개발도상국가에 있어 농촌과 도시간의 관계(하)

Weitz, Raanan 대한지방행정공제회 1972 도시문제 Vol.7 No.5

개발도상국가에 있어 농촌과 도시간의 관계(상)

Weitz, Raanan 대한지방행정공제회 1972 도시문제 Vol.7 No.4

Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A New Force in Asian Security?

( Richard Weitz ) 한국국방연구원 2011 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.23 No.1

The size and resources at the disposal of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) give the institution inherent geopolitical potential. Combined, the organization`s full members and observers encompass much of the world`s habitable landmass and almost half its population. The SCO governments engage in a number of mutual security activities. For example, regular meetings occur among the defense ministers, armed forces chiefs, general staffs, and border commanders of the SCO governments. Contacts are even more common among mid-level military officers, especially those in charge of border security units and military units in nearby SCO territories. Military experts from SCO countries also engage in regular direct discussions related to their functions. In addition, for several years SCO members have undertaken numerous joint initiatives to combat narcotics trafficking and organized crime. Increasingly, these are directed at establishing a security "belt" around Afghanistan, which is seen as the source of most of the region`s narco-trafficking. Still, the most important SCO military activities are its major security exercises, which have become quite extensive in recent years. Yet, the failure of the organization to have much of an impact on Afghanistan and especially Kyrgyzstan―which after all is a SCO member―raises doubts about its developing security role in Asia.

An Enduring Partnership: South Korea and the United States

( Richard Weitz ) 한국국방연구원 2013 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.25 No.3

The United States has had an intense military alliance relationship with South Korea for more than six decades. By occupying the southern half of the Korean Peninsula at the end of World War II, the U.S. military created the conditions for the establishment of South Korea as an independent country in 1948. The United States then rescued the new country from foreign invasion by the North in 1950. Since then, and despite the growing capabilities of the ROK`s own military, thousands of U.S. troops have remained in South Korea, along with tanks, warplanes, and other powerful weapons. While the numbers of U.S. troops in South Korea have fluctuated over the years, the general mutual defense commitment has remained solid.

Transforming Korea-Us Defenses: The Agenda Ahead

( Richard Weitz ) 국방대학교 안보문제연구소 2014 The Korean Journal of Security Affairs Vol.19 No.1

Recent developments have increasingly called into question U.S. security guaranteesto its allies. These new worries build on deeper difficulties between the United Statesand the Republic of South Korea (ROK) over what they need for their joint defensesagainst Pyongyang in the face of the evolving threat from the Democratic Peoples` Republic of Korea (DPRK).These troubles encompass Washington`s plans to sharplyreduce the U.S. military presence in the ROK from 520,000 to perhaps 450,000 activeduty soldiers, the two countries` diverging missile defense architectures in Asia, elevated ROK interest in acquiring preemptive strike options against the DPRK, and other defense and deterrence differences. Yet, the ROK-U.S. alliance has overcome earlier challenges of equal magnitude and its enduring goals remain unchanged: to help deter North Korean aggression, maintain South Koreans` security and welfare, encourage the ROK to contribute to regional and global stability, and work toward Korean reunification. With skilled management, the ROK-U.S. partnership should be able to overcome its current troubles and pursue these goals more effectively, provided the alliance continues to evolve to respond to contemporary challenges and new realities.

Regional Powers Grapple with North Korea`s New LeaderKim Jong Un

( Richard Weitz ) 한국국방연구원 2012 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.24 No.3

Dealing with the new DPRK leadership has become a vital security issue for the East Asian region. The Korean peninsula represents the one global hotspot where the direct interests of all the Asia-Pacific powers. China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. intersect. The new generation of leaders in Pyongyang, led by Kim Jong Un, has not fundamentally departed from Kim Jong Il`s policies. At the moment, all the major players in the region are preoccupied with their economic woes and internal political transitions, making it unlikely that we will see a new diplomatic initiative in 2012. Even if the DPRK returns to the talks, there are still major obstacles that must be overcome for much progress to be made. The impediments include the dissimilar goals and policies of the parties, the deadlock with regard to verification, and devising constraints on North Korea`s ballistic missile developments. In the interim, the United States and South Korea need to stick together to manage the DPRK`s succession and future evolution. Contingency planning should be pursued vigorously. The DPRK suffers from several serious vulnerabilities, including its potentially contested dynastic succession, increasingly horrid economic conditions, and weakening conventional forces. North Korea could slowly die due to its economic failings, but it could also abruptly collapse, likely requiring military intervention by neighboring countries that should informally establish clear rules of behavior for such a scenario.

Demise of Russian-Chinese Arms Relationship and Its Korean Implications

Richard Weitz 통일연구원 2009 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.18 No.2

China and Russia share a concern with the evolving political, military, and economic situation on the Korean peninsula, which borders both countries. In terms of relative influence in Pyongyang, however, Beijing enjoys a clearly dominant role, while Moscow often struggles to maintain even a supporting position. One development that might further increase this gap is the abrupt decrease in recent Chinese purchases of Russian defense technologies and weapons systems. The major reason for this transformation has been that the Chinese defense industry has become capable of producing much more sophisticated armaments. Moscow now confronts the choice of either accepting a greatly diminished share of the Chinese arms market or agreeing to sell even more advanced weapons to Beijing. In addition to threatening existing force balances in East Asia, such transfers could further strengthen China’s ability to compete for sales on third-party markets. Thus far, surging Russian arms sales to other countries have allowed Russian policy makers to accept the decreasing Chinese military purchases rather than risk the transfer of new technologies. Even so, the threat to Russian arms exports presented by the global recession may cause more Russians to seek short-term profits by allowing the sale to China of even their most advanced systems, which would make China and even more formidable competitor for sales to North Korea and other third-party markets. China and Russia share a concern with the evolving political, military, and economic situation on the Korean peninsula, which borders both countries. In terms of relative influence in Pyongyang, however, Beijing enjoys a clearly dominant role, while Moscow often struggles to maintain even a supporting position. One development that might further increase this gap is the abrupt decrease in recent Chinese purchases of Russian defense technologies and weapons systems. The major reason for this transformation has been that the Chinese defense industry has become capable of producing much more sophisticated armaments. Moscow now confronts the choice of either accepting a greatly diminished share of the Chinese arms market or agreeing to sell even more advanced weapons to Beijing. In addition to threatening existing force balances in East Asia, such transfers could further strengthen China’s ability to compete for sales on third-party markets. Thus far, surging Russian arms sales to other countries have allowed Russian policy makers to accept the decreasing Chinese military purchases rather than risk the transfer of new technologies. Even so, the threat to Russian arms exports presented by the global recession may cause more Russians to seek short-term profits by allowing the sale to China of even their most advanced systems, which would make China and even more formidable competitor for sales to North Korea and other third-party markets.

Enduring difficulties in China-U,S, defense diplomacy

( Richard Weitz ) 한국국방연구원 2009 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.21 No.4

Despite decades of military-to-military talks and the creation of several China- U.S. defense confidence-building measures, clashes between Chinese and American military units operating in the international waters and airspace near China have repeatedly disrupted their bilateral relations. Since the mid-1990s, the two defense communities have negotiated a series of bilateral defense and security agreements and confidence-building measures seeking to reduce mutual tensions and advance their common security interests. These measures have promoted a better understanding of each party`s security concerns, but they remain highly constrained and vulnerable to disruption from external shocks. Several factors have impeded their development. The most important obstacle has been the underlying contentious nature of the Chinese U.S. relationship, which is manifested most acutely by tensions over Taiwan. As leaders of the weaker power, moreover, Chinese policymakers fear that excessive transparency could provide Americans with insights into their military vulnerabilities. Influenced by a strategic tradition that emphasizes deception, many Chinese strategists also believe that opaqueness assists in deterring potential adversaries by complicating their military planning. Furthermore, Chinese policymakers do not want to draw foreign attention to their continued military buildup. Finally, defense policymakers in both countries have generally resisted measures that constrain their military operations and capabilities.

The South Korean-U.S. Nuclear Alliance: Steadfast and Changing

( Richard Weitz ) 한국국방연구원 2015 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.27 No.3

Nuclear-related issues remain at the core of the Seoul-Washington partnership. These include shared nuclear weapons threats to both partners from North Korea, tussles between South Koreans and Americans regarding how to deter and defeat these North Korean threats without antagonizing the other regional nuclear powers, and managing the transformation of the Republic of Korea (ROK) into a major civilian nuclear energy producer and exporter. Whatever the changes in the Northeast Asian security environment, the enduring goals of the South Korean-U.S. defense alliance remain unchanged-to deter North Korean aggression, maintain South Koreans` security and welfare, contribute to regional and global stability, and work toward Korean reunification. But the shifting nature of the regional security environment has required difficult adjustments by both partners to sustain a robust and effective partnership.

US Security Challenges in Northeast Asia After Bush

Richard Weitz 통일연구원 2008 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.17 No.1

The next US administration will need to pursue a vigorous shaping and hedging strategy to manage several adverse security challenges in Northeast Asia. First, many people in the region perceive the George W. Bush administration as excessively preoccupied with the Middle East at the expense of its East Asian interests. Second, North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs remain unconstrained by a formal six-party agreement. Third, China has taken advantage of these trends to bolster its position in East Asia, sometimes at Washington’s expense. Finally, developments in North Korea and China have stimulated concerns that Japan might eventually loosen its tight security ties with the United States. American policymakers urgently need to rebalance their energies between the Middle East and East Asia. ASEAN in particular warrants much more attention in Washington. In addition, US officials must reaffirm their commitment and capacity to protect Japan and South Korea. Managing China’s rise also requires a more vigorous American engagement with Beijing’s neighbors. Finally, the United States should employ more creative strategies to affirm its unique security role in Northeast Asia.