환경 윤리학에서 이성중심주의

배의용 東國大學校 嶺南地域發展硏究所 1998 地域發展硏究 Vol.4 No.1

[논평]「眞心의 현상학」에 대한 논평

배의용 새한철학회 2001 새한철학회 학술대회 발표논문집 Vol.2001 No.11

후설과 프레게의 의미론

배의용 동국대학교 경주대학 1993 東國論集 Vol.12 No.-

유식학의 유가행과 현상학적 방법 : 언어적 관점에서의 비교 A comparative study from a linguistic point of view

배의용 한국불교학회 1997 韓國佛敎學 Vol.23 No.-

유식론과 현상학에서 식의 존재 문제

배의용 동국대학교 동서사상연구소 2008 철학·사상·문화 Vol.0 No.6

As is generally known, the development of Husserlian phenomenology through Heideggerian thought of Being left behind the problem of existence of consciousness as a aporia. Started with this problem-consciousness, to understand Yogācāra’s standpoint about this matter from the henomenological point of view obliges us to concentrate on the structural explication of the Tri-svabhāvavada(三性說) as its fundamental doctrine rather than on the historical explanation of it. In this paper we will point out some features of the Tri-svabhāvavada that are comparable with Husserlian Phenomenogy: Firstly, the Paratantra-svabhāva(依他起性) as the actuality of consciousness is contrasted with the intentionality as the essence of consciousness in Phenomenogy. Secondly, the process of conversion of the Para-tantra-svabhāva from the Parikalpita-svabhāva(遍計所執性) to the Parinispanna-svabhāva(圓成實性) is comparable to phenomenological reduction. However, from the Husserlian phenomenological point of view, the Parinispanna-svabhāva as the original mode of existence of consciousness - “Being of Nothingness”(無의 有) - should be enigmatic. In the last analysis, the reason must be found in the fact while intentionality is epistemologically oriented, Paratantra-svabhāva ontologically. 후설 현상학이 하이데거의 존재사유를 거치면서 의식의 존재 문제가 아포리로 남게 되었음은 주지하는 바이다. 이러한 서양 현대철학사상의 문제론에서 출발하여 이 문제에 대한 유가행파의 견지를 현상학적인 관점에서 이해하고자 하는 데 이 글의 목적이 있다. 이에 따라 본고의 논의는 당연히 불교사적인 고찰보다는 유가행파의 근본교설인 삼성설의 구조적인 이해에 주력하게 될 것이다. 심의식이 윤회와 해탈의 가능 근거라고 보는 유가행파의 견지는 삼성설에서 심의식의 본질을 의타기성으로 규정하는 데서 명확히 드러난다. 심의식의 의타기성은 의식의 존재 방식에 관한 유가행파의 입장을 단적으로 말해준다. 이에 따르면, 의식은 고정된 존재가 아니라 인간의 실존 방식에 따라 변계소집성과 원성실성으로 전환되는 가변적인 것이다. 우리가 자신을 망각하고 객관적 세계의 존재를 절대시할 때, 의식은 은폐되어 한낱 비유(非有)로 보인다. 그러나 유가행의 실천을 통해 유식성에 오입할 때, 은폐되어 있던 의식이 세계의 존재근거로서 존재함(有)을 알게 된다. 더 나아가 마침내 허망분별을 단멸하고, 원성실성을 성취하게 되면, 세계와 함께 의식도 없어져 무(無)가 된다. 그래서 유가행파에서는 식의 진정한 존재방식을 궁극적으로 “無의 有”라고 규정한다. 이상과 같은 유가행파의 교설에서 우리는 후설 현상학과 대비될만한 몇 가지 점을 지적할 수 있다. 첫째로, 삼성설에서 심의식의 현실성인 의타기성은 현상학에서 의식의 본질 규정인 지향성과 대조적이다. 둘째로, 의타기성이 변계소집성에서 원성실성으로 전환되는 과정은 확실히 현상학적인 환원과 대비된다. 하지만 의식의 본래적인 존재 방식으로서의 원성실성 - “無의 有” - 은 현상학적 입장에서는 아무래도 불가해하게 여겨질 수밖에 없다. 그 이유는 결국 지향성이 인식론적으로 방향 잡힌 데 반하여, 의타기성은 존재론적으로 방향 잡혀 있다는 데서 찾아야 할 것이다.

역사적, 학제적 배경에서 본 현상학적 방법

배의용 동국대학교 경주대학 2000 東國論集 Vol.19 No.-

Husserl's phenomenological method can be divided largely in two reflection-dimensions, i.e. that of substantial reflection and that of methodical reflection. Again to subdivide first dimension is four steps, i.e. ε˙ποχ??(abstention from judgement), transcendental reduction, eidetic reduction and description conforms to my basic intention in this paper. This lies in orderly consideration of these four steps in virtue of the second dimension. The concepts of epoche and reduction already have manifold adumbrations of ambiguous meanings which they got from their various usages in many disciplines. I consider first two concepts with these meanings for a historical and interdisciplinary background and provide a wider perspective to understand them on the more whole. Especially I want to verify the importance of the linguistic aspect of phenomenological description which has scarcely been paid adequate regards. As a result, a more complete picture of the phenomenological method shall be drawn.

김형효 교수의 『하이데거와 마음의 철학』을 읽고

배의용(서평자) 한국현상학회 2000 철학과 현상학 연구 Vol.15 No.-

『論理硏究』에 나타난 E. Husserl의 言語哲學

裵義勇 신룡교학회 1984 정신개벽논집 Vol.3 No.-

기호와 의미

裵義勇 동국대학교 철학회 1989 哲學思想 Vol.10-11 No.-

現象學的 本質主義 : 그 意義와 問題性

裵義勇 圓光大學校 1984 論文集 Vol.18 No.1

1. Nowadays, in antimetaphysical epoch, the word "Wesen" is heard to us as ominous metaphysical phantom. Nontheless Husserlian Phenomenology searches for the essences so earnestly that they are determinant elements for it. Why Husserl must do make it so? He proposed the ideal of <Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft> and <Die erste Philosophie> as his ultimate philosophical end. Now this ideal is the one of the system of the absolute and apodictic evidence. Husserl believes that this evidence can be acquired by the method of <eidetische Einsicht>, <Wesensanschauung>. Essences are nothing other than the necessary conditions which make the necessary truth possible. But does the way in which phenomenology searches for the ideal of apodictic absolute evidence lie in a singleline? Can we see the <eidetische Reduktion> and the <transzendentale Reduktion> are two lines to seek the dieal? Or must the transzendent essences necessarily be subjected to the transzendental reduction, and then, by this procedure, what sorts of dignity is given to the essences? This is the central problem which we intend to examine in this paper. 2. "Apoicticity" means the indubitable absolute certainty, which Descartes allowed to the cognition of one's own thinking act(cogito). It is the <Archimedian Point> upon which all necessarily true knowledge depends. For husserl the point is just the transcendental subjectivity (ego). That is, transcendental subjectivity is the origin of apodictic certainty. This allows that all of the modes of consciousness can now be understood as modifications of consciousness of the primordial dator intuition <originar gebende Anschauung> which is the original mode of consciousness. On this respect Husserl's most radical step is the extension of positivism to the realm of essences. He cont ends that eidetic intuition is directly parallel to empirical intuition since <Ideation> brings the essence to bodily presence. 3. Already in his Philosophy of Arithmetic of 1884 discovered husserl the concept of an act of higher oder, which afterwards developes to categorical act. According to his new conception of intentionality, every act has a correlate object. Now, to a normal sensory perceptive act corresponds a real object, while to the categorical act founded in sensory perception corresponds the categorical object. This categorical object Husserl calls the general object which is ideal, identical, iterable. Husserl's ideation is a process of free variation by which the individual and contingent characteristics of phenomena are bracketed out of considerations and are replaced by necessity and generality. 4. The generalized correlate of consciousness Husserl calls an eidos or "essence". The essence belongs to the realm of pure possibility. And pure possibility is, for Husserl, the realm of the "Phantasiable", the purely imaginable or conceivable. Through an <Denkexperiment> one is left with an ideal object which can be the set of conditions governing the possibility of a given object and ultimately any conceivable actualization of it. But our insight into essences may well be incomplete, that is, the set of conditions which we uncover for a given structure may be partial. And then, How can be reconcilated the possibility of deception inhernet in the evidence of essential intuition as experience with the claim to absolute apodictic evidence of it? Our living consciousness has "the all-pervasive teleological structure". The evidence of a new experience is what makes the previously uncontested experience undergo that modification of believing called "annulment" or "cancellation". Evidence of experience is therefore always presupposed by this process. When we proceed with reflective unquiry which always sticks to pure intuiting and is faithful to its pure contents, we have continuously anew the living truth from the living source, which is our absolute life.