정유재란 시기 해전과 조선 수군 운용 = (The) Naval Battle and Operations of Joseon's Navy Troops during Jungyujaeran(the 2nd Japanese Invasion)

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

I have focused this study on the activities of Joseon Navy Forces during Jungyu jaeran(1597~1598), the Second Joseon-Japanese War respectably. Mainly, the study is synthetically on the early phase of the naval battles during Jungyujaeran which had not been so much focused to study and post activities of them. That the crucial importance of this early period of Jungyujaeran is the Joseon Navy Forces had been collapsed not to be existed by being demolished in Chilcheonryang naval battle, however, it dramatically recovered as itself and more reinforced. The main people who did the crucial role to reconstruct the collapsed navy are in low social classed, righteous militias and the ordinary civilians. Also, it can give an attention of command group by Admiral, Yi Sunsin’s strategies and harmonized management. These became a reason of successful operations with the allied forces with the Ming, China. The importance of the reconstructed naval forces power is it did the best role of overcoming the severe war and provided the background of powerful navy forces of the late Joseon Period.
As Jungyujaeran arose, Joseon Naval Forces suffered the huge crisis. The king, Seonjo condemned the Admiral Yi, Sunsin neglecting of his responsibilities of Japan’s invasion, and substitute the position to the other. Even after replacement of the admiral position, the Navy did dragging and blocking the Japanese troops invading on seas by the oder of the Army Commander, and it obviously resulted the critical defeat of the Chilcheonryang naval battle. This critical defeat gave the fall of the Namwon Fortress by the Japanese and desired the help of the Chinese help.
The Joseon government appointed Yi again to the Admiral, and asked him rearrange the naval forces. Yi was already studying the harsh naval situations while Baekuijonggun (白衣從軍, still serving military service without position) at Chogye Gyeongsang-do Province. As soon as he appointed to the Admiral, he speeded up to reinforce the naval forces of Joseon. Getting to the destination of the navy camp of three provincial inclusive, he passed via Sunchoen, Boseong to Hyoryeong-pho and he prepared the experts and supplies for battles. As the result, Joseon Navy forces faced the battle at the Myeongryang Strait with only 13 warships against the enemy and defeated it. This battle made a reason to drag the enemy not to move up to the northern part of Joseon.
After the Myeongryang naval battle, Joseon navy force moved the base camp to Goha and Gogeum island and concentrated to reinforce the navy power. Fled Korean refugees on ships gave much help developing Joseon's naval power. Since supplies from the government of Joseon was hard to be supported, crops, cloths, and other military raw supplies of the ordinary civilians became the major reason to cope the risk. Also, materials of making ships were many around South sea shores and this made easy to build the war ships as long as the civilians gave a lot help for that. While staying at Gogeum island, the reinforced navy was first opened at Goha island and they got 60 warships and 7,000 people ready to face battles and the troops could lead the allied force with the Ming, China.
The allied force of Joseon and the Ming, China established a huge strategy, Sarobyeongjin-strategy (四路竝進作戰, 4high-way strategy to block the Japanese troops) to attack the Japanese troops. This time the strategy of adding the gateway lines for sea ways has especially prepared 3 lines more. Now, the allied forces with the both navy forces Joseon and Chinese troops under the general, Jin Rin(陳璘) are opened at Gogeum island by July.
The strategy, Sarobyeongjin-strategy of the allied Joseon and Ming troops operated from the late September until the early October. However, this strategy had been eliminated in fail due to the Ming troops negative assistance to win the battles as well as the misreading strategies of the Ming’s towards one of the three ways and very much fortified of Japanese fortresses.
Now the war condition totally changed as Toyotomi Hideyosi died on 18, August 1598. The four Dimyos(四大老) disguised his soldiers Toyotomi's death and ordered his troops to retreat. Here, the allied forces appeared to defeat the retreating enemies. The allied troops on western way and sea way only attacked Gonishi’s troops at Suncheon Fortress. Gonishi gave bribes to the Ming generals, Yu Jung(劉綎) and Jin Rin and they allowed the enemy to retreat, but not the Admiral Yi Sunsin agreed them retreated. By the promise to retreat by the Ming generals broke up, Gonishi group had to ask the help the troops at Sacheon Fortress.
Admiral, Yi gave his strategy idea to block the sea way of Noryang(露梁) Strait prior to the rescue troops arriving, and Joseon Navy Force arrived at Noryang on very late night of 18, November. Noryang naval battle started very early morning of 19, November, and this battle was the allied forces of Joseon and Ming to the enemy with the rescue troops of Japanese. The allied forces of Joseon and Ming read the wind coming and used firing arrows tactics, and the battle was mainly severe around Gwaneum-pho(觀音浦) inlet. This early morning battle ended a great victory of the allied forces of Joseon and Ming. Hereby, the battles of Jungyujaeran were over, the whole Imjin War ended.
After the war, Joseon Navy had to reinforce exhausted the naval condition while defending the sea. The Navy was preparing the future attack of the enemy on the sea. The core mean of facing the enemy was the Naval Forces itself.
Now, Admiral Yi's reputation in the government of Joseon started being affirmative. Particularly, the Ming generals towards Yi was even apparent. This proves how much Yi and the Josoen Navy Force gave most effort for the war conditions.
Joseon government carried on defending the enemy by the naval force mainly, however, it had totally in sufficient man-power in rowers and general soldiers, so for this, the government gave much improved welfare of the rowers. If the rowers who tried to resign the position, the government tried to control them issuing the pass documents.
The government also gave effort to secure warships and weapons. There were 60 warships called the ship of a house on deck in 1598, and the volume of them was 80 around 1600 years, but 30 of them were broken due to the typhoon in the same year. It gave much effort to build the warships, however, the number of warship was around 80 only in 1609 years. The navy was reorganized. The task force position, the three provinces commander on sea, set up as permanent position. The rapidly decreased navy was also reorganized. One of the sufficient effort of the government defending on sea was Gyeongsang Province navy's front line role. The force of Jeonlla and Chungcheong Province was distributed to Busan and Geoje where were indicated to be invaded.
Josoen's Navy was in poor condition, but they concentrated to defend on seas, especially Busan and Geoje. When sometimes the vessels of enemy came close to Joseon's area, and captured them to read what Japan was planning to. These use of Joseon's Naval Force was very much suitable plans. The reinforced navy could made during Jungyujaeran resulted to have applicable power. The man-power and war supplies were totally depleted, however, the Navy had to defend on sea was Joseon Navy's crucial task along with reinforcing the troops.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 서론 1
• 1. 연구 동향 1
• 2. 연구 방향 8
• Ⅱ. 정유재란 이전의 수군 조직과 방어체제 13
• 1. 수군의 조직과 구성 13
• 1) 수군의 조직 13
• 2) 전투 구성원 24
• 2. 수군의 전력과 방어체제 35
• 1) 전선과 무기 35
• 2) 전술과 방어체제 46
• Ⅲ. 정유재란 초기의 수군 운용과 해전 53
• 1. 일본군의 재침과 대응책 53
• 1) 일본군의 재침 53
• 2) 조정의 수군 운용책 59
• 2. 정유재란 초기 해전의 전개 66
• 1) 기문포해전 66
• 2) 안골포‧가덕도해전 69
• 3) 절영도 외양해전 76
• 3. 칠천량해전의 경과와 패배 원인 81
• 1) 해전의 경과 81
• 2) 조선 수군의 패배 원인 87
• Ⅳ. 칠천량해전 이후의 수군 정비와 명량해전 93
• 1. 통제사의 교체와 군비체계 정비 93
• 1) 통제사의 교체와 병력 확충 93
• 2) 군비체계의 정비 101
• 2. 명량해전의 전황과 수군 전술 106
• 1) 명량해전의 경과 106
• 2) 수군의 전술과 승리 요인 116
• 3. 명량해전 직후의 수군 운용 122
• 1) 해전의 영향과 의미 122
• 2) 해전 직후의 수군 운용 126
• Ⅴ. 수군의 재건과 조명연합작전 132
• 1. 수군의 재건 노력과 수군력의 증대 132
• 1) 수군 병력의 확충 132
• 2) 전선 건조와 군수물자의 확보 137
• 3) 수군 재건의 성과 146
• 2. 일본군의 정황과 명 수군의 참전 149
• 1) 일본군의 정황과 도산성 전투 149
• 2) 명 수군의 참전과 조명연합함대의 형성 154
• 3. 조명연합군의 전술과 작전 수행 163
• 1) 사로병진작전의 전개 163
• 2) 예교성 수륙합공전의 수행 170
• Ⅵ. 노량해전과 종전 후의 수군 운용 177
• 1. 일본군의 철군 계획과 노량해전 177
• 1) 일본군의 철군 계획 177
• 2) 노량해전의 경과와 의미 181
• 2. 종전과 수군에 대한 평가 192
• 1) 수군 활동에 대한 평가 193
• 2) 수군력의 실상과 확보 대책 198
• 3. 수군 조직의 재편과 운용책의 변화 205
• 1) 수군진의 재편과 방어체제의 변화 205
• 2) 수군 운용의 한계 212
• Ⅶ. 결론 217
• 【별표】정유재란 시기의 주요 사건과 조선 수군 활동표 224
• 참고 문헌 229
• Abstract 247