아동의 도덕성 발달을 위한 조망수용과 공감의 역할모형

국문 초록 (Abstract)

本 硏究는 幼兒-兒童期의 眺望受容 및 共感이 도덕성발달의 과정에서 어떤 역할을 하는가 규명하고 그에 따른 道德性 發達의 假說的 模型을 개발 제시하고자 한 것이다. 이를 위하여 眺望受容과 共感의 발달과정, 親社會行動 및 道德性의 發達過程, 그리고 Kohlberg의 도덕발달이론을 補完하는 發達理論들이 검토되었다.
眺望受容은 他人의 생각과 感情을 推論하는 능력으로, 共感은 他人의 狀況을 이해한 다음 타인의 感情을 代理經驗하는 능력으로 정의되는데, 이 두 가지 요소는 아동의 내부 세계에서 적어도 3세 이전에 발생하여 道德性 發達의 根源이 되고 있다는 사실이 밝혀졌다. 親社會行動은 自己의 欲求充足을 포기하고 他人을 利롭게 하는 행동으로 좁게 정의될 수 있으나, 넓게 보면 타인들에 의해 긍정적으로 여겨지는 모든 행동이라고 할 수 있는 데, 이는 眺望受容과 共感의 過程에 의해서 仲介된다고 여겨진다. 이 親社會行動의 發達段階는 그 行爲의 基低에 깔린 推論의 成熱水準을 말하는 바, 本 硏究에서는 이를 幼兒-兒童期의 道德性 發達을 설명하는 核心槪念으로 논의하였다.
親社會行動을 포함하는 道德性의 根源은 어디이며, 또한 道德性의 발달은 어떻게 이루어지는 것인가? 이 문제에 대한 哲學者들의 다양한 관점들이 있으나, 本 硏究에서는 正義 公正性 他人尊重 등의 合理的 原理의 理解過程에서 道德性의 根源을 찾으며, 인간의 利己的 本性과 利他的 義務의 연결과정을 설명하는 Lawrence Kohlberg의 認知-發達的 觀點을 검토하고, 그에 대한 補完的 觀點인 유아기의 分配 正義槪念에 관한 Waliam Damon의 연구와 親社會行動에 관한 Nancy Eisenberg 등의 硏究를 함께 綜合하였다.
Kohlberg의 디렘마 이야기는 禁止志向的 要素로 가득 채워져 있고, 그 디렘마의 내용도 幼兒-兒童들의 生活經驗과는 동떨어진 것이었는데, 반면 Damon과 Eisenberg의 디렘마 이야기는 금지지향적 요소를 최소화하고 그 내용도 어린이들의 일상생활경험과 가까운 것에서 취했다. 이 때 어린이들의 道德的 推論과 判斷은 놀랄만하게 進步된 수준으로 나타났다는 사실이 本 硏究에서 부각되었다. 이 과정에서 영 유아기의 共感과 眺望受容능력의 발달과정이 강조되었다. 또한 親社會行動에 관한 理論과 그 推論 및 行動動機에 관한 硏究들은 아직 그 체계가 불완전한 수준이지만 그런대로 유아 아동들의 道德性 發達段階를 설명하는데 貢獻하고 있다는 점에서, 앞으로 그 이론적 체계와 경험적 실증이 계속되어져야 할 것으로 보인다. 또한 Kohlberg의 도덕판단 단계1(罰과 服從의 道德性)은 Damon의 4-9세 아동의 權威개념 및 分配正義개념에 대한 연구에 의해서 세부적 모습이 비교적 정교하게 밝혀진 것으로 보인다.
道德的 判斷은 共感의 맥락 속에서 眺望受容에 기초한 正義의 준거에 의해 이루어지는 것으로서, 이것이 道德的 行動으로 연결되려면 共感을 통한 共感的 苦痛(同情心)의 경험과 實踐動機에 의해서 推進力을 받아야 가능한 것이라고 생각된다. Bar-Tal, Hoffman, Gilligan 등의 學者들에 의해 강조되는 共感의 발달과정이 親社會行動을 포함하는 道德性 發達過程의 情意的 要因으로서 논의되었다. 여기에서 共感은 眺望受容의 端緖가 되고 親社會的-道德的 行動의 動機를 제공하며 "規則이나 原理를 지지하는 感情"(rule-supporting feelings)의 역할을 하는 것으로 밝혀졌다.
本 硏究는 幼兒-兒童期의 兒童들 內部의 세계에서 共感과 眺望受容의 능력이 발달하고 있다는 사실이 밝혀짐으로써, 그에 맞는 道德科 敎授-學習過程의 模型을 개발하여 제시하였다. 그러나 이 模型은 敎育 現場에 가서 科學的 實驗檢證을 더 거친 후에 一般化, 定着될 수 있는 것이라 하겠다. 幼稚園과 국민학교의 저학년에서는 道德科가 독립된 敎科로 되어있지 않고 統合된 과정 속에서 다루어지고 있기 때문에 이를 위한 敎授 學習過程의 模型은 따로 제시하지 못하였다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study aims to develop a role model of perspective taking and empathy for the development of childhood morality including prosocial behavior. It tries to examine the developmental processes of perspective taking and empathy in relation to prosocial and moral development in order to develop a model of children's moral development.
1. Perspective taking may be defined as the ability to infer the thoughts and feelings of others. It can be divided into three dimensions: 1) perceptual perspective taking as the ability to assume another person's perceptual viewpoint; 2)cognitive perspective taking as the ability to assess another person's knowledge; and 3)affective perspective taking as the ability to assess another's emtional state. Empathy is referred to an affective state that stems from the apprehension of another's emotional state, and results in the vicarious experiencing of the emtional state of another. It is found in the research literature that there are two different approaches to the interpretation of the term "empathy". One is cognitively interpreted as the recognition of feeling states of another person, and the other is affectively conceptualized as the vicarious emotional arousal and response to another's state. It is recognized that empathy is developed by the interactive components of both cognition and affect.
2. Prosocial behavior of human beings is understood as the action that aids or benefits another person without anticipation of external reward, often at the risk of one's own welfare to protect or rescue another. The quality of a prosocial behavior, which is assumed as the maturity of reasoning underlying the behavior, is believed to change as an individual develops his capacity for higher level moral judgment.
The relation between various forms of perspective-taking and prosocial behavior is generally significant. The conceptual basis for such relations is well-articulated and clear: as children become more cognitively differentiated and better able to take the perspective of another in a variety of ways, they will be more likely to be aware of the distress of another and consequently, to intervene to alleviate that distress. It is also clear that the relation between perspective taking and prosocial behavior is a complex one; probably many developmentalists would agree that perspespective taking is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for prosocial intervention.
Most theorists have assumed that empathy mediates prosocial behaviors that are voluntary and intentional, benefit others, and are not motivated by self-concern or externally produced rewards or pressures. In contrast, nonal-ruistic prosocial behaviors are viewed as being motivated by factors such as the desire for social approval, concrete rewards, or the need to relieve one's own personal distress. Conceptually, prosocial intervention is originated as a desire in the actor to alleviate the unpleasant arousal generated by the witnessing of another's suffering. This clear conceptual link has generated a number of studies examining the relation between empathy and prosocial behavior including altruism. Despite the prevailing view that empathy is an important mediator of prosocial behavior, the results of the empirical work examining this link are eqivocal. Empathy is also a necessary but not a sufficient condition for prosocial intervention. Furthermore, it appears likely that there are a number of important moderators of the relation.
3. What is the origin of morality? How does it develop? The diverse philosophical and theoretical orientations can be organized into three fundamental positions on the origins of morality: 1)morality as rooted in human nature, or sociobiological perspective: 2)morality as the adoption of externally imposed societal norms, which includes both the Freudian and behaviorist perspectives; and 3)morality as rational understanding of social justice, or the cognitive-developmental perspective. But no single theory provides a complete account of foundations of morality and the essence of moral development.
The German philosopher Immanuel Kant regarded human beings as motivated by both selfish and benevolent passions and concluded that only reason could resolve the conflicting tendencies between the two. To Kant, the essence of morality was acting according to rational principles of justice, fairness, and respect for other persons. Kant's philosophy foreshadows the modern cognitive-developmental approach to moral development, as exemplified by Piaget's theory and its more recent extension by Lawrence Kohlberg.
4. Kohlberg's stages of moral development focus on broad transformations in moral understanding that take place between late childhood and adulthood. Since most of the research on his theory concentrates on children age 10 and older, it tells us little about changes in moral reasoning that take places during early and middle childhood. Moreover, Kohlberg's moral dilemmas are remote from the experiences of young children and may not be clearly understood by them. Consequently, the dilemmas are inappropriate for gathering information about moral understanding during the preschool and early elementary school years. Recent research in which young children have been provided with moral problems related to their everyday experience indicates that Kohlberg's Stage One, much like Piaget's stage of heteronomous morality, underestimates the moral reasoning of the younger child.
5. Two bodies of research have used moral dilemmas specifically designed for children age 12 and below : 1)studies of children's distributie justice, or how they think rewards should be allocated among group members, and 2)investigations of children's responses to prosocial moral dilemmas in which they must choose between satisfying their own needs and those of others. Besides being relevant to children's real-life experiences, the moral problems used in these studies differ from Kohlberg's in that the importance of laws, punishment, and formal obligations is deempathized, and there are few obvious rules on which to base a course of action. When dilemmas are formulated in this way, young children reveal some surprisingly sophisticated moral judgments.
William Damon's research on children's ideas of distributive justice suggests that complex, internalized concepts of fairness emerge at a much earlier age than Kohlberg's punishment-oriented Stage One would have us believe. In fact, fear of punishment and deference to authority do not even appear as themes in children's distributive justice rationales. Because Damon's dilemmas minimize the relevance of these factors to moral choice, they permit some unusually elaborate and mature moral reasoning on the part of children to rise to the surface.
Prosocial choices in Kohlberg's dilemmas are always pitted against legal prohibitions or an authority's dictates. For example, in the Heinz dilemma, to help his wife, Heinz has no choice but to break the law and steal. On the other hand in most everyday prosocial situations in which children must decide whether or not to do something for another person, the primary cost is not disobeying a law or an authority figure. Instead, the cost is a personal one of not satisfying one's own wants or needs. Kohlberg says that the pre-conventional level(Stage One and Two) is usually occupied by children aged four to ten. Stage One is "Punishment and obedience orientation", and Stage Two "Individual Instrumental Purpose and Exchange".
Nancy Eisenberg's seven-year-period longitudinal study reported that unlike for prohibition oriented reasoning young children apparently use little authority and punishment-oriented reasoning to justify moral decisions, and that rather they verbalize much hedonistic and needs-oriented(primitive empathic) reasoning. In elementary school, children's judgments begin to reflect approval-oriented considerations and the desire to behave in stereotypically "good" ways. In contrast, high school-students frequently verbalilze reasoning reflecting abstract principles, internalized affective reactions(e.g., guilt or positive affect relating to living up to one's own principles), and self-refelective empathy as well as other less advanced forms of deliberation.
Eisenberg's hedonistic, pragmatic orientation is like Kohlberg's Stage Two, and her "needs of others" and approval focused orientations are like Kohlberg's Stage Three. Children's prosocial understanding is clearly accelerated when compared to the timing of Kohlberg's stages. For example, Kohlberg reported that approval-focused (Stage Three) reasoning was rare until midadolescence, but when children are given Eisenberg's prosocial dilemmas, it occurs often during the elementary school years. Her dilemmas bring out a new form of moral reasoning that she calls "empathic". By the late elementary school years, children realize that empathy is an important motivator of behaviors aimed at benefiting others. The appearence of empathic reasoning also indicates that children's prosocial understanding has become truly altruistic, for empathic justifications include a clear willingness to share and help others without expecting concrete rewards or social approval in return.
6. Recent research on infancy provides compelling demonstrations that the foundations of morality are present early in child development -- in infant's responsiveness to the feelings of others and the young child's appreciation of standards. Questions regarding moral reasoning are much the same as those regarding perspective taking. Carol Gilligan locates the origins of morality in the young child's awareness of self in relation to others, and considered empathy to be the esssence of morality. Studies of early years lead to the conclusion that prosocial behaviors are present before three years.
7. This study concludes that the ability to recognize differences in point of view emerges slowly during the early and middle school years, that the ability to experience another's feelings begins very early, and that perspective taking and empathy can mediate to moral behavior including helping and altruism. Finally, this study proposed a possible role model of perspective taking and empathy for the development of childhood morality including prosocial behavior.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 國文抄錄 = 3
• I. 序論 = 6
• II. 眺望受容과 共感의 發達 = 9
• 1. 眺望受容의 發達 = 9
• 2. 共感의 發達 = 15
• 3. 眺望受容과 共感의 關係 = 21
• III. 親社會行動의 發達過程에서 眺望受容과 共感의 役割 = 24
• 1. 親社會行動의 槪念 = 24
• 2. 親社會行動의 發達段階 = 30
• 3. 眺望受容과 共感의 役割 = 39
• IV. 道德性의 發達過程에서 眺望受容과 共感의 役割 = 44
• 1. 道德性 發達의 理論 = 44
• 2. 道德判斷의 發達段階 = 48
• 3. 眺望受容과 共感의 役割 = 61
• V. 道德敎育에의 示峻 = 66
• 1. 幼兒-兒童期의 道德性 發達特性 = 66
• 2. 道德的 問題解決의 最適化 類型 = 70
• 3. 道德科 敎授-導習過程 展開模型 = 77
• VI. 論議 및 結論 = 81
• 1. 論議 = 81
• 2. 結論 = 84
• 參考文獻 = 87
• Abstract = 101
• 附錄 = 108