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      • KCI등재

        Game Theoretical Models of the Cooperative Carrier Behavior

        이향숙,Maria Boile,Sotirios Theofanis,추상호 대한토목학회 2014 KSCE JOURNAL OF CIVIL ENGINEERING Vol.18 No.5

        This paper presents a multi-level modeling approach which captures the cooperative behavior of carriers in maritime freighttransportation networks. Ocean carriers, land carriers and port terminal operators are considered. Port terminal operators are regardedas a special type of carrier for modeling purposes. Ocean carriers are the leaders in a maritime shipping market. Port terminaloperators are the followers of ocean carriers as well as the leaders of land carriers. For cooperating ocean and land carriers,compensation principle is used to find the optimal service charge and routing pattern that maximize their total profit, while portterminal operators act competitively. The concept of Stackelberg game is applied to a multi-level game, assuming a single oceanshipping company (leader) through an alliance. Subsequently, the paper considers cooperation between ocean carriers and portterminal operators, while individual carriers within the same group are considered to act competitively. Cooperative games within thesame carrier group and between different groups of carriers are examined and compared with competitive games. A numericalexample is presented to demonstrate the validity of the developed model.

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