법관의 결정의무 – 재판거부금지의 역사적 전개과정에 관하여

윤재왕 고려대학교 법학연구원 2019 고려법학 Vol.0 No.92

The judges must decide any case submitted to them; they cannot refuse to decide because of a lack of applicable norms or rules. It is called the prohibition of the denial of justice, which seems to be beyond question nowadays. The main purpose of this paper is, however, to show that such prohibition is not an a priori structure, but an evolutionary achievement. To do this, we need to closely observe the historical development of the prohibition of the denial of justice in Western legal orders. The formation of the modern state was accompanied by the concept of sovereignty. It was understood that the legislative power forms the core of sovereignty; legislation came to the fore when it comes to state power. This brought about far-reaching changes in the way people understood the relationship between legislation and interpretation as well. It is necessary to go over the prohibition for the judge to interpret legislative provisions when making a decision and hence the obligation for him to refer to the legislature how to decide the case. These principles for the judiciary can be observed in the modern history of France, Prussia and Austria in particular, whether expressly written or not. And this paper attempts to elaborate on the dramatic transformation from such référé législatif to the prohibition of déni de justice. Furthermore, a sequel to this paper will deploy Niklas Luhmann's system theory to examine the theoretical grounds for the prohibition of the denial of justice. 법관은 제기된 사건에 대해 반드시 결정을 내려야 한다. 즉 법관은 적용할 수 있는 규범이나 규칙이 없다는 이유로 재판을 거부할 수 없다. 이러한 규범은 재판거부금지라 일컬어지며, 오늘날 이를 부정하는 견해는 찾기 어렵다. 그러나 이 글에서 필자는, 재판거부금지가 역사적으로는 결코 당연한 제도가 아니며, 오랜 기간에 걸쳐 형성된 진화적 성취에 해당한다는 점을 밝히고자 한다. 이를 위해서는 재판거부금지의 연원에서부터 이것이 법제도로 정착되는 국면까지의 역사적 추적이 필수적이다. 근대 국가가 형성되면서 주권 개념이 덩달아 탄생했다. 이 때 주권의 핵심을 법률제정권으로 파악함으로써 입법이 국가권력의 알짬으로 부상하였으며, 이에 따라 법률의 제정과 해석에 관한 이해에도 커다란 변화가 일어나게 된다. 특히 법관의 해석을 금지하기에 이르렀다는 사실, 그리고 이러한 금지에 따른 문제에 대응하기 위해 법관의 문의의무라는 제도적 장치를 마련하게 된 사정에 주목할 필요가 있다. 즉 이러한 의무를 명문으로 규정한 프랑스의 역사를 찬찬히 더듬어 보고, 비록 명문의 규정을 두지는 않았으나 동일한 문제의식을 갖고 유사한 대응을 보여준 프로이센과 오스트리아의 역사도 아울러 살피고자 한다. 이어서 법관의 문의의무에서 재판거부금지로의 급격한 전환을 겪게 된 과정을 상술한다. 나아가 이 글의 속편에서는 주로 루만(Niklas Luhmann)의 체계이론의 힘을 빌려 재판거부금지의 이론적 근거를 조명해나갈 것이다.

결정강제와 재판거부금지– 체계이론적 해명을 위한 시도

윤재왕 고려대학교 법학연구원 2020 고려법학 Vol.0 No.97

The prohibition of the denial of justice (Justizverweigerungsverbot) has been taken for granted since the 19th century; it is very difficult to find any theorist trying to analyze and explain the principle. Needless to say, any jurist has never constructed a complete theory to describe the significance of the norm in the legal system as a whole, which needs us to look outside. This paper basically gives details about the correlatino among three distinctions made in the legal system: the distinction between closure/openness, code/program, and center/periphery. And this systems-theoretical approach will lead us to new insights into the position of courts in the legal system as a whole which are subject to the special pressure of the prohibition of the denial of justice. To sum up, the operational closure and the binary code are dealt with in the center of the legal system which lies far away from the environment, whereas the structural coupling and the programs are coped with in the periphery which stays in close contact with the environment. This can be applied to the sub-systems including the legal system as well. While courts as the center of the legal system deal with its code of legal/illegal and accomplish its closure, legislators and contracting parties as its periphery generate its programs and guarantee its openness. Statutes need not to be passed and contracts need not to be concluded, but courts must decide every case submitted to them. This compulsory decision-making gives an institutional expression to the closure and the code dealt with in the center of the legal system; only courts are subject to this basic norm, or the prohibition of the denial of justice. 재판거부금지는 19세기부터는 너무나도 당연시된 나머지 이에 대한 이론적 해명을 시도하는 경우를 좀처럼 찾아보기 어렵다. 특히 이 금지규범이 법체계 전체에서 차지하고 있는 위치를 하나의 완결된 이론적 토대 위에서 설명하려는 법학 내재적 이론은 존재하지 않는다. 이 글에서는 인식 관심을 법학의 외부로 전환함으로써 법체계의 폐쇄성/개방성의 구별, 코드/프로그램의 구별, 중심/주변의 구별이라는 세 가지 좌표계를 설정하고, 이러한 체계이론적 접근을 통해 재판거부금지라는 독특한 강제를 받는 사법부가 전체 법체계에서 어떠한 위치를 점하고 있는지를 해명하고자 한다. 요컨대, 환경과 상당한 거리를 유지하고 있는 체계의 중심에서는 폐쇄성과 코드가 관리되는 반면, 환경과 밀접한 접촉을 유지하는 체계의 주변에서는 개방성과 프로그램이 관리된다. 이를 부분체계인 법체계에 적용해보면, 법체계의 중심을 차지하는 법원은 코드를 관리하면서 법체계의 폐쇄성을 보장하는 반면, 법체계의 주변에 위치한 입법부나 계약 당사자는 프로그램을 생산하면서 법체계의 개방성을 보장한다. 입법부나 계약 당사자는 반드시 결정을 내려야 할 강제하에 있지 않지만, 법원은 어떠한 경우에도 결정을 내려야 하는 강제하에 있다. 이러한 결정강제는 법체계의 중심에서 관리되는 폐쇄성과 코드의 제도적 표현에 해당하고, 이것이 바로 법원에 대해서만 구속력을 갖는 근본규범인 재판거부금지이다.

법, 진리, 권위

윤재왕 한국법철학회 2013 법철학연구 Vol.16 No.2

업무방해와 파업방해(Ⅱ) - 대법원 2011. 3. 17. 선고 2007도482 전원합의체 판결의 법치국가적 문제점

윤재왕,임철희 노동법이론실무학회 2016 노동법포럼 Vol.- No.17

The Supreme Court (17 March 2011, 2007do482) have revised the former opinion of the punishability of the collective refusal to work, but still hold the view: if a strike were “committed abruptly at a time unpredictable to the employer causing serious confusion or material damage”, then strikers would be charged with the “obstruction of business” under article 314 (1) of criminal code. In this paper we try to show that this revised opinion of the Supreme Court is still unconstitutional and anticonstitutional. A strike can only exercise force over the employer if it has already disrupted a business operation. Therefore a strike can not be an exercise of force which shall disrupt a business operation. The assertion, a strike is criminal, is based on a slurring of the two constituent elements of the criminal obstruction of business, scilicet the exercise of force and the interference with business operation. This violates the principle rule of clarity. The Supreme Court’s view is also anticonstitutional due to the lack of consideration that the article 33 (1) of constitution guarantees the free choice of mediums of industrial action and that material damages to the employer is a criminal irrelevant risk.

실증주의 이후 시대의 법률과 판결

윤재왕 한국법철학회 2016 법철학연구 Vol.19 No.1

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신칸트주의 법철학에서 ‘방법이원주의’ ― 존재와 당위의 관계에 대한 구스타브 라드브루흐의 입장

윤재왕 한국법철학회 2017 법철학연구 Vol.20 No.1

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업무방해와 파업방해(I)

윤재왕,임철희 노동법이론실무학회 2015 노동법포럼 Vol.- No.16

The Supreme Court (17 March 2011, 2007do482) have revised the former opinion of the punishability of the collective refusal to work, but still hold the view: if a strike were “committed abruptly at a time unpredictable to the employer causing serious confusion or material damage”, then strikers would be charged with the “obstruction of business” under article 314 (1) of criminal code. In this paper I try to show that this revised opinion of the Supreme Court is still unconstitutional and anticonstitutional. A strike can only exercise force over the employer if it has already disrupted a business operation. Therefore a strike can not be an exercise of force which shall disrupt a business operation. The assertion, a strike is criminal, is based on a slurring of the two constituent elements of the criminal obstruction of business, scilicet the exercise of force and the interference with business operation. This violates the principle rule of clarity. The Supreme Court’s view is also anticonstitutional due to the lack of consideration that the article 33 (1) of constitution guarantees the free choice of mediums of industrial action and that material damages to the employer is a criminal irrelevant risk.

노동법과 형법 - 노동력의 형법적 보호를 둘러싼 후고 진츠하이머와 구스타프 라드브루흐의 대립과 화해 -

윤재왕 노동법이론실무학회 2013 노동법포럼 Vol.- No.11

Die vorliegende Abhandlung ist ein kurzer Bericht über eine Verhandlung des 35. deutschen Juristenstentages, der 1928 in Salzburg gehalten wurde. Dabei handelt es sich um die Verhandung der Abteilung 'Wirtschafts- und Finanzrecht' über das Thema 'Der strafrechtliche Schutz der Arbeitskraft'. Auf dieser Bühne traten zwei prominente Rechtswissenschftler auf, nämlich Gustav Radbruch, einer der bekantesten Rechtsphilosophen des 20 Jahrhunderts einerseits und Hugo Sinzheimer, der Vater des deutschen Arbeitsrechts andererseits. Im Vorfeld des Juristentages hat Radbuch in einem kleinen Aufsatz dafür plädiert, die Arbeitskraft mittels des Strafrechts zu schützen. Demgegenüber hat Sinzheimer aufgrund seiner festen Überzeugung über die Autonomie des Arbeitsrechts und auch über die Selbsthilfekraft der Arbeiterklasse an der Einmischung des Stafrechts in die Arbeitsverhältnisse eine grundlegende Kritik ausgeübt. Gleichzeitig sah er in der Kliminalisierung eine große Gefahr, weil das Strafrecht dessen Spieß umdrehen und als Waffe gegen die Arbeitnehmer verwendet werden kann. So bewertete er den strafrechtlichen Schutz der Arbeitskraft als einen zweischneidigen Schwert. Vor diesem Hintergrung optierte Sinzheimer für die Verstärkung und Fortbildung der sozialgesetzgeberischen Maßnahmen als besten Weg zum Arbeitskraftschutz. Im Rahmen der Verhandlung hat Radbruch bei beinah allen Punkten seine frühre Ansichten hinter sich lassen und die Berechtigung der Sinzheimer‘s Kritik bestätigen. Diese wissenschaftliche Auseinandersetzung muss eine große Anregung dafür gegeben haben, dass Radbruch später sein soziales Rechtsdenken entwickelt hat. Der Verfasser hofft, dass dieser kleine historische Reisebericht einen Anlass dazu bieten könnte, über das Verhältnis von Arbeits- und Strafrecht bzw. die Rolle des Arbeitsstrafrecht in der gesamten Rechtsordnung kritisch nachzudenekn.

법적 논증이론과 절차적 정의

윤재왕 법과사회이론학회 1992 법과 사회 Vol.5 No.1

개인주의적 절대주의 - 토마스 홉스의 국가철학과 법철학에 관하여

윤재왕 원광대학교 법학연구소 2012 法學硏究 Vol.28 No.2

Die neuzeitliche Staats- und Rechtsphilosophie beginnt mit dem “Leviathan” von Thomas Hobbes. Dieser umstrittene Begründer des Modernen geht bekanntlich davon aus, dass jeder Mensch im Naturzustand eine unbegrenzte Freiheit und Gleichheit genießt, die er mit dem Begriff der natürlichen Rechte zusammenzufassen versucht. In diesem Naturzustand herrscht jedoch der Krieg aller gegen alle, gerade weil jeder sine natürrliche Rechte frei und gleich ausüben kann. Um diesen Zustand zu überwinden sollen alle Menschen einen Vertrag abschließen, mit dem sie erklären, auf ihre Rechte samt und sonders zu verzichten. Dadurch entsteht allerdings noch kein Staat. Denn die bloße Verzichtserklärung gründet noch keine gemeinsame Gewalt. Wenn die Vertragsparteien einen Souverän authorisieren, damit er als einzig höchster Gewalt alle „innerstaatliche“ Rechte in seiner Hand monopolisiert, erst dann kommt ein souveräner Staat zustande, den Hobbes mit dem biblischen Ungeheuer “Leviathan” tituliert. In dieser Hinsicht ist der Leviathan ein Menschenwerk, d.h. ein von Menschen geschaffenes Konstrukt. Deshalb läßt sich zweifelsohne sagen, dass die Idee des Individualismus bei Hobbes wenigstens von der Genesis der Theoriekonstriuktion her eine entscheidende Rolle spielt. Allerdings bleibt die absolute Herrschaft des Souverän, die unumschränkte Gewaltoberhoheit von dieser individualistischen Genesis unberührt. Der Souverän und seine Gesetze kennen keinen Individualismus, und die individuelle Freiheit schmelzt sich in einem gigantischen Hochofen namens “Leviathan” ab. So gesehen, trennt sich die absolutistische Geltung bei der Staats- und Rechtsphilosophie von Hobbes von der individualischen Geltung strikt ab. Vor diesem Hintergrund versucht die vorliegende Abhandlung anhand des Textes von Hobbes zu zeigen, dass das Schlüsselwort „Individualistscher Absolutismus“ trotz oder sogar wegen seines widersrprüchlichen Implikationen nicht nur ein mögliches, sondern auch ein notwendiges Schlusswort für eine dem Text gerechte Hobbes-Interpretation ist.