이사책임감면규정 도입이 기업에 미치는 영향

배창현(Changhyun Bae),손성규(Sungkyu Sohn) 한국경영학회 2018 經營學硏究 Vol.47 No.5

기관투자자의 주주행동주의가 자본시장에 미치는 영향

손성규(Sungkyu Sohn),배창현(Changhyun Bae) 한국경영학회 2018 經營學硏究 Vol.47 No.6

연구논문 : 특수관계자 거래가 타인자본비용에 미치는 영향

전성일(제1저자) ( Seong Il Jeon ),배창현(교신저자) ( Changhyun Bae ) 한국회계학회 2015 회계저널 Vol.24 No.3

본 연구는 2003년부터 2010년까지의 기간동안 기업의 특수관계자 거래가 자본시장에 미치는 영향에 대해 타인자본비용을 통해 검증하였다. 타인자본비용의 측정치로는 재무제표를 이용하여 측정된 부채이자비용과 신용평가기관이 제공하는 신용등급을 사용하였으며, 신용등급 분석의 경우 회귀분석과 순위로짓분석을 각각 실시하였다. 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 특수관계자 거래는 타인자본비용에 유의적인 양(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 결과는 특수관계자 거래가 많을수록 경영자와 외부이해관계자 사이에 정보비대칭이 증가할 수 있기 때문에 상대적으로 높은 위험 프리미엄이 반영되어 타인자본비용이 증가한 것으로 해석할 수 있다. 둘째, 외국인투자자 비율이 높은 기업의 경우 특수관계자 거래가 커질수록 타인자본비용은 증가하는 것으로 나타났다. 셋째, 감사인규모가 큰 기업의 경우 특수관계자 거래가 증가할수록 타인자본비용은 커지는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 외국인투자자와 대형회계법인의 경우, 경영자의 자의성을 감소시키지 못할 수 있기 때문에 특수관계자 거래가 증가할수록 자본시장에서는 이를 보다 부정적인 평가를 하는 것으로 살펴볼 수 있다. 본 연구의 결과는 특수관계자 거래를 빈번하게 행하고 있는 기업에 대한 하나의 유용한 투자정보로서 활용될 수 있을 것이며, 기업 입장에서는 특수관계자 거래에 대한 정보비대칭을 감소시키려는 노력이 필요함을 제시하고 있다. This study examines the effect of related party transaction on the cost of debt. Related party transactions are expected to have high risk premium resulting in high cost of debt. Cost of debt is defined as borrowing rates calculated by using financial statements and credit ratings provided by the credit rating agency. In addition, this study investigates the effect of the firm``s monitoring system such as foreign investors, big audit firms on the relationship between related party transaction and cost of debt. If foreign investor and big audit firms efficiently play a role in monitoring, they will monitor(reduce) related party transaction. Related party transactions are easy to adjust business condition because of discrepancy of influence caused by a related party. So, related party transactions will be used as a way of earnings management. Therefore regulators request firms to disclose related party transactions on financial statement footnotes. In fact, it has not been recorded in detail. According to the prior studies, related party transactions would worse earnings quality because related party transactions are used as a way of earnings management(Kim and Woo 2008, 2009). Furthermore, Managers pursue private profits through related party transactions. In case of highly related party transactions, auditor spends more time and effort in audit procedure to reduce audit risk(Woo and Lee 2010). That is, the more related party transactions are, the information asymmetry(information risk) is greater. Companies with low disclosure quality shown to increase cost of debt. The sample is composed of firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2010. The sample is composed of non-financial firms that satisfy all of the following criteria are selected: (1) fiscal-year ending December 31, (2) availability of related party transaction from TS2000 Database, (3) availability of financial statement KIS-Value database. Also, we use credit rating as a proxy for cost of debt. For additional analysis, this study obtain data on credit rating by searching through KIS-Value database. This study draw these credit ratings such that the best rating corresponds with 1 and the worst rating with 10 to conduct our empirical analysis. Finally, 3,698 firm-year observations are used in the empirical analysis. To test hypothesis of the effect of related party transaction on the cost of debt, this study carry out ordinary least squares(OLS) regressions and ordered logit(OL) regression analysis. The empirical findings are summarized as follows. First, the related party transaction positively influences the cost of debt(or credit rating). This result means that related party transaction increase the cost of debt byenlarging information asymmetry between managers and investors. Thus, investors may require higher risk premium on the firms with many transactions to the related-party. Second, foreign investors positively affect the relationship between related party transaction and the cost of debt. Consistent with prior studies(Paek and Cho 2006; Kim and Woo 2008), this result suggests that foreign investors are not concerned about earnings management. Third, the size of audit firms is positively related to the relationship between related party transaction and the cost of debt. This result means that big audit firms are considered as less concerned about arbitrary earnings management, related party transactions are negatively evaluated by investors. In addition, we separate the sample 3,698 firm-year into tunneling(N=1,732) and propping(N=1,966). It is measured by the difference related party transaction(purchases+other losses) and related party transactions(sales+other gains). If the difference is greater(lower) than 0, it is tunneling(propping). In case of tunneling group, the related party transaction positively influences the cost of debt. This result indicates that related party transaction increase cost of debt by increasing risk premium(information uncertainty) between managers and investors because managers tends to gain private profits through tunneling activities. Meanwhile, in case of propping group, the related party transaction don``t affect the cost of debt. This study additional test according to the type of related party transactions. Also, this study examines the effect of related party capital transaction(such as trade receivables, loans, trade payables, borrowings) on the cost of debt. The related party capital transaction positively influences the cost of debt. It means that investors may require higher risk premium on the firms with many capital transactions to the related-party. The findings of this study provide the insightful information to decide investment on the firms with related party transactions. Firms with related party transaction need to increase the effort to reduce information asymmetry.

가결산이익 정정공시에 대한 시장반응

손성규 ( Sungkyu Sohn ),정주렴 ( Juryum Chung ),배창현 ( Changhyun Bae ) 한국회계학회 2015 회계학연구 Vol.40 No.5

국내 상장기업은 전년도에 비해 손익구조가 일정수준 이상 차이가 날 것으로 전망되는 경우 의무적으로 손익구조변경 공시를 통해 가결산이익을 공시하여야 한다. 이때 해당 공시내용에 수정사항이 생기게 되면 정정공시를 통해 변경 내용을 공시하는데, 이렇게 공시내용을 정정하더라도 규제상의 불이익은 없다. 따라서 기업이 의도적으로 왜곡된 예측이익을 발표하고 이후 적절한 시기에 이익을 수정하는 정정공시를 할 유인이 존재한다. 실제로 공시제도 도입 이후 2005년부터 2011년까지의 기간 동안 전체 손익구조변경 공시 중에서 35%이상이 정정공시에 해당되는 것으로 나타나 빈번하게 공시가 정정되고 있음을 알수 있다. 선행연구에 따르면, 시장은 가결산이익 정보와 정정정보 모두에 유의한 양의 반응을 보인다. 만일 시장에서 정정공시를 반복적으로 수행하는 기업을 제재하지 못한다면 회계정보의 적시성을 위해 도입된 수시공시 제도가 오히려 시장에 혼란을 가져오고 기업의 의도에 따라 악용될 여지가 있을 수 있다. 본 연구에서는 시장에서 정정공시를 실시한 기업과 그렇지 않은 기업을 구분하여 이후 가결산이익 정보에 차별적인 반응을 하는지에 초점을 맞추어 연구를 수행하였다. 분석결과, 첫째, 주식시장은 전기에 정정공시를 하지 않았던 기업의 손익구조변경 공시에 대해서는 유의한 양의 반응을 보였으나, 정정공시를 했던 기업의 이익정보에 대해서는 그 반응이 감소하거나 유의하지 않은 것으로 나타났다. 이는 주식시장이 정정공시를 실시한 기업의 이익 공시정보를 그렇지 않은 기업의 이익 공시정보와 자율적으로 분리하여 반응하고 있음을 보여준다. 둘째, 이러한 시장의 부정적인 반응에 대한 장기 효과를 분석한 결과, 2년이 지나면 약화되고 3년 후에는 사라지는 것으로 나타났다. 마지막으로 정정공시를 통해 수정한 순이익이 최종 재무제표와 다른 경우 시장에서 이후 정정공시에 차별적으로 반응하는지 검토하였는데, 유의한 차이를 발견하지 못하였다. 즉 시장에서는 기업의 예측이익과 외부감사 이후 이익이 다르다는 이유로 기업의 이익정보에 대한 신뢰성을 약화시키지는 않는 것으로 판단된다. 본 연구는 예측이익 공시가 빈번하게 정정되는 것에 대한 우려가 지속적으로 제기되고 있는 상황에서 시장이 해당 정보에 효율적으로 반응하는지 살펴보았다는데 공헌점이 있다. In Korea, all listed firms must disclose details of expected sales, operating income, and net income when they expect changes in those indicators of more than 30% (15% for large firms) compared to the prior fiscal year. While this disclosure of income structural change was introduced in 2000 to ensure the timeliness and fairness of income information, it concerns preliminary earnings prior to external audits, which brings into question the reliability of the information. After firms disclose these details about expected income, they can revise the information at their leisure with no regulatory disadvantage. Consequently, the possibility exists of intentionally providing a distorted report of preliminary earnings and revising it afterwards. During the years 2005 to 2011, more than 35% of preliminary earnings disclosures were revised versions of original disclosures. Previous studies report positive stock market reactions to both preliminary income disclosures and revisions. If the market cannot distinguish between firms that report honestly and those that intentionally revise expected income reports frequently, it might be misleaded. This study investigates differentiations in market response towards income information about firms that disclose preliminary information and then revise it afterwards versus firms that do not make revisions. We focus on listed firms in the Korean Stock Exchange in which income structural changes were disclosed from 2008 to 2011, analyzing differences in response between those with revised disclosures in the past 1-3 years ("Highrev firms" hereafter) and non-Highrev firms in the stock market. For selecting Highrev firms, we consider both the frequency and amount of disclosure revision. On one hand, the market may consider all revisions as a sign of a weak internal control system or intentional action. On the other hand, the market may respond only to significant revisions, rather than all revision of small errors. Therefore we classify firms as Highrev when (1) their disclosed preliminary income information was revised in the prior year for any reason, (2) their income amount was revised, and (3) the income was revised more than 5%. We then examine the market reaction in these different circumstances. We select disclosures of income structural changes between the fiscal closing date and external audit report. Data regarding the date of disclosure and contents (reason for revision and revised amount) were collected manually through the Corporate Disclosure System of the Korea Stock Exchange (http://kind.krx.or.kr). Financial data of the sample firms were extracted from the Fn-DataguidePro database. For firms with more than two corrected disclosures, only the last revision was selected. The final sample for preliminary disclosure sample consisted of 796 firms for which analyst forecast information was available among a total of 1,890 firms with preliminary disclosures. The number of firms with corrective disclosure reports was 931. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Our empirical results are summarized as follows. First, on the whole, the market reacts positively to preliminary earnings disclosure, but the stock market reaction to the revision of reports disclosed by Highrev firms is much less than that for non-Highrev firms, or not significant. This result suggests that the market recognizes the Highrev firm and accordingly responds less to income information of those firms. Second, these negative effects diminish after 2 years and disappear in 3 years. Finally, we examine whether the market reacts differently to corrective disclosure reports for firms in which earnings were changed in audit reports after revision. The results were not significant, which suggests that the difference between preliminary income and audited income does not deteriorate the informativeness of the reports perceived by the stock market. While concerns do exist about frequent revision of expected income, the findings of this study provide valuable implications for regulators, investors, and managers of firms. From the regulatory perspective, regulators may need to consider that the market itself responds efficiently to firms that revise their income disclosures frequently and significantly. Investors may better understand that the market reacts differently to income information about Highrev firms compared to that of non-Highrev firms.