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朴柱璜 全北大學校 法政大學 極東問題硏究所 1974 극동논총 Vol.2 No.-
In this thesis, the Soviet role in the process of the sovietization of China after the failure of Christianity to revolutionize and regenerate China and after Sun Yat-sen's. Alliance with Soviet Russia is examined from various angles. It must be recognized that Christianity and the missions accomplished many things in China, though not the thing they most desired to do. They broke into the closed world of Confucian learning, and sowed there the seeds of scientific knowledge, of westrn poltical thought, and of western economic theory. They started the first hospitals in China, and the whole Chinese medical profession owes, its origin to their teaching. They opened the Chinese mind to the consideration, though not in this case to the acceptance, of a different ideology, an alien but yet ancient orthodoxy which China had ignored. The Christian missons, staffed men of different sects and various nationalities, showed that it was possible to have a world-wide faith, a system of values which was applicable in many countries. All these were new ideas to the Chinese. It may be said that Christianity stormed first into the breach in the Confucian citadel : it was repelled and overcome; and on its back the ultimate victor, Communism, mounted to the assault. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's alliance with Russia marked the entry of Soviet influence into China's politics and provided the Chinese Communists with an opportunity for development. In view of the circumstances under which the alliance was concluded, there is no reason to believe that Sun could have done otherwise. Frustrated in the Chinese revolution and ignored by the West, Sun was impressed not only by the Soviet regime's achievement, but also by its readiness to help China on the basis of full equality. The decision to ally himself with Russia was one of the political necessity, a move to save his revolutionary work from bankruptcy. To the Russians, the Chinese revolution was a part of the world revolution, and cooperation with the K.M.T. could pave the way for eventual victory of Communism in China. As for Sun, he was prompted by the desire to use Moscow's aid to achieve the Chinese revolution according to his own programs. Not only aid both sides differ in their ultimate objectives, their alliance was essentially a limited arrangement though, for several years he worked closely with these dangerous allies. He has been called "The first of many world statesmen to fall victim to the fallacy of the 'popular front'." And the transformation of Sun Yat-sen, the original champion of Westernization, the product of a missionary school, from liberalism to open support of Leninism contains in itself the history of China's reawakening and the failure of its liberal renaissance. In the early years of their careers as communists, before their ideological conditioning had been fully-developed, and before they had gone through the long and tough struggle for survival and, later, for control of the machinery of the state, Mao Tse-tung, Chou Enlai;,and other top leaders of the present people's Republic of China came under the influence of Sun Yat-sen, one of the greatest of the non-Communist revolutionaries of modern Asia. In a formative period of their own development, these Communist leaders learned a great deal from the successes and failures of Dr. Sun, and from the influence of his personality, his example, and his ideas. However much they were influenced by Sun Yut-sen, they have, in general, used him for their own purposes rather than accepted his ideas and example in their inmost hearts. Originally, Mao himself had oriented his thought consistently and persistently for over a quarter of a century in the direction of close cooperation with the Soviet Union, so it seemed psychologically improbable that he would change his thinking habits and turn away from the Kremlin, unless, of course, he became profoundly disillusioned about the motives of the Kremlin, or there was some real rapprochment between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. But, actually, it has just realized. Upon the establishment of the Central People's Government in Peking in September 1949, Mao's sovietization policy developed in new directions. In the first place, the policy was made into a cardinal policy by being embodied in the Common Program, which was generally regarded as a basic law of Communist China. In the second place, this policy was expanded to cover Communist China's internal developments. Whether in political ideology or in the study of natural science, whether in economic reconstruction or in cultural development, whether in techniques of propaganda or in methods of popular control, the Soviet Union was held up in China at that time as a shining example or ideal model and as a source of wisdom and enlightenment. While all this was a legitimate offspring of the sovietization policy, it in turn strengthened that policy by its effects. As a conspicuous example of Outer Mongolia showed us, although in name and in law Communist China claimed and was recognized to be an independent country, she seemed to be in fact under strong Soviet influence as exerted by the many Soviet advisers in her domain, specifically by the ones, whom the Comintern sent to China almost in the 1920s. Finally, I can not help admitting that Soviet role in the process of the sovietization of China was decisive and considerably essential for its success and I think that the Communist movement in China might have remained academic and theoretical had it not been for the intervention of the Cominter at that time.