해상진지 고하도가 지니는 해양전략적 의의

박주미 ( Park Joo Mee ) 미래군사학회 2019 한국군사학논총 Vol.8 No.1

Research on Chungmugong Yi Sun-shin has been conducted continuously in the circles of historical studies. However, relatively less research has been done in the perspective of maritime strategy that has to involve the application of military science and sea battles history both. Here, this study has analyzed “Gohado”, the marine foothold selected by Chungmugong for battles, in the perspective of maritime strategy. Utilized as a marine stronghold during wartime which restored the naval forces of Chosun almost destroyed after Cilcheonryang Haejeon, Gohado is a place equipped with great value for research not just historically but as maritime strategy, too. To address the goal, in Chapter 2, this author examines the three conditions of marine stronghold - self sufficiency, defense, strategic point - through the theories of Alfred Mahan, Julian Corbett, Stephen B. Luce, the representative maritime strategists. Next, in Chapter 3, this researcher looks into the time background of Gohado and the results there actually were in that foothold when Navy Headquarters were built to examine whether it corresponds to maritime strategist’s theories. According to the results, Gohado was a place that met the three conditions of a marine stronghold that Mahan, Corbett and Luce suggested. Particularly, considering the circumstances, as Gohado was a place where the naval forces of Chosun could be fully ready for the fight by meeting strategic objectives, “defense” and “reconstruction”. Based on the results above, this author has understood the significance of Gohado as maritime strategy and also the fact that it was selected as a sea base by Chungmugong Yi Sun-shin in consideration of the details synthetically including preparation for war or provision of aid.

정유재란 시기 이순신 처벌 당위성에 대한 고찰 - 해군의 임무형 지휘를 중심으로-

박주미 ( Park Joo Mee ) 미래군사학회 2022 한국군사학논총 Vol.11 No.1

정유재란 시기 조선수군은 일본의 재침공을 앞두고 갑작스럽게 최고 지휘관의 교체라는 상황을 맞게 되었다. 그리고 그 결과, 칠천량해전에서 조선수군은 궤멸하였다. 본 연구는 칠천량해전의 결정적 패인이 되었던 이순신의 처벌과 최고 지휘관의 교체는 ‘정유재란 시기 잘못된 형태의 임무형 지휘가 조선수군에 적용되고 있었기 때문에 발생한 결과였다’라는 것을 증명하였다. 임무형 지휘는 하급 부대에서 주도적이고 창의적으로 임무를 수행할 수 있도록 하기 위한 지휘개념이다. 해군 작전에서도 승리하기 위해서는 임무형 지휘가 이루어져야 한다. 그러나 분석결과, 정유재란 시기 조선수군에게는 임무형 지휘의 6가지 원칙 모두 잘못된 형태로 적용되고 있었다. 또한, 이순신에게 처음 내려졌던 처벌, '사형' 역시 임무형 지휘 관점에서 볼 때는 당위성을 지니기 어려웠다. 조선수군에게 급박하게 출전하라는 선조의 명령은 당시 조선수군의 인원, 배, 장비 등 물리적 준비 기간 등을 전혀 고려하지 않아 이순신이 곧바로 이행할 수 없는 불가능한 것이었다. 이에 조선수군은 매우 급하게 출전 준비를 마쳐야만 했었다. 또한, 선조는 현장과 소통이 어려운 한양에 있었기 때문에 이러한 상황을 상부에 곧바로 설명하고 이해시킬 수 없었던 것이다. 역사에서 증명하듯 해군 작전에서 임무형 지휘가 제대로 적용되지 않는다면 승리할 수 없다. 우리는 정유재란 시기 잘못된 임무형 지휘의 적용과 이순신 처벌의 결과가 어떠했는지를 잊지 않고, 교훈을 얻어야 한다. Before the Jeongyujaran [the Second Invasion of the Japanese Troop] (1597~1598) after its first invasion of Joseon [Korea] in 1592, the supreme commander of the Joseon Navy was abruptly changed from Yi Sun-sin to Won Gyun. Mainly because of the shift of top commander, the Joseon Navy was completely defeated in the Chilcheonryang naval battle. This research proved that the punishment of Yi Sun-sin and replacement of the top leader of the Joseon Navy served as the crucial reason for the defeat of the battle, and both the replacement of the commander and the defeat in the battle were the results of wrongly applying mission command to the Joseon navy. Mission command is the concept of command which allows sub-units under the commander to conduct their military operations autonomously and creatively. In marine operations as well, mission command can be effective. But, the analysis of the Jeongyujaran revealed that the Joseon navy applied all the six principles of mission command not in correct ways. In addition, the punishment of 'death sentence' imposed on Yi Sun-sin cannot be validated from the perspective of mission command. First of all, so the royal directive to attack the Japanese fleet did not take into account the situation of Joseon Navy such as ships and personnel that Yi was unable to carry out it right away. In such a situation, Joseon Navy had to hurry to prepare for attacking the enemy fleet according to the royal directive. And Yi could not explain the situation of Joseon Navy immediately because the king was far away from the scene. History has proven that, if mission command is not properly applied, a battle cannot be won. We should not forget the lesson of the Jeongyujaran where the mission command was wrongly applied in the battle, and in the punishment of Yi Sun-sin.

전투사례를 통해 본 정신전력의 중요성과 강화방안

박주미(Park, Joo-mee) 국방정신전력원 2018 정신전력연구 Vol.0 No.55

본 연구는 과연 정신전력이란 무엇이고, 왜 중요한 것일까에 대한 답을 찾기 위해 기존 연구 성과를 바탕으로 정신전력 구성요소를 확인하고, 실제사례에 적용시켜 본 후 강화방안을 도출하였다. 무형전력에 대한 연구의 어려움에도 불구하고 클라우제비츠의 『전쟁론』, 손자의 『손자병법』, 아르뎅 뒤 피크의 『전투연구』등에서 볼 수 있듯 수많은 군사 전략가들은 전쟁의 승리에 있어 정신전력의 중요성을 강조하고 있었다. 2장에서 이들의 연구를 종합한 결과, 이들이 공통적으로 정신전력을 강화시키는 요소로 주장했던 부분을 확인하였다. 첫째 지휘관, 둘째 (부대원들의) 군기와 사기, 셋째 연습과 훈련, 군사교육이 그것이었다. 3장에서는 이 요소를 임진왜란 시기 충무공 이순신의 명량해전과 원균의 칠천량 해전에 적용시켜 이 세 가지가 정말 무형전력을 변화시켜 전쟁의 승패를 바꾸었는지를 확인해 보았다. 그리고 그 결과 조선 수군의 리더였던 충무공 이순신과 원균은 임진왜란 시기의 해전에서 부대원의 군기와 사기, 그리고 교육훈련 등의 요소를 변화시켰고, 그 결과 서로 다른 결과를 가져왔던 것을 확인할 수 있었다. 4장에서는 지금까지의 논의를 종합하여 정신전력 강화방안을 다음의 세 가지로 도출해 보았다. 첫째, 지휘관의 자질 함양, 둘째, 부대의 군기와 사기를 측정하기 위한 부대 정밀진단과 계획수립, 마지막 정신전력 교육 및 훈련강화가 그것이다. 정신전력은 보이지 않는 무형 요소지만 군사 전략가들의 이론과 근거, 그리고 실제 역사적 사례를 통해 국가전력의 중요부분으로 전승의 기본이 된다는 사실을 확인하였다. ‘전쟁’의 본질에는 언제나 ‘인간’이 있기 때문이다. The purpose of this study is to find an answer to what spiritual combat power is and why it is important. To address the goal, the researcher reviewed literatures and found out the components of spiritual combat power. Furthermore, the researcher also derived a strengthening plan by applying the components to the real cases. Despite the difficulty of conducting research on intangible combat power, a number of military strategists has stressed the importance of spiritual combat power for winning the war, as seen in Karl Clausewitz’s 『Vom Kriege』, Sun Tzu’s 『The Art of War』, or Ardant du Picq’s 『Battle Studies』. In chapter 2, the researcher summarizes the results of the researches and finds out what they commonly had emphasized to enhance spiritual combat power: first, commander, second, (the troops’) military discipline and morale, and third, practice and training, and military training. In Chapter 3, the researcher applies the three components to Yi Sun-shin’s Battle of Myeongnyang and Won Gyun’s Battle of Chilcheonryang during Imjinwaeran (Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592) and examines whether the components really changed their intangible combat power and influenced victory or defeat in the war. According to the results, Chungmugong Yi Sun-shin and Won Gyun who were the leaders of Chosun’s naval forces changed elements such as the troops’ military discipline and morale and educational training in their own ways in the naval battles during Imjinwaeran. As a result, they led to different results. In Chapter 4, the researcher sums up discussions in the previous chapters and figures out three ways to enhance spiritual combat power. The first is to improve commanders’ qualities. The second is to diagnose the troops precisely and devise plans to measure their military discipline and morale. The third is to reinforce education and training of spiritual combat power. Although spiritual combat power is one of the intangible elements, the researcher has found that it is the basis of winning in the war as an important part of a nation’s combat power is based on military strategists’ theories and grounds and actual cases in the history. It is because in the essence of ‘war’, there always are ‘humans’.

이순신의 전쟁 대비 전라좌수영 수군진 운영 연구 -『무경칠서』에 의한 전투준비태세 현장 점검 행적 중심으로 -

박주미 ( Park Joo Mee ),고광섭 ( Ko Kwang-soob ) 미래군사학회 2023 한국군사학논총 Vol.12 No.4

임진왜란 발발 후 이순신의 전라좌수영 수군함대는 이미 남해의 제해권을 장악한 일본군과 급작스럽게 해전을 치러야만 했다. 그러나 이들은 개전 초 궤멸한 경상 수군함대와 달리 첫 출전에 이어서 2차 출전에 이르기까지 연속하여 승리를 거두었다. 준비가 없는 당연한 결과는 없기에 본 연구는 이순신이 어떻게 전투를 준비하였는지 임진왜란 발발 전 전라좌수영에서의 행적을 통해 분석하였다. 그리고 무과시험의 필수과목이었던 『무경칠서』를 통해 이순신이 왜 이러한 전투 준비를 하게 되었는지를 고찰하였다. 즉, “이순신은 『무경칠서』를 통한 병법의 원리에 근거하여 체계적으로 전투 준비를 하였음”을 입증하였다. 연구 분석 결과 이순신은 『무경칠서』의 병법 원리에 따라 평시에도 전시에 대비하여 전쟁을 준비했다. 본 연구는 북한과의 정전 상태인 오늘날의 우리가 전시에 대비하기 위해서는 평시에 무엇을 어떻게 준비해야 하는지 시사한다. 언제 어디서든 싸울 수 있도록 ‘전쟁을 철저히 준비한 자가 당연히 승리한다’라는 것이 『무경칠서』와 역사가 주는 중요한 교훈이다. After the outbreak of the Imjin War, Admiral Yi Sun-sin's Jeolla Left Navy found itself in the imperative position of engaging the Japanese forces that already controlled the waters around Namhae. In stark contrast to the tragic fate of the Gyeongsang Right Navy in early encounters, the Jeolla Left Navy achieved continuous victories from the first engagement to the second. Recognizing that preparation is the key to success, this study analyzes Admiral Yi Sun-sin's preparations for battles before the Imjin War outbreak, with a focus on his actions in the Jeolla Left Navy. Additionally, by examining Mugyeong Chilseo, an essential subject for the martial arts test, the study investigates why Yi Sun-sin undertook such preparations. The findings confirm that Admiral Yi Sun-shin systematically prepared for battle based on the principles of integrated military law in Mugyeong Chilseo. The research reveals that Admiral Yi Sun-sin adhered to the principles of 'Mugyeong Chilseo' to prepare for war even during peacetime. This study suggests contemporary implications for preparing for war in the present era of armistice with North Korea. The crucial lesson from Mugyeong Chilseo and history is that those who thoroughly prepare for war will naturally win, allowing them to be ready to fight anytime, anywhere.

19세기 해군 과학기술에 따른 영국해군의 계급구조 변화가 미래전 대비에 주는 함의

박주미(Joo Mee Park) 한국해군과학기술학회 2024 Journal of the KNST Vol.7 No.1

In the 19th century, the British Royal Navy held absolute supremacy, yet it was highly conservative in the face of change. How did the class structure of the British Navy change due to scientific and technological advancements in the 19th century, and what significance did such changes carry? In this study, an analysis of the changes in the class structure of the British Navy in the 19th century was conducted using the method of explanatory or causative case studies. The aim was to examine lessons and precautions for future wars based on this research. The analysis reveals that in response to the changing nature of warfare due to the emergence of new technologies, the British Royal Navy in the 19th century pursued the horizontal and diversified restructuring of its class system, driving military innovation. To effectively prepare for future wars, our navy must expedite military innovation through changes in tactics, doctrines, organization, and other aspects.

명량해전 이후 조선함대의 해상진 이동 이유에 대한 전략적 분석 - 콜벳의 현존함대 전략을 중심으로

박주미 ( Park,Joo Mee ) 미래군사학회 2021 한국군사학논총 Vol.10 No.1

During the Japanese Invasion of Korea (1592-8), the period after Chilcheonryang Sea Battle, and, in particular, after the Myeongryang Sea Battle which was won by the Joseon fleet against the Japanese navy, even if the former was much weaker than the latter was an important period when the Joseon fleet could build a footstep to stand up again against the Japanese navy. According to Nanjungilgi [War Diary] by Admiral Lee Sun-shin of Joseon, Admiral Lee, after the miraculous victory at the Myeongryang Sea Battle, moved his battle-tired fleet up to Gogunsan Island, and continued to return to Goha Island near port Mokpo along the same route. While the diary recorded the routes of naval base and the dates, it did not mention the reasons why he decided to continue to move the fleet, causing various interpretations for the reasons. Therefore, this study tried to analyze the reasons for his decision to move around the fleet after winning the Myeongryang Sea Battle, using the Corbett's theory of fleet-in-being as the analytical frame which explains the strategy which the weaker side can take against the stronger party to secure command of the sea. The analysis of the diary and other historical records applying Corbett's 'the fleet-in-being strategy' resulted in the following conclusion. The reason why Admiral Lee continued to move his fleet after the Myeongryang Sea Battle was part of his successful strategy of fleet-in-being to secure control of the sea. Through the faithful implementation of the strategy, the Joseon fleet could dramatically recover from the crushing defeat of the Chilcheonryang Sea Battle.

거북선 함포의 유효사거리와 사각구역 규명에 관한 연구

고광섭(Kwang-Soob Ko),박주미(Joo Mee Park) 한국해군과학기술학회 2024 Journal of the KNST Vol.7 No.1

The superiority of cannons mounted on the BTS(Battle Turtle Ship) or Panokseon was a crucial factor in Admiral Yi Sun-sins victories. However, research or evaluations regarding the effective range in practical combat situations at that time are scarce. This study addresses the effective range and blind spots of the cannons mounted on the BTS during the Imjin War period through a novel geometric analysis method applying trigonometric principles. The research results revealed that during Admiral Yi Sun-sins naval battles, the BTS advanced to the forefront of the Joseon Navy at the beginning of the engagement, closing in on enemy ships and delivering close-range strikes to their hulls. Considering the effective range and blind spot analysis of the cannons in the future, there is a need for a reassessment of Admiral Yi Sun-sins naval battles and the BTS tactics.