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Jianfeng Ding,Lingge Jiang,Chen He 한국통신학회 2016 Journal of communications and networks Vol.18 No.4
Most existing resource management problem modelsarise from the original desire of allocating resources in either auser-centric or network-centric manner. The difference betweentheir objectives is obvious: user-centric methods attempt to optimizethe utility of individual users, whereas network-centric modelsintend to optimize the collective utilities of the entire network. In this paper, from the above two aspects, we analyze the robustpower control problem in device-to-device (D2D) communicationunderlaying cellular networks, where two types of channel uncertaintyset (e.g., ellipsoidal and column-wise) are considered. In theuser-centric method, we formulate the problem into the form of aStackelberg game, where the energy efficiency (EE) of each useris the ingredient of utility function. In order to protect the cellularuser equipment’s (CUE) uplink transmission, we introduce aprice based cost function into the objectives of D2D user equipment(DUE). The existence and uniqueness of the game with theinfluence of channel uncertainty and price are discussed. In thenetwork-centric method, we aim to maximize the collective EE ofCUEs and DUEs. We show that by the appropriate mathematicaltransformation, the network-centric D2D power control problemhas the identical local solution to that of a special case of the usercentricproblem, where price plays a key role. Numerical resultsshow the performance of the robust power control algorithms inthe user-centric and network-centric models.
Ding, Jianfeng,Jiang, Lingge,He, Chen The Korea Institute of Information and Commucation 2016 Journal of communications and networks Vol.18 No.4
Most existing resource management problem models arise from the original desire of allocating resources in either a user-centric or network-centric manner. The difference between their objectives is obvious: user-centric methods attempt to optimize the utility of individual users, whereas network-centric models intend to optimize the collective utilities of the entire network. In this paper, from the above two aspects, we analyze the robust power control problem in device-to-device (D2D) communication underlaying cellular networks, where two types of channel uncertainty set (e.g., ellipsoidal and column-wise) are considered. In the user-centric method, we formulate the problem into the form of a Stackelberg game, where the energy efficiency (EE) of each user is the ingredient of utility function. In order to protect the cellular user equipment's (CUE) uplink transmission, we introduce a price based cost function into the objectives of D2D user equipment (DUE). The existence and uniqueness of the game with the influence of channel uncertainty and price are discussed. In the network-centric method, we aim to maximize the collective EE of CUEs and DUEs. We show that by the appropriate mathematical transformation, the network-centric D2D power control problem has the identical local solution to that of a special case of the user-centric problem, where price plays a key role. Numerical results show the performance of the robust power control algorithms in the user-centric and network-centric models.
Characteristics Curve of Nonlinear Resistive Circuits and its Stability
Ushida, Akio,Jiang, Lingge,Nishio, Yoshifumi 대한전자공학회 1996 APCCAS:Asia Pacific Conference on Circuits And Sys Vol.1 No.1
Distinguishing the stability of characteristic curves for nonlinear resistive circuits is requirement and importance to design various electronic circuit exactly. Since every resistive element has a parasitic component, solutions on the characteristic curves are stable or unstable. In this paper, we show that the stability will be mainly changed at the bifurcation points such as limit point and branch point. Applying the curve tracing method, we can decide the unstable regions on characteristic curves by the locations of bifurcation points.