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외환위기 이후 국내 간접금융의 구조적 변화와 향후 과제
구본성 ( Bon Sung Gu ) 한국금융연구원 2007 금융연구 Vol.21 No.S
외환위기 이후 은행을 중심으로 한 간접금융시장은 우호적인 거시경제적 환경과 안정성 중심의 정책, 건전성 중심의 경영기조를 통해 지속적인 증가세를 시현하였다. 간접금융시장의 구조적 변화는 가계금융을 통한 금융서비스의 균형, 중소기업금융의 확대, 건전성 및 수익성 개선을 통한 금융안정성의 회복을 들 수 있다. 한편 은행을 중심으로 한 간접금융시장은 저금리 기조 또는 정책기조의 변화 등에 따라 안정성이 저해될 소지도 있다. 이에 따라 향후 간접금융시장은 성장성 또는 급속한 위험다변화에 비해 건전성 및 안정성 중심의 여건이 긴요할 것이다. 이와 관련하여 안정성 중심의 경영, 관계형 및 자본연계형 기업금융의 강화, 금융유통기능의 지속적 확대가 요구된다. After the financial crisis the volume and proportion of bank financing has consecutively grown as a result of low interest rate, risk-focused management and macroeconomic stability. Given the favourable market conditions, the Korean banks first could quickly balance out the overall structure of services by extending into mortgages, credit cards and personal loans, etc. And Korean banks could consecutively broaden credit opportunities and availability for small and medium-sized firms as the dis-intermediation of large corporations has continued owing to improved earnings and massive re-capitalization efforts. Especially, stable earning streams from loan growth and falling non-performing loans helped Korean banks to rebuild market stability and profitability successfully. However, the financing roles of banks in Korea is more likely to diminish as the market interest rate may turn to rise or if the government policy becomes more focused on deepening capital market and enhancing securities businesses. Moreover, the financial soundness of the Korean banking sector may weaken in the long term marginally if the market liquidity may squeeze. Therefore, it will be crucial for both Korean banks and the regulatory authorities to maintain the stability and soundness of banking system rather than broadening risk-taking activities through business diversification and expansions. Therefore, the Korean banks will need to strengthen risk management of all loan portfolios and to reduce earnings volatilities through cross-selling and advisory services for households. For corporate customers the Korean banks have to try to tighten relationship banking services and consider offering capital-market products gradually either through strategic partnership or non-bank subsidiaries.
구본성 ( Bon Sung Gu ) 한국금융정보학회 2012 금융정보연구 Vol.1 No.1
본 연구는 글로벌 금융위기 이후 확대되고 있는 신용평가사에 대한 규율체계 논의와 관련하여 투자자와 발행기업,규제당국의 유인체계(incentive system) 관점에서 재설정될 수 있음을 보여준다. 유인체계 상 핵심과제는 신용평가 결과에 따른 기대효과를 제고하기 위해 제3자인 신용평가회사가 제공하는 신용평가등급을 주로 활용하는 투자자의 모니터링 유인을 강화하는 데 있음을 제시하고 있다. 또한 최근 미국·EU의 신용평가업무에 대한 규율체계 개편에 대한 평가를 통해 신용평가사의 규제개혁에 대한 전반적인 흐름과 특징을 평가하고 있다. 본고는 내부통제기능의 규범화, 인증체계에 따른 규제수준의 차별화, 투자자의 자율·내부평가 강화 등을 통해 규제중심(regulatory reference) 체계에서 투자자 중심(investor reference) 체계로의 전환을 통해 신용평가에 의한 시스템효과를 완화시킬 필요가 있음을 보여준다. Re-regulation of Credit Rating Agency and Policy Implications This policy paper shows that the re-regulation of credit rating agencies may be addressed by looking at the incentive system among investors, firms and regulatory body. The regulatory reform should be more aimed on enhancing the investors` incentive for monitoring credit rating agencies which provide the rating opinions as a third party. The shortcomings of current system are mostly driven by unprecedented regulatory reliance, undue monitoring efforts by investors and market capture driven by issuing firms in the reputed market. To lessen further distortion of incentive structures from the market perspective it may be necessary for the regulatory policy to be more directed toward lifting the market entry of new rating agencies, facilitating membership-based operations, and building up strong internal credit rating functions by institutional investors themselves. Also in order to establish more dynamic and diverse credit rating services in the long term it may be necessary for the reference to credit ratings set by external rating agencies to be substituted or driven by the reference to in-house or internal rating system of investors. Such market structural or behavioral change will in the end lead to reduce the systemic risks caused by the regulatory reliance on the external credit rating system as a whole.