북한의 先軍외교 연구 : 약소국의 對美 강압외교 관점에서 = (A) study on North Korea's military-first diplomacy : from the perspective of a small-weak state's coercive diplomacy toward the US

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This dissertation attempts to create a theoretical strategy model about North Korea’s military-first diplomacy that was displayed during North Korea’s nuclear crisis and negotiation that followed. This model was verified by applying it to North Korea’s strategic behavior patterns during the first and second North Korean nuclear crisis. The following is the findings from the study.
The military-first diplomacy, which is North Korea’s basic diplomatic strategy toward the US, is essentially the coercive diplomatic strategy represented by asymmetric deterrence and compellence. In other words, it can be defined as a kind of coercive strategy to develop and mobilize each and every military resource available, including asymmetrical weapons like nuclear arms and ballistic missiles, in order to deter the US threats against North Korea on the one hand, and to force the US to engage in diplomacy and negotiations with North Korea on improving relations on the other. In theoretical views, the military-first diplomacy is assessed to be a type of a non-conforming and confrontational diplomatic policy which small-weak states tend to employ against the powers when small-weak states approach powerful states to forge diplomatic ties without giving up their absolute autonomy. It is also a representative example of foreign policies “rogue states” employ in seeking to coexist with the hegemonic powers they are in conflict with.
North Korea moved away from the diplomatic behavior of “balancing” and “bandwagoning” which small-weak states generally displayed toward the powers and chose the coercive military-first diplomacy due to the change in the international order in the post-cold war era and structural characteristics of the US-North Korea relationship. In order to break out of the diplomatic isolation and overcome the security crisis that followed the end of the cold war, North Korea had to approach the US and improve relations with it. However, during the cold war era, the US-North Korea relationship was structured as ① hostile relationship between enemy states ② relationship a small-weak states and a powerful state ③ relationship between states with heterogeneous political/economic/social/cultural systems ④ trilateral relationship between South Korea, US, and North Korea in which South Korea, as a US ally, should be considered as an alternative regime to North Korea. Due to these characteristics of US-North Korea relations, the US adopted a policy of indifference, ignorance and hostility toward North Korea, which acted as obstacles for North Korea to approach the US. To accomplish the two goals of holding on to its national identity of “Self-reliance” and “Suryongje”(首領制) and successful approach to the US, North Korea was required to deter the threats posed by the US’s hostile policy toward North Korea, and at the same time overcome the US policy of indifference and ignorance to force improvement of US-North Korea ties. So, on the whole, a diplomatic strategy that would forcibly change the US attitude toward North Korea was needed. This is why North Korea came up with the military-first diplomacy based on its military resources such as nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as a means to forcefully induce the US to change its attitude toward North Korea.
North Korea showed the same strategic pattern of behaviors in the process of diplomacy and negotiations with the US both during the first(Mar. 1993 - Oct. 1994) and second North Korean nuclear crisis(Oct. 2002- Feb. 2007), even though the latter came ten years after the former. This is the “asymmetric deterrent and compellent coercive diplomatic strategy” or the military-first diplomatic strategy. In the course of the nuclear crisis and negotiations, the military-first diplomacy was carried out by the sequential sub-process of implementation which consists of the strategies of the “Reputation effect and Keeping Obscurity → Brinkmanship → Tit for tat → Crisis management → North Korea-US bilateral negotiation → Comprehensive package deal → Fundamental issue card → Concurrent action by steps”. In this paper, this strategic process is viewed as the basic working mechcanism of the military-first diplomacy and is set as a theoretical model for military-first diplomatic strategy.
The strategy of“Reputation effects” can be found both in the first and second nuclear crisis. However, The strategy was more distinctive during the second crisis because North Korea, in that period, focused more on the “honoring its commitment” aspect where it had given warning of its threat in advance and was committed to carrying out the threat as stated.
The strategy of Keeping Obscurity was employed in both crises by displaying and hiding its nuclear capacity at the same time, so that confusion was created over its claim of possessing nuclear capacity. In the second crisis, however, North Korea gave more weight to the ‘displaying’ than ‘hiding’ side so that it even reached a point of“confessing possession of the nuclear program”. This is because not only did North Korea come to have diverse playing cards of‘the past nuclear’,‘the future nuclear’, ‘the current nuclear’of plutonium reprocessed since 2003, and the uranium enrichment program(UEP), but North Korea went as far as to utilized it as an offensive toward the US hard-line policy against North Korea.
Due to North Korea’s strategy of confessing the possession of nuclear weapons, inevitably followed by showing off its nuclear capability, Brinkmanship and Tit for tat North Korea took in the second crisis became more offensive and resolute than those in the first crisis. In other words, while North Korea in the first crisis took the actions of “the withdrawal from the NPT → removal of nuclear fuel rods and withdrawal from the IAEA”, North Korea in the second crisis went much further to the “withdrawal from the NPT and resumption of 5MWe reactor → reprocessing spent fuel rods → disclosing the nuclear deterrent(weapon-grade plutonium) → declaring the possession of nuclear capability → taking extreme measures(test-fire of missiles, a delivery means for nuclear weapons) → taking extreme physical measures(nuclear test) → warning of a series of physical measures”.
In the aspect of crisis management strategy, North Korea showed the similar behavior patterns in both crises. North Korea played the public opinion game through conveying hard-line and moderate signals, attempted to mediate the situation by official, non-official diplomatic visits, and explored an agreement with the US by utilizing behind-the-scenes-channels. Yet North Korea came up with more systematic external propaganda and announcement activities during the second nuclear standoff in order to manage the crisis situation and the negotiation. In pursuing its strategy to create a pro-North Korea atmosphere, North Korea fixed multiple targets, including the international public opinions, the Six Party Talks participants and US moderates, and attempted to isolate the US administration from those groups.
In both the first and second nuclear crisis, North Korea pursued the same negotiation strategy patterns namely the US-North Korea bilateral negotiation, comprehensive package deal, fundamental issues card, and concurrent action by steps. In its basic access to the nuclear negotiation, North Korea persistently sought bilateral negotiation with the US. During the first nuclear crisis, because of the US’s moderated attitude toward North Korea, North Korea was able to have bilateral talks with the US while effectively excluding multilateral factors such as the IAEA and South Korea. During the second nuclear standoff, however, North Korea accepted the six-party framework due to the US’s stiff attitude and preference for multilateral negotiation. However, North Korea stood fast in its strategic action to pursue bilateral negotiation with the US and managed the Talk with US-North Korea bilateral negotiation in real by using China and Russia as mediators.
Furthermore, in the first and second nuclear negotiation, North Korea insisted on a comprehensive package deal for agenda setting and the settlement of the nuclear issue. In particular, during the second nuclear negotiation, North Korea took the initiative in systematically presenting to the US its comprehensive package deal based upon the package deal of the first nuclear negotiation which North Korea wanted to restore.
Also, playing the fundamental issue card, North Korea created tensions throughout the negotiation with view to changing the phase and terrain of the negotiation, controlled the tempo and rhythm by tightening and releasing tension of the negotiation and took the initiative by simplifying and concentrating the negotiation agenda. For instance, the fundamental issue card at the time of the first nuclear crisis was the provision of a light-water reactor, and at the second negotiation, the fundamental issue cards were agreement on non-aggression, and provision of a light-water reactor and ‘Banko Delta Asia’ issue. Regarding the use of negotiation cards, North Korea clearly presented its ‘threats card’ to the US on the grounds of commitment strategy that it will ‘do as it says’ during the second nuclear negotiation. Not only that, North Korea also clearly presented ‘concessions card’ in order to show off its will to settle the nuclear issue through negotiation during the second nuclear negotiation. The clear use of these threats and concessions cards is among the most notable behaviors during the second nuclear negotiation. It suggests that North Korea was followed a premeditated path in dealing with the US.
Lastly, North Korea executed the strategic action of ‘Concurrent action by steps’ during the first and second nuclear negotiations. In particular, during the second nuclear negotiation, it segmented the implementation process from the previous 2 steps of “freeze for compensation → nuclear dismantlement for normalization of US-North Korea relations” to 4 steps of “declaration(word for word) → freeze → disablement → abandonment”. North Korea’s such behavior of emphasizing gradual and simultaneous actions is intended to carefully make progress in negotiations with a deep suspicion toward the US and at the same time to receive compensation in each step. While applying the same military-first diplomatic strategy toward the US during the first and second nuclear crises and negotiations, North Korea’s response during the second nuclear crisis was more firm, aggressive, and systematic. It seems that North Korea has learned how to deal with the US from the experience of the first nuclear crisis.
However, North Korea will not be able to overcome the ‘dilemma of a small-weak state to keep the national security and absolute autonomy simultaneously’ and the ‘security dilemma’ in Northeast Asia with only the military-first diplomacy. In addition, it will not be able to form “cooperative diplomatic relations” with neighboring states necessary for its economic development. The military-first diplomacy that pursues regime survival and absolute autonomy at the same time is for a powerful state, not for a small-weak state like North Korea. If North Korea continues with such a strategy, it will have to face a paradoxical situation in which North Korea’s political, economic, and social interests are undermined and its capacity for regime survival and growth potential diminishes.
Also, if it keeps on strengthening its military power to strengthen its diplomatic power, it may unintentionally trigger an arms race in the region as neighboring countries will face a security dilemma. If such an arms race were to start and heat up, it may drive North Korea into regime collapse, for it does not have a strong economy. Finally, since the military-first diplomacy is a form of a hostile and confrontational strategy, it cannot be applied to a country that seeks cooperative relations with North Korea. If North Korea were to use this policy toward a cooperative country, the neighboring countries will avoid North Korea, and North Korea will in fact come under siege. Such limits of the military-first diplomacy will be more evident when the focus is shifted from regime security and maintenance to economic and regime development. Therefore, the military-first diplomacy can not be an eternal strategy. North Korea will have to change and ease its military-first diplomatic strategy in trying to improve relations with the US.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 제1장 서론 = 1
• 제1절 연구목적 = 1
• 제2절 이론적 배경과 선행연구 검토 = 8
• 1. 약소국의 대강대국 외교유형 논의 = 8
• 2. 북한의 대미 강압외교 논의 = 22
• 3. 선군외교의 전략과 협상방식 논의 = 28
• 제3절 연구 범위와 방법 및 논문 구성 = 33
• 1. 연구 범위와 방법 = 33
• 2. 논문의 구성 = 34
• 제2장 선군외교의 환경적 요인과 전략모델 = 37
• 제1절 선군외교의 환경적 요인 = 37
• 1. 탈냉전이후 국제질서의 변화 = 37
• 2. 북미관계의 구조적 특징 = 43
• 3. 북한내 체제위기 요인 = 67
• 제2절 선군외교 전략모델 = 86
• 1. 선군외교의 형성과 의미 = 86
• 2. 선군외교의 구조와 작동조건 = 95
• 3. 선군외교의 전략 = 108
• 4. 협상국면하의 행동방식 = 125
• 제3장 제1차 북핵위기와 선군외교의 등장 = 138
• 제1절 제1차 북핵위기의 발생과 전개과정 = 138
• 제2절 선군외교 전략의 등장 = 162
• 제3절 협상국면하의 행동방식 = 175
• 제4장 제2차 북핵위기와 선군외교의 발전 = 193
• 제1절 제2차 북핵위기의 발생과 전개과정 = 193
• 제2절 선군외교 전략의 발전 = 233
• 제3절 협상국면하의 행동방식 = 252
• 제5장 결론 = 276
• 제1절 선군외교 전략모델의 적실성 = 276
• 제2절 북한 선군외교의 전망 = 288
• 참고문헌 = 304
• ABSTRACT = 332
• 북한 핵문제 주요일지 = 340