담합의 소비자피해와 규제효과 분석 = Analysis on Consumer Damage by Cartels and Results of Regulations

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Cartel is one of the most common economic crimes in market economy. Cartel practices take place in a variety of industries and products ranged from materials and components to daily necessities such as detergents, flours, petrols, ice creams, beverages. Despite stringent laws against them, however, the number of cartel cases has been on the rise, which makes us wonder if they are genuinely effective. This study aims to shed light on the cases of consumer damage done by cartels and suggest policies by analyzing related cases in order to raise the effectiveness of relevant regulations. In this study, we examined 20 cartel cases where manufactures of end-products were ordered to correct their action and fined for breaching the antitrust regulations between January 2005 and July 2009. We analyzed the details of each case, related regulations and reasons behind it. In order to find out whether regulations function properly, we tracked out-of-town, in-town and international calls. As for the cases on ice creams and sugar, we estimated the amount of the consumer damage by taking a forecasting approach, (economic modelling) using commodity prices and inflation rates as price variations. The results are as follows: First, we found in the analysis that price-fixing tops the list of cartel cases, while the number of correction orders has remained stable since the year 2000. Nevertheless, more and more companies get criminal charges and imposed with surcharges, although the number is still relatively low. Second, analyzing details of cartel cases, we found that the rates of bringing law suits against manufactures and their senior executives are Quite high, but it is actually very low considering that they are cases on end-products. Besides, the period, the number of violation, the amount of illegal profits were not fully reflected in the process of determining the amount of surcharges. Third, analyzing the details of cartel cases, we discovered that cartels involve price fixing, terms of product transaction, production·delivery·shipment, restriction on types and size of products. Reasons for cartels are as follows: influences of manufactures, production cost, administrative instructions, new competitors, slower growth, increasing power of hypermarkets, etc. Fourth, in this study we found that orders to prohibit acts and to report turned out not to be effective in cases on out-of-town, in-town and international calls. In fact, those prohibited by the regulators remains unchanged. Besides, telephone operators lowered prices of international calls when ordered, and then changed them back to where they were. Fifth, the prices fixed by cartels were set above commodity prices. The estimated amount of consumer damage from ice creams is 21.7 billion won and 1.18 trillion won from sugar respectively, which are larger than surcharges imposed on them: ice cream(4 billion won) and sugar(51.1 trillion). Following is the results of the analysis. First, we need to boost regulation to address and prevent cases of consumer damage. In this study, the estimated amount of consumer damage from collusion on ice creams and sugar are 5.4 times and 23.1 times larger than penalty surcharges imposed for violating companies. This means that illegal profits they made from their cartel agreements are tremendous. In order to collect unfair profits and unroot the practice, regulatory authorities should raise surcharges, especially because giving compensation to consumers by manufacturers makes it difficult for regulators to collect their illegal profits in the form of surcharges. In addition, criminal regulation against companies and individuals need to be strengthened. Second, we should identify the exact amount of damage caused by all collusion cases and consider it in the process of strengthening regulations. The authorities as a watchdog whose role is to protect consumers, it is obliged to investigate consumer damage. In addition, given that the amount of consumer damage is equivalent to illegal profits violating companies gained from their agreement, the amount of consumer damage must be taken into account in setting the level of regulation. More importantly, we need to seek ways of providing compensation for consumer damage as penal fines flow only into the state coffers. Third, we should take into account elements that determine surcharges. Those elements include the number of violation, period, illegal profits, etc. And they need reexamining so as not to reflect too much those in favor of the companies in setting surcharges. In Korea, however, regulatory agencies are wielding their discretionary powers to do exactly the opposite, thereby hurting its reliability. Therefore, it is necessary to redefine the scope and degree of which the authorities could use in. Fourth, we should implement corrective measures from each violation case and put in place a system to make sure whether markets meet administrative regulations in an appropriate manner. The authorities are entitled to issue corrections in order to enforce corrective measures, prevent a repeat of violation and improve market forces. If they could use discretion in employing a variety of corrective measures, then we could enhance the effectiveness of each regulation, which would lead to market functioning properly. But as this study showed in the analysis, corrective measures become meaningless if they are not implemented the way they should be. And sometimes, they can be used as a way of monitoring companies caught breaching laws. For example, in the case of a cartel, regulators order companies to report changes in prices that occur during a certain period of time. That way, those companies feel the pressure in setting prices, which makes it easier for the authorities to supervise the manufacturers.

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