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양혜린 ( Helin Yang ),이세미 ( Semi Lee ) 이화간호과학연구소 2022 Health & Nursing Vol.34 No.2
Purpose: The purpose of this study was to conceptually analyze non-compliance in elderly diabetic patients and its specific attributes. Method: Walker and Avant’s process of concept analysis was used. We searched databases using the keywords ‘older diabetes’, ‘patient compliance’, and ‘treatment non-compliance’. Result: The attributes of non-compliance in elderly diabetic patients were identified as follows: 1) Non-compliance with medication therapy, 2) Non-compliance with lifestyle therapy, and 3) Hospital visit non-compliance. The antecedents of non-compliance in elderly diabetic patients were as follows: 1) Lack of knowledge, 2) Low self-efficacy, and 3) Low social support. The consequences of non-compliance were: 1) Blood sugar control problems and 2) Diabetic complications. Conclusion: This concept analysis defined non-compliance in elderly diabetic patients based on theoretical evidence. The findings of this study will contribute to developing systematic programs to increase compliance in elderly diabetic patients.
Yang, Aijun,Wang, Helin The Korean Society for Computational and Applied M 2012 Journal of applied mathematics & informatics Vol.30 No.1
We consider the fourth-order differential equation with one-dimensional $p$-Laplacian (${\phi}_p(x^{\prime\prime}(t)))^{\prime\prime}=f(t,x(t),x^{\prime}(t),x^{\prime\prime}(t)$) a.e. $t{\in}[0,1]$, subject to the boundary conditions $x^{\prime\prime}}(0)=0$, $({\phi}_p(x^{\prime\prime}(t)))^{\prime}{\mid}_{t=0}=0$, $x(0)={\sum}_{i=1}^n{\mu}_ix({\xi}_i)$, $x(t)=x(1-t)$, $t{\in}[0,1]$, where ${\phi}_p(s)={\mid}s{\mid}^{p-2}s$, $p$ > 1, 0 < ${\xi}_1$ < ${\xi}_2$ < ${\cdots}$ < ${\xi}_n$ < $\frac{1}{2}$, ${\mu}_i{\in}\mathbb{R}$, $i=1$, 2, ${\cdots}$, $n$, ${\sum}_{i=1}^n{\mu}_i=1$ and $f:[0,1]{\times}\mathbb{R}^3{\rightarrow}\mathbb{R}$ is a $L^1$-Carath$\acute{e}$odory function with $f(t,u,v,w)=f(1-t,u,-v,w)$ for $(t,u,v,w){\in}[0,1]{\times}\mathbb{R}^3$. We obtain the existence of at least one nonconstant symmetric solution by applying an extension of Mawhin's continuation theorem due to Ge. Furthermore, an example is given to illustrate the results.
Aijun Yang,Helin Wang 한국전산응용수학회 2012 Journal of applied mathematics & informatics Vol.30 No.1
We consider the fourth-order differential equation with one-dimensional p-Laplacian [수식] subject to the boundary conditions [수식] is a L1-Caratheodory function with [수식]. We obtain the existence of at least one nonconstant symmetric solution by applying an extension of Mawhin's continuation theorem due to Ge. Furthermore, an example is given to illustrate the results.
Fair Power Control Using Game Theory with Pricing Scheme in Cognitive Radio Networks
Xianzhong Xie,Helin Yang,Athanasios V. Vasilakos,Lu He 한국통신학회 2014 Journal of communications and networks Vol.16 No.2
This paper proposes a payment-based power controlscheme using non-cooperative game with a novel pricing functionin cognitive radio networks (CRNs). The proposed algorithm considersthe fairness of power control among second users (SUs)where the value of per SU’ signal to noise ratio (SINR) or distancebetween SU and SU station is used as reference for punishmentprice setting. Due to the effect of uncertainty fading environment,the system is unable to get the link gain coefficient tocontrol SUs’ transmission power accurately, so the quality of service(QoS) requirements of SUs may not be guaranteed, and theexistence of Nash equilibrium (NE) is not ensured. Therefore, analternative iterative scheme with sliding model is presented for thenon-cooperative power control game algorithm. Simulation resultsshow that the pricing policy using SUs’ SINR as price punishmentreference can improve total throughput, ensure fairness and reducetotal transmission power in CRNs.
Fair Power Control Using Game Theory with Pricing Scheme in Cognitive Radio Networks
Xie, Xianzhong,Yang, Helin,Vasilakos, Athanasios V.,He, Lu The Korea Institute of Information and Commucation 2014 Journal of communications and networks Vol.16 No.2
This paper proposes a payment-based power control scheme using non-cooperative game with a novel pricing function in cognitive radio networks (CRNs). The proposed algorithm considers the fairness of power control among second users (SUs) where the value of per SU' signal to noise ratio (SINR) or distance between SU and SU station is used as reference for punishment price setting. Due to the effect of uncertainty fading environment, the system is unable to get the link gain coefficient to control SUs' transmission power accurately, so the quality of service (QoS) requirements of SUs may not be guaranteed, and the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) is not ensured. Therefore, an alternative iterative scheme with sliding model is presented for the non-cooperative power control game algorithm. Simulation results show that the pricing policy using SUs' SINR as price punishment reference can improve total throughput, ensure fairness and reduce total transmission power in CRNs.