjoys a high degree of reliability (70%) it just gets to 6% in terms of the level of closeness between the church and people, the importance of ROC in the everyday lives of Russian people has been somewhat overrated. Critical for ROC’s future role and status in Russian society is its reactions and measures to more actual social problems, including family violence, juvenile delinquency, divorce, orphan, abortion, maternal rights, alcoholism, drug addiction, poverty and others. The changes in the social role of ROC, as a ‘social institution’, would make an impact on Russian civil society.

스탈린 종교정책, 1943-1948

신동혁(Shin Dong Hyug) 한국슬라브유라시아학회 2009 슬라브학보 Vol.24 No.4

This article is intented to investigate the process of Stalin's New Religious Policy and its influence through organization and activity of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church(CAROC) established by Stalin in 1943, which exclusively executed Stalin' Religious Policy. To examine the process of organization and activity of CAROC based on primary sources is to show substance of Stalin's Religious Policy. For this study, first of all, the process of organization of CAROC and the reaction of the soviet bureaucratic organization are important. The second is the process of organization and activity of representativestynonaoaoseaasre) in the local government. Consequently, would say that this study provides an important historical clue for understanding the correlation between Stalin's New Religious Policy and Russian Orthodox Church's revival as a social institution in atheistic state. In addition, this research helps to know how the Russian Orthodox Church could revive rapidly in post-soviet Russia.

19세기 카프카스 전쟁과 체르케스 민족의 이주 문제

신동혁(Shin, Dong-Hyug) 국방부 군사편찬연구소 2016 군사 Vol.- No.99

The “Circassian question” is an important element defining the characteristic of the Caucasus war in the 19th century and contains the tragic history of an ethnic group. This article examines the “Circassian question” as a result of the Caucasus war of the 19th century, that is, studies the cause and process of large-scale Circassian migration into the Ottoman Empire from the Northwest Caucasus to 1864 after the Crimean War. The interpretation and assessment about the 19th century the Caucasian war(the Circassian question) shows a clear different position between the central(mainly russkie scholars) and local scholars(mainly from the Caucasus regions). Russkie scholars recognize an inevitability, a harsh conquest policy in war process and Circassian’s big victim as it’s result. Also they assert that Tsar’s government had no goal of eliminating Circassians, there were important assignments of Tsar’s government policy that to keep Black Sea coast and to strengthen the new frontier of the empire in the Caucasus. Russkie scholars, emphasizing that as the most sensitive issue the cause and characteristic of Circassian migration are an outcome of Russia-Turkey-Britain interests surrounding the Northwest Caucasus, using sometimes ‘forced-muhajirun’ expressions they insist that Circassian’s migration was ‘muhajirun’. This stance doesn’t differ much from interpretation of Russian Empire period. On the other hand, the first source cited in the text and like the Caucasus region researchers did prove in their studies, after defeat in the Crimean War Tsar’s colonial policy in the Northwest Caucasus was not differentㄴ from that of other Caucasus(Chechnya and Dagestan). There is a need to give an eye to that Circassian migration policy was implemented, in the situation that Russia already seized the chance to victory in Caucasus war. And there was not the case of driving out 90% inhabitant of the conquest of areas outside Caucasus like Circassians anywhere. Deportation has occurred frequently in history of Russia, but it is difficult to find a case of driving an ethnic group out of country. But Tsar’s government regarded Circassians as the potential risks of the northwest Caucasus region, it decided to get rid of them permanently rather than to manage the risk element. And the result was the large-scale Circassian migration into the Ottoman Empire. Therefore in spite that the Circassian migration has elements such as ‘muhajirun’, ‘forced-muhajirun’ and ‘deportation’ in fact, there are more distinctive things like ‘the deportation of an ethnic unit’ or ‘an ethnic cleansing.’

현대 러시아인의 종교성: 정교도의 종교성을 중심으로

신동혁 ( Dong Hyug Shin ) 서울대학교 러시아연구소 2014 러시아연구 Vol.24 No.1

As religiosity is an important element for understanding a religion culture of a society, religious identity and ethnic identity, the study of Russian``s religiosity is essential. In addition, it is to grasp a substance of ‘religious revival’ that began to appear with collapse of Soviet Union. This research, on the basis of the theory of ‘Multidimensional religiosity’, analyzes and reconstructs existing various survey data and results. As a result, we can think that there are more customary elements than religion or faith in contemporary Russian``s religiosity. And the reason why this characteristic appears, can be found in the tradition of the religious life of Orthodoxy believers and the heritage of the Soviet period. In Russian Orthodoxy Church that stresses ritual(liturgy) and tradition, in particular, as the ritual was excluded in the Soviet period, religious knowledge of Russians, which was traditionally learned through the ritual, was discontinued. The severance brought about an ‘autonomy’ which excessively impregnated into the religiosity of Russians. It made the religiosity of contemporary Russians more dubious. On the other hand, the contemporary Russian``s religiosity might be clearer as time goes by when compared to the situations in the 1990s and the 2000s. In Russian history and considering present status of Russian Orthodox Church, as the religiosity becomes clear, the religion identity may become clear as well. It can also influence national identity.