벤처기업 활성화와 지역경제 발전방안 : 부산을 중심으로

이기환,구형건 한국중소기업학회 1999 기업가정신과 벤처연구 Vol.2 No.1

This paper discusses the policy issues on the promotion of the high-tech venture enterprises for the regional economic development. The current administration's new industrial policy has targeted at fostering new technology- based firms in order to restructure the currently ailing economy. Furthermore, each regional government has been focusing on supporting venture enterprises in order to vitalize its stagnant regional economy. In this article, the policy ideas for the promotion of the new ventures are suggested. First, we contend that regional government authorities should offer appropriate tax and financial incentives for new venture enterprises which are created in their regions. Then regional universities and economic institutions should also offer entrepreneurship programmes to encourage new ventures creation. Second, it is necessary to set up the network between regional universities and related institutions for exchange of new information on technology and business opportunities. Furthermore, universities and institutions need to fully cooperate when building technology business incubators(TBI) or business incubators(BI). Third, we contend that it is desirable to have buildings specifically assigned for new venture enterprises. The venture buildings can provide the space and facilities for the potential venture enterprises. Finally, it is so important for the citizens to understand the entrepreneurs and the venture enterprises. Formation of a good relationship between the citizens and the enterprises in the region would provide the entrepreneurs with good business environments and motivation to start many promising high-tech enterprises.

EVALUATION OF ILLIQUID ASSETS

Koo, Hyeng Keun 한국재무관리학회 1996 財務管理論叢 Vol.3 No.2

Optimal Multi-Agent Performance Measures for Team Contracts

Hyeng Keun Koo,Gyoocheol Shim,Jaeyoung Sung 한국재무학회 2007 한국재무학회 학술대회 Vol.2007 No.04

We present a continuous-time contracting model under moral hazard with many agents. The principal contracts many agents as a team, and they jointly produce correlated outcomes. We show the optimal contract for each agent is linear in outcomes of all other agents as well as his/her own. The structure of the optimal contract strikingly reveals that the optimal aggregate performance measure in general can be orthogonally decomposed into two statistics: one is a sucient statistic, and the other a non-sucient statistic. As a consequence, the optimal aggregate performance measure in general is not a sucient statistic, unless the principal is risk neutral. We further discuss agents' optimal eort choices using a \quadratic-cost" example, which also strikingly suggests that team contracts sometimes provide lower-powered eort incentives than individually separate contracts do.

Hierarchical Contract, Firm Size, and Pay Sensitivity

Hyeng Keun Koo,Gyoocheol Shim,Jaeyoung Sung 한국재무학회 2007 한국재무학회 학술대회 Vol.2007 No.05

We present a moral-hazard-based hierarchical contracting model, where investors con- tract the top manager and the top manager contracts all middle managers. We compare e®ects of hierarchical contracting on managerial contract sensitivities with those of a di- rect contracting benchmark where investors directly contract all managers. We argue that under hierarchical contracting, the top manager shifts his compensation risk to middle man- agers by providing middle managers with higher-powered incentive contracts than would be desired by investors under direct contracting. It is striking that this top managerial risk- shifting behavior motivates investors to design the top managerial contract in such a way that the top-managerial hierarchical contract sensitivity approaches either the ¯rst best or zero, as the ¯rm size grows. However, under some reasonable conditions such as correlated managerial e®ort outcomes, the top managerial sensitivity quickly approaches zero as the ¯rm size increases, and consequently, the sensitivity for large ¯rms can be far lower than predicted by the standard agency theory. This result can serve as an explanation of widely observed ¯rm-size e®ects on CEO compensations, namely, lower pay sensitivities for large ¯rms than those for small ¯rms. We also argue that even when investors are risk-neutral and then individual performance outcomes of nonexecutive employees may be very weakly correlated to the total outcome of the ¯rm, company-wide bonus plans for nonexecutive employees can still be justi¯ed under hierarchical contracting.

Hierarchical Contract, Firm Size, and Pay Sensitivity

Hyeng Keun Koo,Gyoo Cheol Shim,Jae Young Sung 한국경영학회 2007 한국경영학회 통합학술발표논문집 Vol.2007 No.8

We present a moral-hazard-based hierarchical contracting model, where investors contract the top manager and the top manager contracts all middle managers. We compare effects of hierarchical contracting on managerial contract sensitivities with those of a direct contracting benchmark where investors directly contract all managers. We argue that under hierarchical contracting, the top manager shifts his compensation risk to middle managers by providing middle managers with higher-powered incentive contracts than would be desired by investors under direct contracting. It is striking that this top managerial risk-shifting behavior motivates investors to design the top managerial contract in such a way that the top-managerial hierarchical contract sensitivity approaches either the first best or zero, as the firm size grows. However, under some reasonable conditions such as correlated managerial effort outcomes, the top managerial sensitivity quickly approaches zero as the firm size increases, and consequently, the sensitivity for large firms can be far lower than predicted by the standard agency theory. This result can serve as an explanation of widely observed firm-size effects on CEO compensations, namely, lower pay sensitivities for large firms than those for small firms. We also argue that even when investors are risk-neutral and then individual performance outcomes of nonexecutive employees may be very weakly correlated to the total outcome of the firm, company-wide bonus plans for nonexecutive employees can still be justified under hierarchical contracting.

Hierarchical Contract and Collusion

Hyeng Keun Koo,Gyoo Cheol Shim,Jae Young Sung 한국경영학회 2009 한국경영학회 통합학술발표논문집 Vol.2009 No.08

Optimal Consumption and Investment with a Wealth-Dependent Time-Varying Investment Opportunity

( Hyeng Keun Koo ),( Gyoo Cheol Shim ) 한국금융공학회 2014 한국금융공학회 학술발표회 Vol.2014 No.1

In this paper we study an optimization problem of an investor in which there is a better investment opportunity when he is rich than when he is poor. We model the betterment of the investment opportunity by considering an exogenously speciffied wealth threshold such that the investor`s investment opportunity is better when his wealth is above the threshold than when it is below the threshold. We derive a closed form solution for the optimal consumption and investment strategies by using a dynamic programming method, and investigate the effiects of the potential investment opportunity changes on the optimal strategies. We show that the investor consumes less for all wealth levels and takes more(resp. less) risk at wealth below(resp. above) the threshold level than he would in the absence of potential investment opportunity changes. Furthermore, we show that such effiects of the potential investment opportunity changes on the optimal strategies become stronger as the investor`s wealth gets closer to the threshold level, while the effiects are negligible when his wealth is sufficiently far from the threshold level. We also show that the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth and the revealed coefficient of relative risk aversion are strictly decreasing for all wealth levels except at the threshold level, where they exhibit upward jumps.

Hierarchical Contract, Firm Size, and Pay Sensitivity

Hyeng Keun Koo,Gyoocheol Shim,Jaeyoung Sung 한국재무학회 2007 한국재무학회 학술대회 Vol.2007 No.04

We present a moral-hazard-based hierarchical contracting model, where investors con- tract the top manager and the top manager contracts all middle managers. We compare e®ects of hierarchical contracting on managerial contract sensitivities with those of a di- rect contracting benchmark where investors directly contract all managers. We argue that under hierarchical contracting, the top manager shifts his compensation risk to middle man- agers by providing middle managers with higher-powered incentive contracts than would be desired by investors under direct contracting. It is striking that this top managerial risk- shifting behavior motivates investors to design the top managerial contract in such a way that the top-managerial hierarchical contract sensitivity approaches either the ¯rst best or zero, as the ¯rm size grows. However, under some reasonable conditions such as correlated managerial e®ort outcomes, the top managerial sensitivity quickly approaches zero as the ¯rm size increases, and consequently, the sensitivity for large ¯rms can be far lower than predicted by the standard agency theory. This result can serve as an explanation of widely observed ¯rm-size e®ects on CEO compensations, namely, lower pay sensitivities for large ¯rms than those for small ¯rms. We also argue that even when investors are risk-neutral and then individual performance outcomes of nonexecutive employees may be very weakly correlated to the total outcome of the ¯rm, company-wide bonus plans for nonexecutive employees can still be justi¯ed under hierarchical contracting.

Hierarchical Contract and Collusion

Hyeng Keun Koo,Gyoocheol Shim,Jaeyoung Sung 한국재무학회 2009 한국재무학회 학술대회 Vol.2009 No.08

We study a moral-hazard-based multi-agent contracting model where the agents have the chance of collusion. We argue that an hierarchical contract, where investors contract the top manager and the top manager contracts all middle managers, is a collusion proof contract, and show that it is more e±cient than the direct contract in the presence of collusion chance.

국면전환 환경에서의 퇴직계획 및 자산선택

구형건(Hyeng Keun Koo),배세융(Seyung Bae),심규철(Gyoocheol Shim) 한국경영과학회 2017 經營 科學 Vol.34 No.4

In this paper we study the purchase of life insurance, optimal consumption/investment and retirement decisions of an economic agent who faces uncertain death. The agent receives labor income but suffers a utility loss before retirement. The agent"s attitude toward risk changes after retirement. That is, a regime switching happens by the agent’s retirement. We derive optimal strategies in closed form. In particular, we show that it is optimal for the agent to retire immediately when the wealth reaches a certain threshold level. We do comparative static analysis and derive economic intuition for optimal strategies.