동북아시아 철기문화의 전개와 限冶供鐵정책

김도영 한국고고학회 2015 한국고고학보 Vol.94 No.-

The objective of this paper is to interpret the phenomenon of the emergenceof iron in China, its development in the Korean Peninsula, and its spread (viathe peninsula) to the Japanese Archipelago from the perspective of technologicalcontrol, rather than the dissemination of technology. First, the Warring States ironware which appeared in the Korean Peninsulaand the Japanese Archipelago prior to the advent of iron production in boththese regions is presumed to be related to Emperor Wu of Han(漢武帝)’s ‘saltand iron monopoly system’. This can be understood in the same context asthat of the ‘limiting steel production technology and providing ironware’ policywhich pursued economic interest through the distribution of ironware and thecontrol of iron production technology. Namely, the Warring States or Han ironware which appeared in both theKorean Peninsula and the Japanese Archipelago had been produced and soldby the Chinese government, with its advanced technology; the intention was tofulfill multiple purposes, such as economic benefit, protection of its commercialsupremacy, and the containment of the surrounding forces. In order for thesuccessful execution of this policy, they had to prevent steel technology frombeing leaked. However, due to the establishment of the Lelang Commandery andthe geographical condition in which the Chinese continent and the KoreanPeninsula are linked by land, iron came to be produced even in the easternzone of the Korean Peninsula and the ‘limiting steel production technology andproviding ironware’ policy of the Chinese government was soon discarded. 동북아시아 철기문화의 전개와 限冶供鐵정책 | 69Subsequently, the political powers of the Korean Peninsula, such asGoguryeo, Baekje, Silla and Gaya, which grew based on iron production,also implemented the ‘limiting steel production technology and providingironware’ policy against the Japanese. A number of iron artifacts dating to the4th-5th century, when iron production had yet to take place in the JapaneseArchipelago, have been found, such as iron nails, the seven-branched swordand iron shields. These artifacts illustrate the intentions of the Three Kingdomsto restrain Japanese forces using iron, but without leaking the technology of ironproduction. In the middle of the 6th century, the iron production technology of theKorean Peninsula found its way to the Japanese Archipelago, resulting inthe Japanese production of iron. As a result, the ‘limiting steel productiontechnology and providing ironware’ policy, which had been in existence inEast Asia for 900 years, finally disappeared. The 20 iron nails delivered fromJapan to Baekje in the first year of Emperor Kogyoku’s reign (642 CE) marksthe beginning of Japnese iron production and the extinction the ‘limiting steelproduction technology and providing ironware’ policy.

21세기 과학기술법의 과제

손경한,박진아 法務部 商事法務課 2007 선진상사법률연구 Vol.- No.37

21세기 지식정보사회는 이미 인간사회와 생활의 중추적 요소로 자리 잡은 과학기술의 사회적 함의를 정확하게 이해함으로써 법제도와 과학기술간의 상관관계에 관한 끊임없는 성찰이 필요한 시대라 할 것이다. 이러한 관점에서 발전하는 과학기술을 위축시키지 않으면서 어떻게 부작용 없이 법제도로 수용할 것인가를 검토하여 과학기술을 십이분 이용하는 법제의 연구가 필요하다하겠다. 본고에서는 먼저 과학기술과 사회 및 법 간의 관계와 과학기술법의 개념과 범위에 대하여 고찰한 후, 과학기술법이 해결하여야 할 과제로서 다음에 대하여 살펴보았다. 첫째, 인간복제, 휴먼로봇, 사이버인간과 같이 인간의 존엄성에 도전하는 과학기술에 대응하여 인간의 존엄과 가치를 지키는 법제도로서 생명윤리에 관한 법제도, 휴먼로봇의 통제를 위한 법제도, 사이버인격에 관한 법제도에 대하여 살펴보았다. 둘째, 정보통신기술의 발전으로 개인정보와 프라이버시(privacy)가 침해되기 쉬운 상황이 도래하였는바 이에 대응하여 프라이버시권보호법제와 사적정보보호법제에 대하여 살펴보았다. 특히 정보통신기술과 생명공학기술 등 여러 첨단기술들이 결합되면서 사적정보가 공유되어 발생하는 사적정보의 침해문제에 대한 법적 대응방안을 마련하는 것도 앞으로의 큰 과제임을 언급하였다. 셋째, 원자력에너지와 화학물질의 개발과 유전공학의 발달 등으로 인간의 건강과 안전에 대한 위협의 증가에 대응하여 인간의 건강과 안전을 지키는 법제도로서 위험기술이용을 통제하고 위험의 제거와 감소를 위한 법제도, 환경보호기술법제가 필요함을 들었다. 넷째, 과학기술사회에 진입하면서 전통적인 지적재산권제도가 커다란 위기에 직면하고 있는바 지적재산권을 적절히 보호하는 법제도를 마련하기 위한 과제를 고찰하였다. 그 밖에도 기술표준화와 독점의 통제, 과학기술법의 세계화에 관하여도 간략하게 살펴보았다. We live in the 'Society of Knowledge and Information' of the 21st century. Such society requires we accurately understand the social import of the science and technology that became one of important factors of human society and life and then we deliberate on a correlation between the legal system and the science and technology continuatively. The purpose of this paper is to review a correlation between the science and technology and the law, to consider a definition and the scope of the law of science and technology and to explore its challenges in the 21st century as follows: First, the authors carefully considered those legal problems for protecting the dignity and the value of human beings from the threats of science and technology with respect to the human cloning, the human-shaped robots, and the identity problem of human beings in the cyberspace, etc. These legal tasks are concerned with the life ethics, the control of human-shaped robots and the personality in the cyberspace. Secondly, we now live in an era when the Information Technology has so developed that one's personal information and the privacy rights can easily be infringed. Faced with those threats, the authors gave a careful consideration on the legislations to protect the personal information and the privacy rights. Thirdly, the developments of the nuclear power, new chemical compounds alien to humans, and the genetic engineering have been threats to the health and the safety of human beings. As an effort to find a solution to overcome such problems, the authors suggest, as a future task for all of us, to enact laws to control the use of dangerous technologies, thereby decreasing or hopefully, utterly removing such threats, and to develop environment-protective technologies. Fourthly, because as we are entering into the society of the new science and technology, the existing intellectual property laws are confronted with a crucial moment of challenges, the authors propose to establish a new intellectual property protection system, rather than merely amending the existing intellectual property system. Finally, the authors reviewed conceivable legal problems regarding the technology standardization, the regulation on the monopoly as well as the globalization of the law of science and technology.

미국 항공군사기술의 독점적 주도와 기술표준화에 대한 연구 - NATO와 일본의 사례를 중심으로 -

이재인 ( Jae-in Lee ),이민호 ( Min-ho Lee ),김성현 ( Sung-hyun Kim ),배종윤 ( Jong-yun Bae ) 연세대학교 통일연구원 2018 통일연구 Vol.22 No.2

본 연구는 세계 최고의 독자적인 군사기술과 군사무기체계를 보유하고 있는 미국이 군수품이나 첨단무기의 완성품을 판매하는 경우와 달리, 첨단 군사기술의 경우에는 판매나 이전 또는 수출통제에 대한 결정이 지속되는 것이 아니라 상황에 따라 변화한다는점에 주목하였고, 이를 설명할 수 있는 요인을 검토하였다. 군사안보적 이유나 경제적 이익, 또는 정치적 이해관계 등과 관련한 요인으로는 완성품의 판매나 군사기술 이전 여부 등을 결정한 배경을 설명하는 데에는 유익하였으나, 미국의 결정이 변화하는 패턴이나 양상에 대해서는 적절한 설명을 제공해 주지 못하는 점을 확인하였다. 이와 관련하여, 본 연구는 재래식 무기에 있어 미국이 결정하는 군사기술의 이전 또는 판매나 수출통제에 대한 내용이 변화하는 양상을 설명하기 위하여, 국제사회에서 군사기술적 측면에서의 독점적 위상 확보와 기술표준화의 주도라는 미국의 전략적 가치에 주목하면서, 핵심 군사기술의 발전 및 기술주기를 단계별로 분류하여, 미국의 차별적인 전술적 대응에 따른 입장변화의 양상을 분석하였다. 그리고 군사기술의 진화 단계에 따라 세대별 구분이 상대적으로 분명한 전투항공기의 사례들을 중심으로 군사기술 이전 또는 수출통제에 대한 미국의 입장 변화 추이를 분석하였고, 유사한 결과는 다자간 관계인 NATO의 사례와 양자간 관계인 일본의 사례에서 공통적으로 확인할 수 있었다. This research examines the determining factor of licensing United States military technology transfers. Currently, the U.S. undisputedly holds the world’s most advanced military technologies and weapon systems. Contrary to a rather consistent behavior in licensing exports of off-the-shelf, the case for licensing transfers of advanced military technologies tends to vary greatly from time to time. Although security, economic and political factors are useful in explaining the motivation to license arms and technology transfers, these factors alone cannot provide an appropriate explanation of the changing pattern of U.S. decision-making concerning military technology transfers. To address this limitation, the international monopoly and the global standardization of advanced military technology are utilized as the main factor in explaining its changing pattern. Specifically, technology development and cycle are divided into four stages. In each stage, the U.S. shows varying strategies. The changing pattern is analyzed based on generations of fighter aircrafts which are relatively clearly defined. The resulting analysis reveals similar patterns in bilateral and multilateral relationships with NATO and Japan.

플랫폼의 “양자택일” 행위에 대한 중국법의 규제 - 반독점법을 중심으로

이윤미 서울대학교 기술과법센터 2022 Law & technology Vol.18 No.2

Thanks to the support and encouragement of the Chinese government over the past decade, China’s platform economy has made rapid progress. However, as some large-scale big-tech companies grew into super-platforms, they formed a structure that dominated the market and their behaviors of “choose between two” became widespread. On February 7, 2021, the competition authorities promulgated the <Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on the Platform Economy of the Anti-Monopoly Committee>, which ended the era of unlimited policy support for Chinese platform companies and entered an era of strong management supervision. The platform’s forced act of “choosing between two” is currently receiving the most attention among the platform's anti-competitive acts, and three routines are currently being used simultaneously in China to regulate this. The first is legislation, and the second routine is the strong administrative punishment of competition authorities. In addition, China is actively applying the means of corporate interviews to suit the characteristics of its social system. These measures have sufficiently shown the attitude of competition authorities and serve as a preventive and warning to other platform companies. There are still problems to be solved, for example, whether to view each side as a separate market or a unified market in defining related markets in a two-sided market (multi-market) formed by platform is the first problem. In addition, legislation is inconsistent in the analysis method, creating confusion in the enforcement law in practice. Then, there are still many difficulties in determining the platform’s dominant market position, and due to the confidentiality and technology of some “Choose between two” actions adopted by the platform, there will be many difficulties in proving them and obtaining damages.

Equilibrium Analysis of a Two-Sided Market with Multiple Platforms of Monopoly Provider

( Do Hoon Kim ) 정보통신정책학회 2012 정보통신정책연구 Vol.19 No.3

In this paper, we consider a single monopoly platform provider which operates both platforms: an old and a new platform. These two platforms connect the user group with the suppliers, thereby leveraging the indirect network externalities in a two-sided market. We also incorporate a cross-platform externality which represents a potential backward compatibility of the new platform: i.e., users joining the new platform can also enjoy the products and services provided by suppliers using the old platform. Users and suppliers are uniformly populated over [0, 1] interval as in the Hotelling model, and play a subscription game to choose (exactly) one platform. The platform determines the pricing profile for the supplier market, and users and suppliers respond to the pricing profile. Our basic analysis for static equilibrium indicates that it is very unlikely that an interior equilibrium is stable. Furthermore, some specific types of boundary equilibriums, where at least one market side tips to a single platform, are stable under certain conditions. We also present a dynamic decision model of the platform provider, which tries to maneuver the markets toward a target state by controlling price profiles. Our analytical results from the optimal control theory assert that a bang-bang control with subsidization for a specific platform eventually leads the market to the corresponding boundary equilibrium. The cross-platform externality plays an important role for a co-existence of competing platforms under a certain condition.

중소·중견 기업 기술탈취 방지를 위한 손해배상소송의 실효성 확보방안

최승재 한국지식재산연구원 2015 지식재산연구 Vol.10 No.2

중소·중견 기업 기술탈취 방지방안은 지속적으로 논의되는 과제로서, 지금까지의 문제의 해법은 주로 공정거래위원회를 통한 방지였다. 실제 기술탈취에서 대해서는 공정거래위원회의 소관법령인 하도급공정화법에 기술탈취에 대한 규정을두고 우리나라 입법사상 최초로 손해배상액 가중제도(소위 3배 배상)가 도입되어제재가 강화되었다. 하지만 실제 제35조가 활용되는 경우는 보고된 바 없다. 그리고 중소기업법제의 일환으로 2014년에는 중소기업기술보호법이 제정되었다. 그러나 이런 3배 배상까지 규정한 입법에도 불구하고 여전히 기술탈취 문제에 대한 근본적인 해결은 되지 않고 있다. 기술탈취 문제에 대한 근본적인 해결책의 모색하여야 할 시점이다. 기술탈취 문제는 그 대상이 되는 기술에 대한 논의 없이 이루어지고 있다는점이 문제의 출발점이다. 중소기업의 기술은 특허권에 의하여 보호되는 기술과 영업비밀에 의해서 보호되는 기술로 크게 대별할 수 있다. 만일 특허, 영업비밀 등에 대한 보호법제가 제대로 작동한다면, 지금 논의되고 있는 것과 같은 중소기업의 기술탈취라는 주제가 사회적으로 문제시 되지는 않을 것이다. 우리 특허법이나영업비밀보호법제의 기본적인 문제는 실손해(實損害)의 배상도 이루어지지 않는다는 점이다. 이런 상황에서 중소기업은 특허권이나 법상 보호되는 영업비밀을 침해당해도 거래단절을 감수하면서 소를 제기하는 등의 방식으로 구제를 도모하기 어렵다. 이런 점에서 기술탈취 문제는 기본적으로 특허법이나 영업비밀보호법 등에의한 보호가 제대로 이루어지고 있지 않아서 발생하는 문제이다. 그러므로 중소· 중견 기업 기술탈취 방지방안의 기본은 기술탈취의 대상이 되는 특허나 영업비밀등을 본래적으로 보호하기 위한 손해배상소송을 실효화하는 것이다. 따라서 중소·중견 기업 기술탈취 문제를 해결하기 위해서 특허법, 영업비밀보호법 등 지식재산법제에 현재의 과소배상 문제를 해결하기 위한 하도급공정화법의 규정과 같은 손해배상액 증액조항을 개정하여 손해배상액을 높일 수 있는 방안을 강구하여야 한다. In dealing with the issue of IP(including the patent(s), Trade Secret, Know-how but not limited to these type of intangible rights) usurpation by the market dominant companies or such companies with inarguably higher bargaining power, Korean Fair Trade Commission and Small and Medium Business Administration, that is Bureau of the Small and Medium sized Enterprise(SME), have been working as a police to monitor, admonish and punish any sort of unfair business practices of this type. However their performance is not that very noticeable and its role is also very limited up to now. Korea’s first treble damage act was introduced for the protection of the Subcontractors to this effect. However no case has been reported yet. Now is the time to come up with a fundamental solution to technology usurpation. The problem of technology usurpation starts with the fact the problem is being dealt with while technology itself, the object of the problem, is hardly discussed. technology of SME is largely divided into one category protected by Patent and another category covered by Trade secret. If Patent and Trade secret system operates properly, above-mentioned technology usurpation would not have been as problematic as the one at the moment. with regard to this, the underlying problem of Patent and Trade secret system of Korea lies in the statutory structure where an actual damage could barely be compensated to right holders. Patent litigations usually take such a long time, 10 years sometimes, in conjunction with lots of costs associated with the actions. However the amount of final damage awarded to patent holders by Korean courts is far lower than that of United States. This suggests that any actions brought by the Small and Medium Sized Company will not be an effective tool for the protection of the Intellectual Properties of the Small and Medium Sized Companies when their IP is infringed or allegedly infringed whatever case it may be. In some cases, they may be threatened that their contract with the fringer will be terminated once their action would be made, which makes it difficult for SMEs to pursue any legal actions such as filing litigations against infringer(s). Therefore, the usage of the technologies of the Small and Medium Sized Company not paying any compensation in essence has to be regulated by the Patent Act. In order for the Patent Act to work for this purpose, the economic analysis done in this article has to be contemplated and Punitive Damage or Enhanced Damage mechanism is to be seriously discussed to solve the IP usurpation problem we have especially between the large and the small and medium sized company.

R&D Technology Choice in Durable Goods Monopoly

Jong-Hee Hahn,Seongmin Kim 한국계량경제학회 2013 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS Vol.24 No.2

This paper examines a durable-good monopolist's R&D decision in new product development. We show that the monopolist without commitment faces a time inconsistency problem concerning the choice of research technology, and as a result ends up choosing a safer research project and investing less than the commitment solution. This implies more frequent but smaller quality improvements in durable-good markets. It is shown that the time inconsistency problem in fact serves to increase social welfare by inducing the firm to choose a socially optimal research project.

R&D Technology Choice in Durable Goods Monopoly

한종희,Seongmin Kim 한국계량경제학회 2013 계량경제학보 Vol.24 No.2

This paper examines a durable-good monopolist’s R&D decision in new product development. We show that the monopolist without commitment faces a time inconsistency problem concerning the choice of research technology,and as a result ends up choosing a safer research project and investing less than the commitment solution. This implies more frequent but smaller quality improvements in durable-good markets. It is shown that the time inconsistency problem in fact serves to increase social welfare by inducing the firm to choose a socially optimal research project.

专利技术并购中的垄断问题及对策

吕明瑜,杜晓丽 전북대학교 동북아법연구소 2016 동북아법연구 Vol.10 No.2

Equilibrium Analysis of a Two-Sided Market with Multiple Platforms of Monopoly Provider

김도훈 정보통신정책학회 2012 정보통신정책연구 Vol.19 No.3

In this paper, we consider a single monopoly platform provider which operates both platforms: an old and a new platform. These two platforms connect the user group with the suppliers, thereby leveraging the indirect network externalities in a two-sided market. We also incorporate a cross-platform externality which represents a potential backward compatibility of the new platform: i.e., users joining the new platform can also enjoy the products and services provided by suppliers using the old platform. Users and suppliers are uniformly populated over [0, 1] interval as in the Hotelling model, and play a subscription game to choose (exactly) one platform. The platform determines the pricing profile for the supplier market, and users and suppliers respond to the pricing profile. Our basic analysis for static equilibrium indicates that it is very unlikely that an interior equilibrium is stable. Furthermore, some specific types of boundary equilibriums, where at least one market side tips to a single platform, are stable under certain conditions. We also present a dynamic decision model of the platform provider, which tries to maneuver the markets toward a target state by controlling price profiles. Our analytical results from the optimal control theory assert that a bang-bang control with subsidization for a specific platform eventually leads the market to the corresponding boundary equilibrium. The cross-platform externality plays an important role for a co-existence of competing platforms under a certain condition.