보험의 목적의 양도

강대섭 한국상사판례학회 1997 상사판례연구 Vol.8 No.1

시장질서 교란행위의 금지 내용과 그 적용상의 문제 - 이른바 정보이용형 시장질서 교란행위를 중심으로 -

강대섭 한국경영법률학회 2019 經營法律 Vol.29 No.2

Under the previous provisions against insider trading, it was not possible to regulate those after sub-tippee of the information, nor to regulate those who acquired inside information in an unjustifiable way. In addition to the previous regulations on unfair trade, the Capital Market and Financial Investment Business Act (hereinafter “the Act”) introduced a new prohibition on market disturbance(market abuse). The reason was to eliminate the blind spot of unfair trade regulation and to protect investors by restricting market disturbance that undermine market soundness. This paper examines the background of new market disturbance regime using inside information, its grounds and the scope of application. I will discuss the expected problems and solutions for the prohibition on market disturbance using the nonpublic information. For comparative studies, I will examine the UK and EU legislative cases that have long regulated market abuse. And I will review the cases in insider trading of the United States, which had been dealt with by the comprehensive prohibition of fraud, and examine Japanese legislative cases to solve the problem. In the prohibition of a new form of market disturbance, it is somewhat controversial about the scope of tippee but all information recipients after the second information recipient are regulated. However, the recipient of the information should be aware that the information received is from an insider, etc. The producer of market disturbance information is not limited in his (or her) office’s scope but has produced or learned the information during the performance of the job. Those who become aware of market disturbance information in an unfair way are subject to regulation without asking about the acquisition method or route of information. Market disturbance information is prohibited from use. The importance of market disturbance information is judged from the viewpoint of preventing unfair transaction in market. The publication of information is not necessarily limited to disclosure by means of statutory regulations. 종전의 내부자거래 금지에서는 제2차 이후의 정보수령자를 규제할 수 없었고, 정보의 전달에 의하지 않고 부정한 방법으로 정보를 획득한 자를 규제하지도 못하였다. 자본시장법은 종전의 불공정거래의 규제에 추가하여 새로운 형태의 시장질서 교란행위 금지 규정을 신설하였다. 이를 신설한 이유는 시장의 건전성을 훼손하는 시장질서 교란행위를 규제함으로써 불공정거래 규제의 사각지대를 해소하고 투자자를 보호하는 데 있었다. 이 논문은 미공개 정보를 이용하는 시장질서 교란행위의 금지에 국한하여, 금지 규정의 도입배경과 그 근거 및 적용범위에 관한 논의를 고찰하고 이 규정의 적용상 예상되는 문제점과 그 해결방안을 모색하였다. 이를 위한 비교법적 연구를 위해, 오래 전부터 내부자거래의 범위를 넓게 잡고 시장남용행위를 규제대상으로 삼았던 영국과 EU의 입법례를 살펴본다. 그리고 포괄적 사기금지 규정으로 이에 대처하였던 미국의 상황과 일부 규정의 개정을 통해 문제를 해결하고 있는 일본의 입법례를 검토하였다. 새로운 형태의 시장질서 교란행위의 금지와 관련하여 정보수령자의 범위를 두고 다소 논란이 있으나 제2차 정보수령자 이후의 모든 정보수령자가 규제대상이 된다고 본다. 다만 정보수령자는 전달받는 정보가 내부자 등으로부터 나온 것임을 알고 있어야 한다. 시장질서 교란정보를 생산하는 자는 그 직무 범위가 제한되지 않고 그 직무의 수행 중에 생산하거나 알게 된 것으로 충분하다. 부정한 방법으로 시장질서 교란정보를 알게 된 자는 정보의 취득방법이나 경로를 묻지 않고 모두 규제대상으로 된다. 이용이 금지되는 시장질서 교란정보는 시장참가자의 불공정 거래 방지라는 측면에서 시세영향기준을 사용하여 중요성이 판단되고, 정보의 공개성은 반드시 법령에 정한 방법으로 공개되는 경우에 한정되지 않는다.

2013년 자본시장법(구증권거래법) 판례의 분석과 연구

강대섭 한국상사판례학회 2014 상사판례연구 Vol.27 No.1

Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (hereinafter the Act) was entered into force on Feb. 2009. The Securities and Exchanges Act(hereinafter SEA) was absorbed into it. The Act is carrying on the important articles of SEA with some changes. Therefore, securities cases are useful to interpret the articles of the Act. In 2013, some securities cases have been produced. First of all, the SupremeCourt has clarified the definition of the principle of suitability and the duty to explain in entering into KIKO contracts. The Court has made the distinction between the `shares(securities) depositary receipts`` and the deposited underlying shares. And in applying the prohibition on the market price manipulation, the Court has manifested the term of ``matched orders`` in distinction from ``wash sales``. This paper aims to review and analyses the major or leading securities cases which will have important effects on the interpretation and application of the Act. Especially in connection with the principle of suitability and the duty to explain, I will treat the four cases in KIKO contracts.

주주축출의 정당성과 그 한계

강대섭 부산대학교 법학연구소 2023 법학연구 Vol.64 No.4

It is an established principle that corporate shareholders can participate in the management of the company by exercising voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned, and as co-owners and investors of the company, they can receive profit dividends or distribution of residual assets from the company according to the same principle. The protection of Shareholders’ rights regarding dominant interests and property interests is an essential requirement of the Company Law that must be taken into consideration when a corporation issues shares or carries out the reorganization of company. In response to changes in the economic environment, the Company Law has introduced the cash-out merger and the acquisition of all the shares of minority shareholders, etc. to change or reorganize a corporate mechanism or business. These statutes aim to advance the efficient and flexible operation of the company. At this time, the basic principle is to maintain the status of shareholders or their investment opportunities. But in the interest of advancing the efficient and flexible operation of the company, cash-out merger, etc. should be permitted in spite of the opposition of minorities. At this time, it is necessary to protect minority shareholders who will lose, in effect, their shareholder status against their will. As one of the methods, it is examined whether the company's business purposes is necessary to eliminate the minority shareholders. While introducing the acquisition of all minority shares, the Company Law strictly establishes the qualifications of controlling shareholder and requires the legitimate business purpose as an affirmative requirement. But it does not set this in the case of a freeze-out merger. As a result, it is questionable whether the mere fact that the merger ratio is fair and that the opposite shareholders are given the appraisal right justifies the squeeze-out of minority shareholders and provides a enough protection for minority shareholders. In this paper, first I will describes the squeeze-out statutes in the Company Law. I will examine the function and meaning of legitimate business purpose according to whether it is stated as a requirement or not. Based on this, I will explain whether minority shareholders can be protected by invalidating a transaction for the squeeze-out of shareholders that has no valid business purpose or violates the equality of shareholders. Finally I will provide the conclusion about the limits of shareholder squeeze-out and the methods of protection of minority shareholders.

고지의무(告知義務)에 있어서 중요한 사항과 질문표(質問表)의 효력

강대섭 안암법학회 1998 안암 법학 Vol.- No.7

대표소송(代表訴訟)의 제소자격(提訴資格)과 담보제공(擔保提供) : 대표소송(代表訴訟)의 활성화를 위한 제언

강대섭 안암법학회 1996 안암 법학 Vol.- No.4

한국과 중국 회사법상의 주주총회에 관한 비교연구

강대섭 한국기업법학회 2005 企業法硏究 Vol.19 No.4

China started its economic reform in 1978. By 1995, China had become the world's third largest economic powerhouse among the world. Among other things, the development of the securities market and a sound corporate governance system play an important role in the progress of China's economic reform. Since 1992, China has made a substantial progress in many areas of corporate governance. Korea has experienced the economic crisis in the end of 1997. To promote the foreign investment to Korea, our country has improved the corporate governance. Through several revisions of our commercial act (company act) and securities exchanges act, etc., Korea has strengthened shareholder rights, improved the internal control and strengthened the transparency of management and auditing. This paper aims to analyze and compare the shareholders' meeting in Korean-Chinese Company Acts. I describe the highly concentrated ownership structure and weak protection of shareholder rights. And I continue to compare the provisions and proceedings about the shareholders' meeting in Korean-Chinese Company Acts. I add some comments. I come to a conclusion that Korea and China have had similar provisions and contents in so far as shareholders' meeting. This is the result of the fact that Korea and China have adopted the good corporate governance. From this point, there will be very similarity in any other area between Korean-Chinese corporate governance.

주주권 행사에 관한 이익공여와 주주총회 결의의 효력 - 대법원 2014. 7. 11. 자 2013마2397 결정 -

강대섭 한국상사법학회 2015 商事法硏究 Vol.34 No.1

Shareholders have various rights to protect shareholders' investment position. They elect directors periodically, vote on fundamental corporate transactions, and may litigate actions to supervise the management. Shareholders may exercise their rights to protect their interests. But it is not desirable that shareholders exercise their right to make unfair profits or under undue influence. Section 467-2 of Commercial Code provides that a company may not grant to any person a pecuniary benefit in connection with the exercise of rights as a shareholder. If a company has granted any pecuniary benefit in contravention of the provision, the person who has received such benefit shall return it to the company. There is little case about prohibition against granting of pecuniary benefit. Recently, the Supreme Court has made a decision as follows : it is against the articles of incorporation for a company to extend the prevoting period; it is against the provision of prohibition against granting of pecuniary benefit for a company to grant a gift certificate to shareholders attending to prevoting; shareholders' meeting's resolution influenced by granting of pecuniary benefit may be revoked on grounds that the manner of a resolution are in violation of the Code. This paper aims to review and analyses the case which are significant for the interpretation of the above provision.

보험자의 고지의무에 관한 소고

강대섭 창원대학교 1994 논문집 Vol.16 No.-

보험자의 고지의무에 관한 소고 ( A Study on the Insurer's of Duty Disclosure )

강대섭 昌原大學校 1994 昌原大學校 論文集 Vol.16 No.-