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Bruce Bechtol Jr 통일연구원 2001 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.10 No.2
This paper reports the results of a methodology that conducts an analysis on the readiness and capabilities of the two Korean militaries. The methodology uses a framework for analysis that compares and contrasts key factors that evaluate the effectiveness of militaries and the governments that support them. This methodology was used to reach an assessment on which military - North or South Korea - is most likely to win in a force on force conflict. Results of the analysis suggest that the South Korean military is far more ready to conduct a successful large-scale conflict than the military of North Korea. In addition, regarding readiness and capabilities for using weapons of mass destruction, analysis results suggest that the strength of the US-ROK alliance makes it unlikely that Pyongyang would ever attempt to use these weapons during a conflict. This paper reports the results of a methodology that conducts an analysis on the readiness and capabilities of the two Korean militaries. The methodology uses a framework for analysis that compares and contrasts key factors that evaluate the effectiveness of militaries and the governments that support them. This methodology was used to reach an assessment on which military - North or South Korea - is most likely to win in a force on force conflict. Results of the analysis suggest that the South Korean military is far more ready to conduct a successful large-scale conflict than the military of North Korea. In addition, regarding readiness and capabilities for using weapons of mass destruction, analysis results suggest that the strength of the US-ROK alliance makes it unlikely that Pyongyang would ever attempt to use these weapons during a conflict.
Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr. 한국학술연구원 2005 Korea Observer Vol.36 No.2
This paper explores how several Cold War actors (North and South Korea, the USSR, and the U.S.) be-came embroiled in a conflict that dragged on for more than three years. Its focus is the two Koreas’ efforts to win military support for a war of unification from their superpower benefactors (the USSR, China, and the U.S.). The U.S. entered the Korean War due to the inability of Seoul’s armed forces to defend the South Korean land mass, having hoped to provide only mi-nor military support for its new ally. The struggle thus changed the U.S. government’s view of its armed forces, paradigms, and policies during the nearly forty years’ duration of the Cold War. During the 1950-1953 Korean Conflict, the U.S. practiced large-scale conscription, although it deployed more troops to Europe to face the Soviet threat than to the penin-sula to fight the Chinese and North Koreans. While the U.S. did not regard the Korean Conflict as “total war,” casualties suffered by Koreans on both sides made it exactly that from an Asian perspective. This was clearly the last war where use of the atomic bomb was both an option, and according to some sources, an impetus to end the war after POW talks between the two sides had prolonged the war far beyond what most had expected.
North Korean Nuclear and Missile Issues and the ROK-U.S. Collaboration: An American Perspective
Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr 한국학술연구원 2004 Korea Observer Vol.35 No.1
The nuclear confrontation with North Korea has been the most important security issue for the ROK-U.S. alliance since the government in Pyongyang initiated its latest brinkmanship strategy during the fall of 2002. It remains unclear whether the six-party talks will accomplish the regional security goals that Seoul and Washington assess are important for peace and prosperity in the region and on the Korean Peninsula. As negotiations continue, there are several key points that need to be made regarding North Korea and their past policies as they affect the ROK-U.S. alliance: 1) Precedent shows that Pyongyang will deceive the governments in Washington and Seoul, and that Pyongyang will proliferate weapons to anyone who will buy them, 2) Bombing or destroying Yongbyon will not end North Koreas nuclear program 3) Pyongyang will continue attempts to drive a wedge in the ROK-U.S. alliance, and 4) A nuclear capability makes North Korea much more than just a threat to the Republic of Korea. The reasons for the current polarization of foreign policy views between Seoul and Washington are both historical and ideological, but as the role of the U.S. in the alliance evolves, both Seoul and Washington need to use diplomatic pressure, military firmness, transparency, and reciprocity in dealing with the government in North Korea and resolving the nuclear confrontation.
Civil-Military Relations in the Republic of Korea: Background and Implications
Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr. 한국학술연구원 2005 Korea Observer Vol.36 No.4
Civil-Military relations in South Korea has been a topic of discussion, particularly since the spring of 2004, among many in policy and academic circles both in the Republic of Korea, and key allies -- par-ticularly the United States. In order to understand the challenges and problems that have been inherent in the Civil-Military relationship in South Korea since 2004, one must first address the unique and rather unprecedented leadership style of Roh Moo-hyun -- and the historical reasons behind the policy moves he has made. It is also important to understand the strengths and weaknesses that the current President brings to the Blue House. Roh’s decision-making process is radically different than any of those who have previously served in the Blue House. An analy-sis of this unique decision-making process and how it has altered the way policy is made (particularly for-eign policy and its impact on the current civil-military relationship) will be made in this paper. Other impor-tant factors in the current Civil-Military relationship include the vision of the National Security Council, the future of military reform, and current signs of Roh’s vision to severely alter the status of the current Civil-Military relationship. All of these factors will be examined in detail in this paper.
( Bruce E Bechtol Jr ),( Shih Yueh Yang ) 한국국방연구원 2012 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.24 No.4
This paper addresses the key concerns of a joint/combined ROK-U.S. military operation in the case of a necessary contingency in North Korea. As such, it focuses on the necessary military issues, some of the likely scenarios where these issues would arise (there are simply too many to address them all in this paper), and the likely political factors in South Korea, the United States, and the international community that would be at play during this time period. China is likely to be the"elephant in the room," though diplomacy with Beijing will be key and the Chinese are unlikely to agree to anything unless it is very clear to the world that North Korea is obviously in the throes of collapse, civil war, or complete anarchy. Any contingency operation into North Korea will be a very large, very expensive operation. South Korea simply does not have all of the resources or the military capabilities to carry out such an operation on its own. but it should lead any effort to intervene in North Korea because ultimately this is a Korea issue. A variety of factors, particularly the instability of the government, are likely to ultimately bring about a catastrophe in the DPRK. When this happens, a unified Korea, under a transparent democracy with its capital in Seoul, is the only viable option for the Korean people.
Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. Ph.D. 한국학술연구원 2009 Korea Observer Vol.40 No.1
There has been a debate in recent years about the threat that North Korea poses. This paper addresses that question by conducting analysis on all of Pyongyang’s conventional and missile forces. First it examines the command and control of the military, and the role the military plays in government. It will also examine the disposition of forces of Pyongyang’s military forces and why this poses a threat to South Korea and the region. Finally, a study is made on how conventional and missile forces have been reorganized in recent years in order to pose a more credible threat to the ROK-U.S. alliance. It is apparent based on the evidence discussed, that despite the primitive state of many of North Korea’s systems compared to the United States and South Korea, Pyongyang has adjusted by developing asymmetric capabilities, and by massing key forces in forward positions from which they could be launched with little or no warning.
ROK-US Military Cooperation in the Post-9/11 Era: Challenges and Paradigms in the Age of Terrorism
Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2007 Pacific Focus Vol.22 No.2
Since the beginning of the Global War on Terror, and largely because of it, Washington and Seoul have viewed their most important security challenges in the region through different prisms. While the leaders in South Korea have sometimes made an effort to help these interests converge (and sometimes not), this has had repercussions as their military forces continue to make an effort to work together in an alliance where the infrastructure and interoperability of forces will change drastically in 2012 and beyond. Much of the problem has been exacerbated because of a radically different view regarding the threat from North Korea and the policy that must be taken to deal with its often rogue-state behavior. An analysis of potential new governments for both nations reveals a potential for continued disagreement and difficulties in both the policy regarding North Korea and the changing structure of the ROK-U.S. military alliance. The electorates in the United States and South Korea have already begun the process of picking their next presidential candidates, and in both countries this has the potential for leadership that will want a substantially different role for the military and for militaryalliances that protect their national interests.
The Northern Limit Line Incident of 2002: Motivations and Implications
Bruce E. Bechtol 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2004 Pacific Focus Vol.19 No.2
The Northern Limit Line(NLL) incident of 2002 helped contribute to an environment of tension on the Korean Peninsula, and created political problems for President Kim Dae‐jung's Sunshine Policy. The attack now appears to have been carefully planned and carried out by the North Koreans. Based on the nature of the North Korean regime, and past precedent based on other recent provocations, it is likely that the attack on the ROK Navy on June 2 of 2002 was ordered, or at least carried out, with the expressed consent of Kim Chong‐il. The most likely reason for the attack appears to have been revenge for a naval defeat Pyongyang suffered near the NLL during the summer of 1999, although other reasons such as an attempt to interfere with the World Cup soccer games in Seoul, a gambit aimed at increasing leverage during upcoming talks with the U.S., or a move aimed at bringing the world's attention to the “illegality” of the NLL, are also possible. Implications of the incident included increased tensions on the Peninsula and postponed foreign aid and security talks, but in the long run, the incident will probably be remembered as one of many provocations conducted by the North since 1953.
The Implications of the Cheonan Sinking: A Security Studies Perspective
Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. 통일연구원 2010 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.19 No.2
The March 26, 2010 sinking of the ROK ship Cheonan was a deliberate, well planned act of violence carried out by North Korean military forces. Evidence now available reveals a change in military leadership that enabled Special Operations Forces and other personnel in their missions to conduct brinkmanship and provocations in the Northern Limit Line area. In addition, the results of the investigation conducted by experts from five democratic nations provided compelling evidence regarding the type of naval craft used (submarine), the weapon used (torpedo), and the circumstances surrounding the day that a North Korean military attack was carried out against a ROK naval ship on a peaceful mission in its own sovereign waters. North Korean actions following the attack consisted largely of denial and defiance. These actions set back inter-Korean relations by at least a year. Thus, future provocations and brinkmanship in the Northern Limit Line area are not only possible, but likely. It is also likely that future acts of violence in the area will be conducted using different tactics, techniques, procedures, and perhaps even different kinds of military forces. Containment of Pyongyang’s rogue behavior and deterrence against future provocations needs to be a high priority for the ROK-U.S. military alliance.