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( Milton Leitenberg ) 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 2016 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE Vol.40 No.1
A LITTLE-REMEMBERED ASPECT OF KOREAN WAR HISTORY IS THE ALLEgation by North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union that the United States had used biological weapons on an enormous scale over both China and North Korea during the war. Despite the public disclosure in 1998 of Soviet Central Committee documents declaring the allegations to have been fraudulent, China-and North Korea much more noisily-still maintains the charges. The issue is of great importance to those concerned with arms control and allegations of actual use of weapons of mass destruction. Those charges have now been refuted in a striking posthumous publication written by Wu Zhili, who was Director of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army Health Division during the Korean War. Wu wrote a brief memoir in September 1997 that was found among his papers after he died in 2008. It was published in a Chinese journal only in November 2013; an English translation first became available in April 2015 (Wu 2013).1 In 1952, Wu was critically involved in the Chinese government’s manipulations that produced the Korean War biological weapons allegations. His own testimonial contains a second one as well, by Huang Kecheng, chief of staff of the Chinese Army during the Korean War and later secretary-general of the Central Military Commission. Wu Zhili’s testimonial overturns everything previously published in a Chinese source. In addition, the full text of the cable from Mao Zedong to Josef Stalin on February 21, 1952, recently published by Russia’s State Archive of Social and Political History (RGASPI), sheds more light on China’s responsibility for the allegations.
THE PARTICIPATION OF JAPANESE MILITARY FORCES IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
Leitenberg, Milton the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam Un 1996 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE Vol.20 No.1
The long history of pressure and requests from senior UN and U.S. officials for Japan to take on the task of military participation in UN peacekeeping was deferred for forty years, from the time that Japan became a full member of the United Nations, Major policy changes first took place in 1992 and 1994. The question of Japan's World war II responsibility remains an obstacle to full-fledge participation. A single, euphemistic word or phrase, uttered once every few years by a Japnese official, does not substitute for a process of national assumption of responsibility. That national understanding seems absent in Japn, despite the apparent desire of large portions of the Japanese population to maintain their "peace" constitution. Too many senior politicians in the LDP appear so unreconstructed that they see little or nothing wrong in Japan's wartime activities. Nevertheless, the basic question remains the same: For the long term, what process is most likely to lead to the peaceful evolution of Japan's role in the world and prevent the aggressive use of its military forces? Is it integration in UN peacekeeping operations, somewhat as a late analogue to Germany's NATO alliance experience, or should Japan be left permanently outside that structure? Either choice might work well, and either choice could lead to undesirable results. Once the precedent of overseas deployment has occurred and has been legitimized, it is obviously easier to envision the beginning of a process with untoward results, in contrast to an absolute firebreak of "no overseas activities", but only if the firebreak could be maintained forever. Nevertheless, it would seem that integrating the Japanese government and its military into the framework of collaborative UN peacekeeping stands the better chance of producing the same long-term outcome as occurred in Germany via NATO. In addition, all the regional geopolitical developments of the past decades would appear to circumscribe the possibilities for Japanese military aggression. Since 1992, Japanse forces have participated in UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, Zaire, and, most recently, the Golan Heights. Asian nations that had expressed apprehensions before have found this development unobjectionable; some have even made public statements in its support. The past and present role of the United States in the Pacific theater is not likely to continue indefinitely, although ironically, it is desired by all the regional states: Japan, China, Korea, and Taiwan. Should a collaborative regional security regime that included Japan develop in Asia in the coming years, that would presumably aid in the same desirable evolution.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AND PROLIFERATION
Leitenberg, Milton the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam Un 1997 인문과학연구 Vol.4 No.-
This paper discusses three interrelated issues that would manifest the international community's interest and willingness to reverse biological-weapons proliferation. It urges serious international sanctions against: (1) any instance of the use of biological weapons, (2) violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and (3) false allengations of biological-weapon use. At the end of 1997, not only is biological-weapons proliferation a growing problem; the credibility of the United Nations Security Council to maintain and enforce its own sanctions in the face of clear and unquestioned violations is in doubt. Even in the case of the Security Council's sanctions against Iraq, for several years now three of the five permanent members have been unwilling to enforce the sanctions, and have even favored their being discontinued. At this point it is not clear if the greater of the two problems is maintaining the integrity and the credibility of the UN security Council, or seeing to it that Iraq does not reestablish all of its programs of weapons of mass destruction, in contravention of the UN's 1991 resolutions.