중앙-지방 관점에서 바라본 스탈린 시기 전쟁의 기억

송준서(Joonseo Song) 한국슬라브유라시아학회 2013 슬라브학보 Vol.28 No.1

This paper focuses two main points. Firstly, the way that Soviet local officials and elites of the front region, especially Leningrad and Sevastopol, commemorated World War II during the postwar Stalin years. Secondly, the way that Stalin regime responded to the practice of commemorating the war. Both Leningrad and Sevastopol located in the wartime front region, experienced a siege by the Nazi German army from the beginning of World War II. While Leningrad was liberated by the Soviet army in 1944, after the 900-day-siege, Sevastopol, a home port of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet located in the Crimean Peninsula, was occupied by the German army after the 250-day-siege for two years. By the end of the war Leningrad party and governmental officials had a strong sense of local patriotism, because of their own sacrifices and ability to survive without military or material support from Moscow during the siege. Based on the local patriotism, the local elites frequently eulogized the effectiveness of their wartime leadership, however remained silent on the role of Stalin and the central government during the siege of Leningrad. The Stalinist leadership, which could not allow such “anti-party” behavior from the local elites, persecuted them by using coercion, such as imprisonment. In contrast, the Stalinist leadership agreed to Sevastopol officials’ reconstruction plan, which was heavily drawn from history and culture, while it criticized a Moscow officials" reconstruction plan that emphasized socialist ideology and the victory of war. Therefore, it has been shown that the Stalinist leadership controlled war memories of local elites not only by using coercion, but also through accommodation, only when the local memories of the war would not undermine the authority of the Stalinist government.

전후 스탈린 시기 사회주의적 경쟁의 퇴조와 ‘대협약’의 성립, 1944-1953

송준서(Song Joonseo) 한국슬라브유라시아학회 2009 슬라브학보 Vol.24 No.1

Drawing on the experiences of Magnitogorsk, a steel town in the Urals, and other heavy-industry enterprises and factories in the Cheliabinsk oblast of the Ural region, this case study examines Stalin regime's efforts to boost productivity after World War Ⅱ. Socialist competition that valued speed of labor and quantitative achievement was rejuvenated briefly in the early years of the war by the Stalin government; but competition began to lose its momentum again by the end of the war. Although the local party tried to emphasize the significance of competition, the factory officials and the technical personnel in Magnitogorsk depended much less on competition as a tool for raising productivity. Accordingly, workers' wage determination and the provision of incentives came to depend more on the significance of work in production rather than the extent of the achievement of output quotas. Surely these changes began to appear before the war, but came to be more consolidated after the war as the regime relied more on professionalization and rationalization than voluntarism to raise labor productivity. Under this circumstance, industrial managerial personnel's indifference to trainees in vocational schools and young unskilled workers was a very expectable consequence. During the hard times of the immediate postwar years, enterprise management "abandoned" the relatively easily replaceable work force. With the decline of voluntarism in production lines, workers were left with few practical chances to be promoted or to be better paid through governmental supported policies, such as the Stakhanovite movement. Not surprisingly, young and unskilled workers were the greatest victims of the Big Deal, characterized by the regime's preferential treatment of the technical intelligentsia.

러시아와 포스트소비에트 신생독립국의 기념비 전쟁과 타자인식

송준서 ( Joonseo Song ) 한국외국어대학교(글로벌캠퍼스) 러시아연구소 2021 슬라브연구 Vol.37 No.1

소련 붕괴 이후 러시아를 ‘우리’에서 ‘남’으로 타자화한 포스트소비에트 신생독립국들은 국가정체성 정립 과정에서 2차 세계대전의 기억을 놓고 러시아와 충돌하면서 더 적극적으로 러시아 타자화 정책을 수행하였다. 하지만 그러한 정책이 해당 국가 국민의 러시아에 대한 타자인식을 동일한 정도로 강화시킨 것은 아니었다. 각국의 지정학적, 지경학적 특성에 따라 타자인식 정도는 상이했다. 반면 러시아의 경우 대조국전쟁의 기억은 1990년대를 거쳐 2000년대에 이르러 러시아 국민들 사이에 가장 신성한 집단기억으로 자리 잡았다. 따라서 러시아는 국가정체성의 근간인 그 기억을 모욕하는 국가에 대해 좌시하지 않고 기억 전쟁을 수행하였으며 러시아 국민들 사이에서는 해당 국가에 대한 타자의식이 높게 표출되었다. This paper examines the ways that Russia and the post-soviet independent nations conducted memory wars over the Soviet monuments of World War II in Estonia and Georgia, in the process of establishing their post-soveit national identities. In doing so, this study aims to answer the following questions: 1) how the policy of otherization in Estonia and Georgia affected the development of sense of otherness among citizens; 2) how Russian government and citizens reacted to the war of memory that those two former Soviet republics initiated. This study implies that the policy of otherization by the newly independent countries did not always yield a universal extent of popular support. The degree of recognition of Russia as “other” was different according to the geopolitical and geoeconomic characteristics of each country. Reacting to the denial of the Soviet war memory in Estonia and Georgia, Russia, which firmly had established the Soviet victory of World War II as the most sacred collective memory, conducted memory wars either by sending warnings of breaking diplomatic relations off or by restoring a demolished Soviet war monument in Moscow while the citizens of Russia expressed high sense of otherness toward those two former Soviet republics.

19세기 신슬라브주의자 니콜라이 다닐렙스키의 유럽 인식과 러시아

송준서 ( Joonseo Song ) 한국외국어대학교 국제지역연구센터 2022 국제지역연구 Vol.26 No.1

19세기 러시아의 신슬라브주의자 니콜라이 다닐렙스키는 1871년 출판된 그의 저서 『러시아와 유럽』에서 러시아의 숙명적인 ‘타자’인 유럽 문명과 러시아와의 차이점을 밝히면서 러시아가 속한 슬라브 문명은 본원적으로 유럽 문명과는 별개의 문명이라고 주장하였다, 또한 그는 유럽 문명은 이미 쇠락의 길로 들어선 반면, 러시아가 선도하는 슬라브 문명은 곧 부흥할 것이라고 예견했다. 다닐렙스키는 이 과정에서 유럽과 러시아의 충돌은 불가피하다고 보았다. 국수주의적이고 제국주의적 팽창주의 성격을 지닌 다닐렙스키의 사상은 소비에트 공식 이데올로기와 공존할 수 없었다. 반면 소련 붕괴 이후 급속히 도입된 서구 제도에 대한 실망과 국제관계에서 서방의 일방적 독주에 대한 지정학적 위기감의 확산 속에서 러시아 지식인, 정치인, 지도자들은 한 세기 전 다닐렙스키가 제시한 유럽 문명의 속성과 러시아의 생존전략에 주목하면서 러시아 정체성과 유럽과의 관계 재설정 과정에 적극 활용하고 있다. Clarifying the critical differences between European and Slavic civilizations, Nikolai Danilevskii, a nineteenth-century Russian Neo-Slavophile thinker, contended in Russia and Europe―published in 1871―that Russia, a leading member of the Slavic civilization, was fundamentally separated from the European civilization. He also predicted that Russia along with the Slavic civilization would emerge as the new dominant civilization while Europe, which treated Russia with constant hostility, would continue its decline. According to Danilevskii, a clash with European powers would be unavoidable for Russia due to conflicting geopolitical interests between the two forces. While the Soviet authorities of the twentieth century did not accept Danilevskii’s chauvinistic and imperialist expansionism that contradicted Soviet socialist ideology, his ideas on Europe-Russia relations remain widely circulated in post-Soviet Russia, gaining attention from not only intellectuals but also politicians who strive to reshape Russian identity and its relationship with Europe.

모스크바 동방노력자공산대학의 조선학부와 대학원의 편제와 운영, 1921-1938

송준서(Song, Joonseo) 한국슬라브유라시아학회 2020 슬라브학보 Vol.35 No.2

In 1921 the Bolshevik government established the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow with the goal of fostering leaders of the socialist revolutionary movement among the minority living both in the peripheries of Soviet Russia and in Asian colonies abroad. During the 1920s~30s, about 200 Korean communists and nationalists studied at the university. Many of them continued to carry out their anti-Japanese independent and communist movements in Korea, as well as in the Primorsk region after their graduation from the university. This implies that the university contributed to some extent to the development of the national liberation movement of Korea by providing communist and nationalist activists. In addition, the university enhanced its role of a research institute that carried out Oriental studies as it established a graduate program in 1927. Despite its contributions to the training of communist activists and experts in Oriental studies, in 1938 the Stalin regime closed the university, where foreign students and ethnic minorities occupied the majority. The regime’s strong suspicion of those foreign students and teachers as foreign spies, as well as its termination of affirmative action for ethnic minorities in the late 1930s, certainly affected the closure of the university.