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Incentive Delegation and Collusion
Arijit Mukherjee 서울대학교 경제연구소 2000 Seoul journal of economics Vol.13 No.1
In an infinitely repeated duopoly we show the implications of strategic incentive delegation. Whether incentive delegation makes consumers or producers better-off depends on the nature of competition. We explain that the presence or absence of incentive delegation may affect the interests of the consumers and the producers in a similar way.
Mondal, Arijit,Mondal, Asish,Mukherjee, Debkumar Techno-Press 2015 Advances in nano research Vol.3 No.2
Air stable nanoparticles were prepared from cobalt sulphate using tetra butyl ammonium bromide as surfactant and sodium borohydride as reductant at room temperature. The cobalt nanocolloids in aqueous medium were found to be efficient catalysts for the degradation of toxic organic dyes. Our present study involves degradation of Methylene Blue and Rhodamine-B using cobalt nanoparticles and easy recovery of the catalyst from the system. The recovered nanoparticles could be recycled several times without loss of catalytic activity. Palladium nanoparticles prepared from palladium chloride and the same surfactant were found to degrade the organic dyes effectively but lose their catalytic activity after recovery. The cause of dye colour discharge by nanocolloids has been assigned based on our experimental findings.
Technology Transfer, Merger and Joint Venture : A Comparative Welfare Analysis
Roy, Prithvijit,Kabiraj, Tarun,Mukherjee, Arijit 세종대학교 국제경제연구소 1999 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.14 No.3
We consider a framework where initially a foreign firm and a few domestic firms are competing in a homogenous product local market. The foreign firm has a lower marginal cost of production relative to the domestic firms. We study then possibility of a bilateral agreement between the foreign firm and a local firm on each of technology transfer, merger and joint venture. Given the optimal behavior of the foreign firm, the paper also examines welfare implications of each such collaborative deal. Depending on cost asymmetry it is always profitable for the foreign firm to go for the one or the other deal. But the local government generally encourages new firm joint venture formation. The degree of cost asymmetry and the number of firms in the market play an important role in this analysis. (JEL Classification: D43, L13, F23)
Technology Transfer, Merger and Joint Venture: A Comparative Welfare Analysis
( Prithvijit Roy ),( Tarun Kabiraj ),( Arijit Mukherjee ) 세종대학교 경제통합연구소 1999 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.14 No.3
We consider a framework where initially a foreign firm and a few domestic firms are competing in a homogenous product local market. The foreign firm has a lower marginal cost of production relative to the domestic firms. We study then possibility of a bilateral agreement between the foreign firm and a local firm on each of technology transfer, merger and joint venture. Given the optimal behavior of the foreign firm, the paper also examines welfare implications of each such collaborative deal. Depending on cost asymmetry it is always profitable for the foreign firm to go for the one or the other deal. But the local government generally encourages new firm joint venture formation. The degree of cost asymmetry and the number of firms in the market play an important role in this analysis. (JEL Classification: D43; L13; F23.)