전환시대의 미국의 지성, 1880-1940 : 반사회진화론자와 그들의 영향을 중심으로

김봉중 전남사학회 1997 역사학연구 Vol.11 No.-

제2차 세계대전중 일본인 강제격리로 본 미국인의 반일본인 감정 , 1882 - 1942

김봉중 한국미국사학회 1997 미국사연구 Vol.6 No.-

카터 인권외교에 대한 재조명

김봉중 한국미국사학회 1999 미국사연구 Vol.10 No.-

This paper is a reevaluation of Jimmy Carter's human rights policy. Carter's human rights policy is a central element in evaluating his entire presidency in general and his foreign policy in particular. With the failure of his reelection, which had much to do with the Iran hostage crisis and the economic recession, the overall evaluation of the presidency of Jimmy Carter has been in the negative. Carter's human rights record was no exception. The rise of neo-conservatism with the election of Ronald Reagan fanned the flames of the criticism of Carter's human rights diplomacy. Starting in the late 1980s, however, scholars began to reevaluate the presidency of Jimmy Carter, including his human rights policy. President Carter was doing all that he had been asked to do, the arguments go, in order to achieve the best possible interests for the nation and the international community. The revisionists blame the condition in and outside of the United States for the failure of his diplomacy, not Carter's personal shortcomings. Both conservatives and revisionists take the failure of Carter's human rights policy for granted. The only difference between them is that the former focuses on Carter's personal weakness in handling foreign affairs while the latter looks to the circumstances surrounding the nation. This paper follows the line of revisionists. However, it calls into question the judgement that Carter's human rights was failed. The moral dimension of foreign policy, such as human rights, needs a longer period of observation than the realistic approach does before one can see any meaningful results. The improvement in human rights as a result of Carter's policy was a fact, albeit it came at various speeds--in some countries, mostly in Latin America, the results came immediately, while in others, for instance, the Soviet Union and South Korea, they came years later after the end of the Carter administration. No one can deny the fact that Carter's stance on human rights effected nearly every country Carter made an issue of during his term. Not until the detailed studies on the effects of the Carter human rights record upon individual countries or regimes appear can we arrive at a more objective analysis of the Carter's human rights policy.

냉전 , 베트남 , 그리고 역사적 기억 : 로버트 맥나매라와 미국의 베트남 전쟁 개입 Robett McNamara and American Intervention into the Vietnam Conflict

김봉중 한국미국사학회 2000 미국사연구 Vol.12 No.-

Robert McNarnara, who had served under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations as Secretary of Defense and who had been quiet over the debate on the U.S. involvement in Vietnam in which he was deeply involved, began to speak out about the war. In less than four years from 1995 to 1999, he has published two books recollecting, reflecting, and interpreting the Vietnam War: one is his personal memoir, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (1995): the other is his views on the war, Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy (1999). $quot;Corning out$quot; of McNamara with these books sheds new light on the American involvement in Vietnam, one of the most controversial topics in contemporary American history. The paper traces the American intervention in the Vietnam conflict from the last days of Eisenhower in the White House through the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations to the fatal decision of Johnson to adopt the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in August 1964. It takes Mcnamara's personal recollections as a tool in reconstructing and reinterpreting the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Comparing McNamara's arguments over the Vietnam issues with the scholarship written before and after the publication of his two books, the paper tries to find validity and objectivity in his recollections. Of concern to this author most is what made McNamara and other American leaders act as they did in regards with Vietnam. The paper stresses the fact that McNamara was a captive of the time he was living in, It was the time of the Cold War, when the majority of Americans, policy makers and the public alike, were deeply immersed into the Cold War mentality, which made it impossible for them to think otherwise. Thus it is all the more necessary to reconstruct the entire story of American intervention in Vietnam within the context of the time, the Cold War. McNamara admits that he and other American leaders made mistakes in judging the nature of the Vietnam War. They understood the war as a political not military conflict, which served as one of the most important reasons for the American failure in the war. Given the Cold War mentality dominating the minds of Americans of the age, it would be very unlikely to expect the American policy makers to do otherwise even though they perceived the nature of the war as an inevitable internal conflict of the Vietnamese themselves.

전환기의 미국외교와 카터 인권외교의 등장

김봉중 한국미국사학회 2003 미국사연구 Vol.17 No.-

This paper traces the back ground of human rights policies of Jimmy Carter from the period of the end of the Vietnam conflict to the first year of the Carter administration, which includes the rising role of Congress in the matters of foreign relations and its impact upon human rights policies to earlier administrations prior to Carter. It tries to answer these questions: Can human rights policies of Jimmy Carter be understood as a continuity of historical development that had already begun since the Vietnam War, or a new beginning in essence? Carter human rights policy needs to be interpreted in two different ways. President Carter indeed inherited the continuing evolution of human rights policies of previous administrations thanks to the Congressional devotion to the matter. Human rights had been almost as empty as a concept as the good of mankind, without receiving any attention from any of the branches in the U.S. government before the executive branch began to take the issue in early 1970s in the backdrop of the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, it was a new departure from the perspective of Jimmy Carter who had little, if any, understanding of human rights policies conducted by the earlier administrations before he took the presidency. He was ignorant of Congressional concern in regard of human rights, which was highlighted in this paper as the most important motive of the rise of human rights policies prior to Carter. It was the personal principle and morality of the new president that embarked upon a new diplomacy that gave prominence to human rights, at least on part of the executive branch, in conducting U.S. foreign policies since World War Ⅱ.

Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), pp. 112(서평)

김봉중 한국미국사학회 2005 미국사연구 Vol.22 No.-

미국의 중동정책과 수에즈 위기: ‘수에즈 외교의 진실’에 대한 소고(小考)

김봉중 한국미국사학회 2008 미국사연구 Vol.28 No.-

This paper deals with U.S. diplomacy during the Suez Crisis, including an examination of U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East since World War II as part of the background and origin of the Crisis. It tries to answer three major questions: How should we evaluate the diplomatic ability of President Eisenhower? What were the objects of U.S. diplomacy during the Crisis? and How did the Eisenhower administration relate the Crisis to the Cold War? This paper reconstructs U.S. diplomacy during the Suez Crisis based on government documents declassified and published over three years since 1989. It concludes that Eisenhower led U.S. foreign policy during the Crisis with a firm principle – to ensure that the U.S. would not to be identified as part of western colonialism in the eyes of Arab states. This objective took precedence over cooperation with Britain, the country’s most important ally. Thus, although American diplomacy toward the Middle East since the war had been conducted within the general frame of the Cold War, the Suez Crisis had little relation to it. 본 논문은 1956년 발발한 수에즈 위기와 그 위기에 대응하는 미국의 외교를 다룬다. 수에즈 위기는 그 역사적 중요성에 따라 많은 연구의 대상이었다. 하지만 ‘수에즈의 진실’은 여전히 보는 각도와 시각에 따라 다양하게 설명된다. 본 논문은 1989년부터 공개된 수에즈 관련 미국 정부문서를 중심으로 수에즈와 관련된 몇 가지 주요한 의문을 염두에 두고 수에즈 위기를 재구성한다. 그 의문은 수에즈 위기를 통해 아이젠하워의 전반적인 외교력에 대한 기존 평가의 타당성, 아이젠하워 행정부의 수에즈 외교의 근본적인 목표, 그리고 수에즈 위기와 냉전과의 상관관계 등이다. 본 논문은 위 의문에 다음과 같이 결론을 내린다. 수에즈 위기 동안 아이젠하워는 뚜렷한 원칙을 갖고 미국 외교를 주도했다. 아이젠하워 행정부의 수에즈 위기 외교의 목표는 아랍 세계에서 미국의 이미지를 훼손하지 않는 것이며, 이것이 미국의 최대 우방인 영국과의 관계보다 우선되었다. 미국의 전후 중동정책은 대체로 냉전 구도 속에 진행되었다. 그러나 수에즈 위기는 냉전과 직접적인 관련이 없었다. 그래서 미국의 수에즈 외교를 냉전의 틀에서 보는 것은 타당하지 않다.

탈냉전, 세계화, 그리고 미국의 외교

김봉중 한국미국사학회 2006 미국사연구 Vol.23 No.-

베트남 전쟁의 기억과 미국 외교

김봉중 한국미국사학회 2011 미국사연구 Vol.34 No.-

This paper traces the memories of the Vietnam War and its impacts upon American foreign policy during the period between the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Vietnam in 1973 and the era prior to the September 11, 2001. It mainly focuses on the memories of the U.S. presidents and other key policy makers about the Vietnam War and its application to the foreign policies of the United States. American presidents tried not to bring up the sore memories of the Vietnam War. President Carter, for instance, who emphasized on the tragedies of Vietnam during his campaign for the presidential election, rarely mentioned about the War once he got elected to the presidency. Most American presidents, like Carter, were reluctant to bring up the sore memories of the Vietnam War; American society was not as divided and confrontational as it was during the War. Nevertheless, the memories of the Vietnam War continued to haunt the American leaders when they made foreign policies. American foreign policy makers had to be sensitive to the negative legacies of the War whenever they constructed the foreign policies of the United States. Thus, they were reluctant to engage in foreign affairs short of public understanding and supports. The active engagement policy in the Latin America without securing the public understanding and support by the Reagan administration, which ended in the Iran-Contra Scandal, reaffirmed the validity of the lessons of the Vietnam War. The memories of the Vietnam War made George Bush more cooperative with the Congress and other nations when he decided to go the war with Iran in 1990. It was also an important background of why he declared the end of the war immediate after he achieved the proposed goal of the war. The foreign polices of the Clinton administration were also deeply affected by the memories of the Vietnam War, as were indicated in the policies toward Africa, the Balkan nations, and Haiti.

먼로독트린의 변용: 파나마회의와 ‘명백한 운명’ 시기를 중심으로

김봉중 한국미국사학회 2016 미국사연구 Vol.43 No.-

This paper deals with the course of the settlement of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 prior to the Civil War in American politics. The starting point of the paper comes from this crucial, but untouched question: how was the Monroe Doctrine established as the touchstone of American foreign policy in the 19th century? Early Americans have shown a great deal of respect for the diplomatic principles of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson as shown in the ‘farewell address’ and the inaugural address respectively, which set the tone of early American principle of neutrality with such famous phrase as “permanent alliance” or “entangling alliance” with none. How did the Monroe Doctrine bypass the these sacred principles of the Founding Fathers and get it established as the touchstone of early American foreign policy? In order to answer the above questions, the paper selects the three issues that represent the early American expansionism: Congress of Panama, Annexation of Texas, and Dispute over Oregon. Debates over sending US delegates to the Congress of Panama in 1826 has some historical significance in that the Monroe Doctrine had been mentioned and remembered, though it was done much less in its frequency and sincerity compared with the principles of Washington and Jefferson. During the debates over the annexation of Texas, southern politicians used the Monroe Doctrine, which had long been forgotten since the Panama issue, as an excuse to secure their regional interest of slavery. President James Polk mentioned the Monroe Doctrine in his first annual message to the Congress in 1845; yet it cannot be understood as a meaningful revival of the Monroe Doctrine, because he used the doctrine for his ambition for California, not for the territory of Oregon, the central region and issue that fired off the fever of ‘Manifest Destiny’ nationwide. In retrospect, the Monroe Doctrine had not been remembered or used by most Americans in the years prior to the Civil War as a serious principle they ought to hold onto as a guide to nation’s foreign policy. ‘Manifest Destiny’ represents the American expansionism in the 1840s but had little direct connection to the Monroe Doctrine. If one traces how the Monroe Doctrine was able to establish itself as the sacred American principle, he or she has to focus more on the period of late 19th century. Nevertheless, history is inevitably made upon by the compilation of long and gradual historical sequences; the debates over the Panama Congress and the Texas and Oregon territories grew as the roots of a giant tree of the Monroe Doctrine. 본 논문은 먼로독트린이 어떻게 초기 미국 외교의 원칙인 ‘독트린’으로 정착하게 되었는가를 추적한다. 1823년 먼로독트린이 발표된 이후 미국 대통령들과 의원들을 포함해서 미국 지도자들이 먼로독트린을 어떻게 이해했으며, 어느 정도로 중요하게 받아들였으며, 어떻게 당대의 현안에 적용했을까? 먼로독트린의 기본적인 원칙이 후대에 가서 어떻게 변용되었을까? 이러한 의문에 대한 해답을 찾는 것이 본 논문의 목적이다. 이러한 목적을 위해 선택한 주요 시대적 배경은 1826년 파나마회의와 이른바 ‘명백한 운명’의 시기인 1840년대 중반이다. 파나마 미션이 먼로독트린의 원칙에 부합하는가에 대한 논쟁이나, 1826년 상황이 먼로독트린에 근거해서 미국의 개입이 필요한 상황인가에 대한 논쟁은 미국 지도자들이 먼로독트린을 어떻게 이해하고 있었는가를 판단하는 주요한 시사점을 던져준다. 무엇보다도, 한동안 “역사 속 문서에 속할 뿐” 대다수의 미국인들에게 잊힌 먼로독트린이 다시금 부활했다는 데 가장 큰 의의가 있다. 1844년 남부 의원들이 먼로독트린에 근거해서 텍사스 합병론을 주장했다. 남부 의원들의 주장은 노예제도를 고수하려는 지역주의의 발로였다. 하지만 텍사스 합병 논쟁에서 남부가 지역 이기주의에 근거해서 먼로독트린을 변용했다하더라도, 그것은 파나마회의 논쟁 이후 오랫동안 기억이나 논의에서 사라졌던 먼로독트린의 존재를 상기시켰다는 점에서 의의가 있다. 역사가들은 오리건 영토 분쟁을 1840년대 미국의 대륙팽창의 열기를 대변하는 ‘명백한 운명’의 슬로건 아래 놓았다. 하지만 ‘명백한 운명’이 1840년대 미국 팽창주의를 대변하지만, 먼로독트린과는 직접적인 연관이 없었다. 그럼에도, 대다수의 미국인들에게 잊힌 먼로독트린이 누군가에 의해서 지속적으로 언급되고 그것이 적용되었다는 점이다. 역사가 만들어지는 것이라면 먼로독트린 역시 파나마회의와 ‘명백한 운명’의 시대를 거쳐 훗날 명실상부한 독트린으로 자리매김할 수 있는 그루터기가 자라나게 되었다는 점에서 중요한 의의를 갖는 것이다.