하트의 법개념 비판

최봉철(Choi, Bong Chul) 성균관대학교 법학연구소 2008 성균관법학 Vol.20 No.3S

In The Concept of Law, Hart maintains that law is similar to morals and different from commands in their nature and structure, and that there is no necessary connection between law and morals. Though his book is praise-worth and known as a book reviving the 20th century legal philosophy, I can't but take the very opposite side against him. I believe law should be understood in terms of rules imposing sanctions rather than rules of behavior along with Austin, Holmes, Kelsen and so on. Thus, I propose that law should be different from morals in its nature. Law should be understood as rules backed by sanction, whereas morals are rules of behavior. And though Hart argues against natural law theories on two grounds, I believe the grounds that he claims rather support them rather than oppose them. In the book, Hart emphasizes internal aspect as the key character of rules. He says that rules have internal aspect, but he does not clarify the question on whether all rules or some rules have it. His position must be the latter, for he is a Wittgensteinian and maintains that general classifying terms have open texture. If so, why doesn't he argue the important issue clearly? I believe that he does not want to state his position clearly because it will weaken the coherence of his theory. He distinguishes rules from habits by internal aspect; contrary to rules, habits do not have internal aspects. Internal aspects are regarded as the most important character of rules, too. Though Hart has provided an alternative theory of understanding law against John Austin in the tradition of Anglo-American legal philosophy, I believe the Austinian theory illuminates the essence of law better than the Hartian. I hope that Korean legal philosophical circle will discuss the merits and demerits of Hart's concept of law seriously.

문언중심적 법해석론 비판

최봉철(Choi Bong Chul) 한국법철학회 1999 법철학연구 Vol.2 No.-

플라톤의 『크리톤』에 대한 분석

최봉철(Choi Bong-Chul) 성균관대학교 법학연구소 2005 성균관법학 Vol.17 No.1

My purpose in this paper is to answer several controversial issues regarding the interpretation of the Crito. First, I aim at demonstrating that it is a triangular dialogue among Crito, Socrates and the Laws. In the first half, Crito and Socrates debate on the question of whether Socrates’ escape from the jail can be justified, respectively. But their conceptions of justice are too conflicting to come to a rupture. Then, Socrates conjures up the Laws as if he is a magician. The Laws persuade Socrates not to escape. However, one should note that the speech consists of two parts whose tones are radically different from each other. In the former part, they claim their authorities according to their general theory which is not totally acceptable to me. On that part of speech, Socrates does not show whether he agrees or not, but continues to keep silent. Instead, he asks to Crito whether he agrees on the speech. In the latter part, they try to persuade Socrates as if they are close and intimate friends who understand every aspect of Socrates’ life. After the end of the Laws’ speech, Socrates decides to remain in the jail. I think that Socrates and the Laws cannot be identified. Therefore, the characters of the Crito are three. Second, I try to answer why Socrates keeps silent on the former part of the Laws’ speech. The reason should be found in the context of the author’s writing. The Crito is known to be one of the early dialogues of Plato, and to be written at the politically dangerous time for Socrates’ schoolmen. Plato must have confronted a dilemma. The dilemma can be escaped if he pursues two conflicting purposes simultaneously; loyal to his teacher as the most ardent and ablest student and reconciling with the Athenian authority to carry on the Socratic school. His solution is to make Socrates silent when the Laws claim their authorities. Silence has a double meaning, and can be construed both affirmatively and negatively. On being construed in an affirmative sense, Socrates and his followers are regarded to be respectful of the Athenian authority, but if not, true Socrates as a social reformer. Third, I try to clarify why Socrates chooses to die, and what the Crito is about. I do not think he decides to drink the hemlock because he accepts the proposition that one should have moral obligation to obey unjust laws. The best way to explain is to distinguish the acts of morality and those of ethics. Socrates seems to pursue an ethics-oriented way of life. In Foucault’s words, he pursues “an ethics of pleasure” or “an aesthetics of existence.” His decision depends on the deliberation about which way is approximate to the good life for him. I also do not see the Crito provide a general theory of obligation to obey the law, but mainly show why he chooses to die. I think that one should not hope to construct Socrates’ theory of obligation to obey the law out of Apology, Crito, etc. It is in danger of building a nice house out of insufficient materials.

법과 도덕의 비교

최봉철(Choi bong chul) 성균관대학교 법학연구소 2007 성균관법학 Vol.19 No.2

  Not a few legal philosophers have made pilgrimages to two countries: the country of law and that of morals. After coming back from the pilgrimages, they have told how each one is similar or dissimilar to the other. However they have presented Quite different opinions: they are identical, similar or Quite heterogenous.<BR>  Even if it is said that the two belong to the group of norms, they do only in a nominal sense. It is wrong to say as if they have something essential in common. The fundamental difference between them can be summarized in this formula: the law is a kind of norm capable of sanctioning the violators, whereas the morals are kinds of norm demanding actors to act as they prescribe.<BR>  Because the two are radically heterogenous, we have to explain each separately. When we tries to explain such core elements of norms as rights and obligations, we have to divide rights into legal rights and moral rights and explain each of them. So of obligations. Interest theories of rights are adapt to the explanation of moral rights and will theories of rights fit to the explanation of legal rights. As for obligations, a legal obligation is as Justice Holmes once told, a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things sanction might be incumbent on him whereas a moral obligation is as Kant correctly pointed out, what should be conformed by virtue of the internal consciousness of duty itself.<BR>  The key idea of such a explanation is the difference of law and morals which should be always emphasized. On the basis of the idea, we can explain the concepts of the authority of law and the rule of law more persuasively. When we say the law have authority, it does not mean that the law is observed but that the sanctioning function of legal system is working without hinderance and resistance. The carrier of rule of law should be understood as public officers, and therefore they have the responsibility to control the sanction system to get a desirable state of the rule of law.

미국의 법률해석론 개관

최봉철(Choi, Bong Chul) 한국법학원 2020 저스티스 Vol.- No.176

법해석과 같은 주제는 비교법적 연구에 적합하다. 국내에는 독일의 법해석론을 소개하거나 그에 터 잡은 글이 상당 수 있지만, 미국의 법해석론을 다루는 글은 적다. 비교법적 연구란 다양한 경험을 알려주며, 제도의 저변을 함께 살핌으로써 문화적 특성을 파악하게 해준다. 이 논문은 미국의 법률해석론을 개관하려고 하며, 주로 연방대법원의 입장을 살필 것이다. 20세기 말 이후로 미국의 로스쿨들은 의회입법과 행정입법에 대해 다루는 과목을 1학년 필수과목으로 개설하기 시작하였고, 캐건 연방대법관은 연방대법원의 경향에 대해 ‘이제 우리 모두 문언중심론자’라고 요약한다. 즉 이는 성문법에 대한 교육이 중요해졌다는 것을 증거하며, 법률해석에서 문언을 법률해석의 한계로 보는 입장이 득세하게 되었다는 것이다. 미국의 법률해석론의 역사는 문언중심의 해석론과 목적중심의 해석론의 경합의 역사이다. 목적중심의 해석론이란 법률의 목적, 다시 말해 입법의 목적 내지 취지가 핵심을 이루는 해석론을 의미한다. 따라서 드워킨 식의 추상적인 법이념에 근거한 해석론은 미국의 실무에서는 위력을 발휘하지 못한다. 비록 법이념에 대한 고려가 판결형성 과정에서는 작용할 수 있겠지만, 적어도 판결이유에서는 언급되지 않는다. 따라서 미국의 법문화는 실증주의적이라고 평할 수 있다. 또한 이 논문은 독립 이후 현재까지 미국의 법해석론의 역사를 살핀다. 역사적으로 가장 큰 사건은 목적중심의 해석론을 정착시킨 1892년 성삼위일체 판결과 20세기 후반 이래 문언중심 법해석론의 득세라고 평할 수 있다. 이 논문은 마지막으로 미국에서 의회와 법원의 관계를 어떻게 파악하는가를 살핀다. 동료설과 대리인설이 대립된다. 특히 경성 목적중심적 해석론자라면 입법자의 의도와 법률의 문언이 충돌할 경우 전자를 우선시하기 때문에 적극적으로 동료설을 취한다고 말할 수 있다. 그러나 문언중심의 해석론자라면 의회와 법원의 관계를 상명하복의 관계로 보기 때문에 법원은 의회의 대리인이라는 입장을 취하게 된다. 캐건은 우리 모두 문언중심론자라고 하지만 이는 연방대법원에 한정하여 말하는 것뿐이다. 예를 들어 카츠먼 제2순회구 연방고등법원장은 강력하게 경성 목적 중심 해석론을 옹호한다. 이를 검토하는 중요한 이유는 우리의 법해석의 문제에 대한 시사점을 찾으려는 것이 이 논문의 목적이기 때문이다. 여하튼 이에 대한 미국에서의 논쟁은 법철학자들이 종종 말하는 빗나간 논쟁이다. 왜나하면 동료설을 주장하는 학자는 역사적인 사실에 근거하여 주장하는 반면에 대리인설을 주장하는 학자는 헌법의 구조에 비추어 주장을 펴기 때문이다. 최종적으로 이 논문은 미국의 법해석론이 가지는 비교법적 함의를 살핀다. 첫째, 미국의 문언중심의 법해석론과 독일의 객관적 법해석론은 법률 그 자체를 중시한다는 점에서 유사성이 있다. 그러나 독일의 객관적 법해석론은 추상적인 법의 목적을 해석의 기준으로 삼는다는 점에서 미국의 문언중심의 법해석론과 큰 차이를 보인다. 둘째, 최근 우리 대법원의 판결을 보면 미국의 신목적중심 법해석론과도 궤를 같이 하는 것처럼 보인다. 미국의 신목적 중심 법해석론이란 캐컨 연방대법관이 주도하는 이론이다. 김도균 교수나 공두현 판사는 우리 대법원의 법해석 경향을 독일의 객관적 해석론 내지 드워킨의 법이론과 친화력이 있다고 본다. 물론 이러한 경향이 있다는 점에 대해 부정할 생각은 없다. 반면에 김영환 교수는 입법자의 주관적인 목적에 따른 법률해석을 지지한다. 그러나 아직은 어떤 해석론이 우리의 실무에 적합한지에 대해서는 결론을 제시하기 어렵고, 법해석론에 관한 비교법적인 연구나 우리의 법해석론에 관한 심층적인 연구가 더욱 요망된다고 본다. This paper aims at introducing American historical developments and current status of the statutory interpretation of the Supreme Court. In Chapter Two, I show that the statutory interpretation has been getting more important than ever in law schools, for a growing number of schools have required a 1L course examining various aspects of statutes and regulations. Recently Justice Kagan told that we, the Justices are all textualists at a talk at Harvard Law School. It means that none of the Justices adopted strong purposivism though Justice Breyer could oppose to her comment justifiably. In Chapter Three, I describe the American history of the methodologies of statutory interpretation as the competition between purposivism and textualism. The reason why such methodologies as Dworkinian interpretive theory has been absent or hybernating is according to Eskridge that the American popular culture and tradition is congenial to legal positivism. In Chapter Four, I summarize the periodical transition of methodologies of statutory interpretation. I depend on the summary by Fleischer a German scholar on account of the lack of better works, and then supplement it. In Chapter Four, I look to the American disputes of the relation between the Congress and the judiciary. While Eskridge argues that judges are partners with Congress on the ground of historical studies, Manning contends that although the founding fathers did not resolve the judiciary’s relationship with Congress, they developed a constitutional structure that fits better with the faithful agent theory and textualism. Several years after the dispute between Eskridge and Manning, Katzmann, chief judge of a Federal Appellate Court joins coequal model, though he recognizes that the historical studies do not provide the conclusion for each side firmly. Instead of the conclusion, I suggest the implications of my essay. One is that American textualism is as a whole, quite similar to German objective theory, but they differ in one significant respect because the German objective theory embraces the interpretive method of the objective purpose of law which is impossible to prove as a fact. The other is that Korean Supreme Court appears to propose a interpretive canon quite similar to American new purposivism. The new purposivism suggests that when a text is ambiguous, the court is allowed to decide the meaning by way of legislative purpose and intent within its textual meaning.

포스트모던 법철학 : 윤리관과 정의관

최봉철(Bong Chul Choi) 한국법철학회 2001 법철학연구 Vol.4 No.2

한국의 법문화 ( 2 ) / 한국적 사법해석론 - 법개념을 중심으로

최봉철(Bong Chul Choi) 延世大學校 法科大學 法學硏究所 2000 法學硏究 Vol.9-10 No.-

市民不服從의 要件과 處罰의 문제

崔鳳哲(Bong-Chul Choi) 한국법학원 2000 저스티스 Vol.33 No.3

특집 - 법학방법론 : 법철학교육

최봉철(Bong Chul Choi) 延世大學校 法科大學 法學硏究所 2002 法學硏究 Vol.12 No.2

특집 : 미국사회의 지적 흐름 ; 미국법을 지배하는 지적 흐름 : 법현실주의

최봉철 ( Bong Chul Choi ) 서울대학교 미국학연구소 1997 미국학 Vol.20 No.-