The threat of transnational crime based in Southeast Asia to South Korean society has recently become severe. Centered around scam compounds in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos, organized voice phishing and online fraud have evolved beyond simple economic ...
The threat of transnational crime based in Southeast Asia to South Korean society has recently become severe. Centered around scam compounds in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos, organized voice phishing and online fraud have evolved beyond simple economic damage into a complex criminal ecosystem combined with human trafficking, forced labor, drug smuggling, and illicit money laundering. As deepfake technology, the dark web, and virtual assets are widely utilized, the execution space of these crimes transcends borders, transferring the damage to ordinary citizens. The structure where victims forcibly mobilized to scam compounds are relegated to perpetrators blurs the line between victims and accomplices, illustrating that this is a multifaceted issue intertwining human trafficking, labor exploitation, and organized crime. Thus, Southeast Asia-originated transnational crime has evolved into a new form of threat fusing cyberspace and physical reality, making fundamental resolution impossible through traditional single-agency responses.
Despite this situation, the domestic response system remains confined to siloed operations by individual ministries and traditional frameworks of mutual legal assistance. Relevant agencies like the National Police Agency, Prosecution Service, Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), and Korea Customs Service pursue overseas cooperation through separate channels, resulting in repeated information fragmentation and inefficient coordination. Information on the same criminal syndicate remains scattered across multiple agencies without integration, lacking a centralized control tower to coordinate efforts. In situations requiring the real-time acquisition of digital evidence, mutual legal assistance (MLAT) procedures that take months cause authorities to miss the golden time, while jurisdictional conflicts over cloud servers and overseas platforms hinder investigative progress. Even with virtual asset transactions where tracing the flow of criminal proceeds is crucial, insufficient information linkage between domestic financial authorities and investigative agencies makes it difficult to timely block money laundering routes.
Starting from this critical awareness, this study aims to propose a Korean international cooperation governance model to effectively respond to Southeast Asia-originated transnational crime. Beyond simple institutional improvement, it presents a multi-layered network governance framework encompassing information sharing, joint investigations, and legal reform. The analysis targets are threefold : ①The reality and structural characteristics of transnational crimes targeting Korea from Southeast Asian bases. ②The structural limitations of Korea's current domestic and international cooperation systems. ③The success factors of transnational crime governance models in Europe, the United States, and the ASEAN region, alongside their applicability to Korea.
The research methods utilized literature reviews, comparative institutional analysis, and case studies, drawing on domestic and international academic papers, government reports, and publications by international organizations. Resource dependence theory and network governance theory were applied as theoretical frameworks. An analytical framework comprising structure, operation, and institution was established to systematically evaluate the strengths and limitations of each model. The comparative analysis of global governance models focused on Europe, the US, and ASEAN. Europe's Europol model is notable for institutionalizing information sharing among member states and enabling real-time coordination through Joint Investigation Teams(JITs). Its sophisticated access management system, which resolves data sovereignty issues and legally balances privacy protection with investigative efficiency, provides direct implications for designing the Korean model. The US core agency model builds dense local networks through the overseas hub strategies of the FBI, DEA, and HSI, establishing a system that enhances the speed and accuracy of tracing criminal funds through public-private partnerships with Big Tech and virtual asset service providers. The US case demonstrates how supplementing law enforcement's capacity limits with private sector technology can lead to tangible outcomes.
Conversely, ASEANAPOL faces clear structural limitations in binding multilateral cooperation due to the political and legal heterogeneity of member states. Paradoxically, these constraints can be reinterpreted as a space where Korea can design asymmetric cooperation incentives through capacity-building support and technical cooperation, thereby securing practical regional leadership. Based on this analysis, the study proposes several specific policy measures.
First, a pan-governmental integrated crime intelligence hub must be established. A system is needed to integrate crime data currently dispersed across ministries into a standardized format and preemptively detect crime trends by introducing an AI-based early warning system. Access to information should be managed according to clear security guidelines, coupled with technical and institutional safeguards that prevent the leakage of sensitive data while enabling rapid sharing. Since information integration must function as an intelligence production system capable of analysis and judgment, the establishment of a dedicated analysis unit should also be considered.
Second, real-time joint investigation hubs between Korea and ASEAN should be permanently established. It is necessary to set up digital joint investigation desks in key base countries like Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines, and to regularize multilateral joint operations via real-time hotlines. Establishing dedicated cooperation channels for rescuing scam compound victims and expediting the extradition of criminals is crucial for linking humanitarian responses with criminal justice cooperation. These permanent local hubs can function beyond mere liaison windows, serving as a practical foundation for joint investigations and a physical symbol of mutual trust.
Third, the digital sphere alliance encompassing the public and private sectors must be strengthened. A real-time cooperation system with global Big Tech platforms must be built, with clear pressure mechanisms legislated for non-compliance. It is also necessary to foster an ecosystem that supplements the limits of public investigative capabilities by institutionalizing private security firms and white hacker groups as threat detection partners. Official cooperation channels with virtual asset exchanges and fintech companies should be formalized to create a joint public-private response system that tracks and blocks the flow of criminal proceeds in real-time.
Finally, the legal and institutional foundation for sustainable international cooperation must be solidified. A special act on responding to transnational organized crime should be enacted to provide a legal basis for multi-ministerial joint budgeting, and special agreements for the rapid exchange of cross-border electronic evidence must be actively pursued. The current MLAT framework fails to keep pace with the digital era, and signing expedited cooperation agreements to supplement it can play a decisive role in enhancing investigative effectiveness. Refining the legal foundation is an essential prerequisite for Korea to position itself as a reliable partner in international criminal justice cooperation.
Responding to Southeast Asia-originated transnational crime is no longer an issue of individual agency capacity. Without a structural transition that shares information, links investigations, and reforms legislation, any enforcement outcome will inevitably be temporary. The Korean multi-layered network governance proposed in this study draws lessons from advanced European and US models but aims for a realistic alternative reflecting the political realities of the ASEAN region and Korea's diplomatic standing. As the threat of transnational crime grows increasingly sophisticated, it is time for Korea to step up as an active designer rather than a mere beneficiary of international cooperation.
Although this study primarily relied on literature reviews and comparative institutional research, and thus lacks in-depth interviews with field practitioners and quantitative effect analysis, it is hoped that this thesis will function as part of multifaceted policy and academic efforts. It is further hoped that these modest proposals will serve as a policy milestone supporting agile field responses, contributing to the realization of public security that safely protects citizens from transnational crime threats.