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천연가스용 고압 인젝터의 Plunger valve 크기 변경에 따른 질량 유량 균일도에 관한 연구
윤태준(Taejun Yoon),김권세(Kwonse Kim),최문석(Munseok Choe),이홍윤(Hongyoon Lee),강도경(Dogyeong Kang),최두석(Dooseuk Choi) 한국자동차공학회 2017 한국자동차공학회 지부 학술대회 논문집 Vol.2017 No.6
Natural gas is in spotlight as an alternative energy source to deal with global exhaustion of resource and environmental pollution. There are many studies related to natural gas. Among them, technology of the fuel rail that maintains internal pressure 8 bar and above is under development. But, the internal flow of the injector becomes unstable because high pressure gas is getting into inlet of injector. Therefore, this study provided the design variables of the plunger valve to reduce the uneven flow rate of internal fluids. As a result, the size of the plunger valve decreases, a uniformity of the internal flow rate is reduced and the pulsation is also reduced however, internal resistance increases, bore size of plunger valve shall be appropriately sized.
Flow Wars: Systemizing the Attack Surface and Defenses in Software-Defined Networks
Yoon, Changhoon,Lee, Seungsoo,Kang, Heedo,Park, Taejune,Shin, Seungwon,Yegneswaran, Vinod,Porras, Phillip,Gu, Guofei Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2017 IEEE/ACM transactions on networking Vol.25 No.6
<P>Emerging software defined network (SDN) stacks have introduced an entirely new attack surface that is exploitable from a wide range of launch points. Through an analysis of the various attack strategies reported in prior work, and through our own efforts to enumerate new and variant attack strategies, we have gained two insights. First, we observe that different SDN controller implementations, developed independently by different groups, seem to manifest common sets of pitfalls and design weakness that enable the extensive set of attacks compiled in this paper. Second, through a principled exploration of the underlying design and implementation weaknesses that enables these attacks, we introduce a taxonomy to offer insight into the common pitfalls that enable SDN stacks to be broken or destabilized when fielded within hostile computing environments. This paper first captures our understanding of the SDN attack surface through a comprehensive survey of existing SDN attack studies, which we extend by enumerating 12 new vectors for SDN abuse. We then organize these vulnerabilities within the well-known confidentiality, integrity, and availability model, assess the severity of these attacks by replicating them in a physical SDN testbed, and evaluate them against three popular SDN controllers. We also evaluate the impact of these attacks against published SDN defense solutions. Finally, we abstract our findings to offer the research and development communities with a deeper understanding of the common design and implementation pitfalls that are enabling the abuse of SDN networks.</P>