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高良坤,崔錫奎 全北大學校 1996 論文集 Vol.42 No.-
The efficiency of a competitive market equilibrium depends on all of the decentralized decision-makers having full information. The market mechanism itself plays an informational role by conveying information in the form of relative prices to decision-makers about the relative costs and benefits of different actions. It is obvious that perfect insurance and financial markets of the type required for pareto optimality do not exist on practice. It is useful to consider the reasons why insurance and financial markets may fail to exist and why those that do exist may not exploit all of the mutual benefits to risk-sharing. Two types of informational externalities impede the functioning of insurance and financial markets, generally referred to as adverse selection and moral hazard. One way to distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard is to remember that adverse selection in a problem of asymmetric information before entering into a transaction, whereas moral hazard is a problem of asymmetric information after the transaction has occurred. The problems created by adverse selection and moral hazard are an important impediment to well functioning insurance and financial markets, so market failure occurs because of those problems. Hence the purpose of this paper is to examine and analysis the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, and then to seek the economically corresponding schemes of asymmetric information from adverse selection and moral hazard. For this purpose, this paper consists of four major sections Chapter Ⅰ involves the necessity, the purpose of this study. Chapter Ⅱ. explains the nature of risk, peril and hazard. In chapter Ⅲ. this paper will analysis the market failure from the asymmetric information of adverse selection and moral hazard. Also it explains the theoretical models of moral hazard. Finally chapter Ⅳ offers the economically corresponding schemes of the problems from adverse selection and moral hazard, and the conclusion. That is, there are some solutions such as lump-sum tax-financed subsidies on locks·burglar and smoke alarms, private production and sale of information, government regulation, financial intermediation, collateral and net worth, monitoring and enforcement of restrictive covenants etc.
高良坤,金世鍾 全北大學校 1996 論文集 Vol.41 No.-
Due to the increasing liberalization of capital, foreign capital inflows are increasing. Despite the deficit in the account balance, the capital account surplus has significantly increased. The abrupt foreign capital inflows has caused the balance of payments and foreign exchange rates to be unstable. The foreign sector is anxious to increase its money supply to fight an increase in inflation. To counteract these problems one of the macroeconomic policies that can be implemented is foreign exchange market intervention. Foreign Exchange market intervention is an effective policy for alleviating the overvariation in the foreign exchange rate This policy can also maintain an appropriate foreign exchange rate level. This type of a foreign exchange market intervention has been adopted in many countries as a means of stabilizing external trades and achieving macroeconomic objective. In this paper we researched the theoretical possibilities of a foreign exchange rate market intervention system and surveyed various forms of this system and the effects of intervention in many countries. According to results from the statistical analysis, increasing the money supply in proportion to the surplus of capital accounts has offset the augmentation of the issuance of monetary stabilization bonds. Also, the results of the estimation of the exchange rate equation are remarkably, statistically significant.