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Choi Suk Wan(崔碩莞) 일본사학회 2000 일본역사연구 Vol.12 No.-
Most of the previous studies on Japan during the early 1890s defined its policies on East Asia as expansionism aimed at the expansion of Japan’s influence on Korea. Its policy on the “Bangkon-ryong Incident” was viewed as inclined toward forceful means and its decision to resolve the issue by using Korea’s dependence on China was a reluctant choice due to the pressures by the Western Powers. Recent studies, however, insist that Japan’s East Asian policy before the Sino-Japanese War was anti-expansionist in nature, emphasizing the cooperation with China. They claim that Japan’s position on the “Bangkon-ryong Incident” was to find peaceful solutions. On the basis of these studies, this article reexamines the overall nature of Japan’s East Asian policy in Chapter II and how such policy was reflected in Japan’s policy in the opening of the Taedong River and the “Bangkon-ryong Incident”
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崔碩莞(Choi, Suk Wan) 일본사학회 2004 일본역사연구 Vol.21 No.-
The aim of this paper is to examine Japan s East Asia policy from the late May to the middle of June in 1894. On the 30th of May the Japanese government made it clear that it would send its troops to Korea if China decided to send its forces to Korea. The dispatch was expected to suppress the Donghak forces and secure Japan s exclusive control over Korea by carrying out the reform of Korean internal affairs. On the second day of June, however, the Japanese government decided to send its troops to Korea immediately even if the dispatch of Chinese forces was not yet decided. Again it moved back and reached the conclusion that it would send its troops only as a response to the Chinese provocation of war. Consul Odori was summoned and it decide to send its troops led by Oshima to Korea. At first Odori opposed the entry of Japanese forces into Seoul, but later he dropped his moderate position toward China as Japan discarded its cooperative stance with China on the thirteenth day of June. A few days later Japan carried out the forced reform of the Korean government by itself. The Japanese move amounted to an official declaration of war against China. Ito Hirobumi, Mutsu Munemitsu and the military played a major role in carrying out Japan s East Asia policy. My research shows that three major players shared a goal of making Korea Japan s protectorate and cooperated with each other in their efforts to find ways to suppress peasants rebellion and intervene in the Korean internal affairs. This fact raises serious doubts about the previous views that Ito who favored the cooperation with China suppressed successfully the hard-line policy of Mutsu and the military, the Japanese government simply followed the military hard-liners, or the Japanese government was driven to war against China by the public opinion.
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최석완(Choi, Suk-Wan) 효원사학회 2014 역사와 세계 Vol.- No.46
This article examines the validity of a recent new theory which defines the character of the Japanese Government`s East Asia policy from the Meiji Restoration to Sino-Japanese War as non-expansionism. In particular, this article analyzes the discussion held in Japanese Government regarding the issue of the outbreak of the war in the middle of July in 1894. the results are as follows. The controversy within the Japanese Government was not about whether Japan should start the war or not, but rather, it was a problem of the active or the passive outbreak of the war. Ito Hirobumi, Mutsu Munemitsu and the military authorities insisted on the active outbreak of the war. They considered that the possibility of Russia`s interference in the Sino-Japanese War would be low and prompted the early outbreak of the war. On the other hand, the emperor Meiji and Cabinet members who insisted on the passive outbreak of the war considered the possibility of Russia`s interference would be high. Therefore, they carefully looked for an external and ostensible reason necessary for the outbreak of the war. However, they did not deny the policy on the outbreak of the war set in the middle of June. On the other hand, Ito, Mutsu, and the military authorities took the initiative in the outbreak of the war policy, but had never violated the dogmatism which was to ignore the decision of the Japanese Government`s policy. Based on this analysis, it can be concluded that this new theory is not persuasive enough to replace the conventional theory.
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청일전쟁기의 일본정부의 동아시아질서 재편정책 : 조약개정 외교와 「6.2 조선 파병 결정」
Choi Suk Wan(崔碩莞) 일본사학회 2002 일본역사연구 Vol.15 No.-
This dissertation is an analysis of the structure as well as the characteristics of the East Asian Policy that was promoted by the 2nd Ito Ministry. The subject of investigation covers the period from when the revised treaty first became an unresolved diplomatic issue in July 1893 to when the composite brigadeled by Oshima Mashayosi left for Chosun in June of 1894. As of lately, a new outlook that during this period the Ito Ministry’s East Asian Policy was anti-expansionism has been enthusiastically accepted by Japanese historical circles. They claim that the dispatched Japanese armies to Chosun were not meant to be a declaration of war to China. The goal of this dissertation is especially to genuinely refute this movement of research and the results of this study are roughly as follows: The Ito Ministry in order to hold supremacy devoted themselves to the revision of their diplomatic treaty/foreign policy with England. They had initially planned to establish themselves on an equal footing withthe World Powers through the revision of this treaty and then by reflecting this treaty with the revised diplomatic treaty with China, they wanted to restructure their association with China in order to place themselves on a higher footing within the Sino-Japanese relationship However, this East Asian policy was not implemented until May of 1894. Therefore, the nonconfidence vote in the Cabinet was passed in the National Assembly and as the rumors flew that the Chosun government, in order to subjugate the Dong-Hak Farmers’ Rebellion, requested soldiers from China, the hostilities towards China were charged through the establishment of the East Asian Supremacy Policy. However, not being able to find a clear justification to send soldiers into Chosun, the Ito Ministry, aware of the opinions of the World Powers, decided at the end to dispatch soldiers passively as well as concentrate more on strategies to wage war. And this became the impetus that accelerated the East Asian Supremacy Policy through the revision of the treaty. In short, the Ito Ministry’s established its course of action to rush into a war with China after achieving a treaty with the World Powers. As they eliminated the possible intervention of the World Powers, they worked out a near-perfect strategy to gain supremacy of East Asia.
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비팽창주의론의 확산과 문제점 : 정한론과 청일전쟁을 바라보는 시각
Choi Suk Wan(崔碩莞) 일본사학회 2003 일본역사연구 Vol.18 No.-
Recently many Japanese scholars have been trying to reappraise the Japan’s East Asian policies of the early Meiji period. They tend to regard these pre-Sino-Japanese war policies as non-expansionist. Their view is just the opposite of the widely accepted view and is exerting a strong influence upon the writing of many of history textbooks, introductory histories, and books of general interest. Their argument is well expressed in their view of the Seikanron and the Sino-Japanese War and can be summarized as follows. Firstly, they emphasized that the moderate group which advocated the cooperation between Japan and Ch’ing China played a dominant role in shaping the foreign policies of the Japanese government. Secondly, they are pointing out that the policy of military expansion designed to have a showdown with Ch’ing China was curtailed by the moderates. Thirdly, they emphasized Ch’ing China’s preoccupation with Sinocentrism, Korea’s anti-modern attitude, and Korea’s rude response to Japanese demand to open its ports. Fourth, they overestimated the threat from both Russia and China. Fifth, they argue that Japan did not want or need to put Korea under its direct rule. Based on these aspects they argued that Japan’s East Asian policies were basically non-expansionist, and the Sino-Japanese war was an accidental war which led blessedly to the modernization of East Asia. This non-expansionist stance has serious problems in building up its logic and interpreting historical documents. The most serious problem is that they have a preconceived idea called the non-expansionist theory even though they strongly argue that historical studies must be free from prejudices.
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