행정입법에 대한 국회 직접통제권 부여에 관한 헌법적 고찰

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Modern society is facing rapid changes with the emergence of new expertise due to the effects of the globalization. This phenomenon influences a lot on laws and institutions. Regulations on the technical and complex areas and the need for prompt responses to rapid changes have increased administrative regulations. Though Constitution has given the National Assembly which represents its people the status of the only legislative body, the increase of administrative regulations have weakened the status of the National Assembly as a legislative institution and controling an executive institution.
The current National Assembly Act stipulates the submission system of administrative regulations to National Assembly in order to control the administrative regulations. However, such scheme has limitations to the control of the administrative regulations because it does not confer the authority to force the administration to invalidate or change later on. In order to complement for this, the National Assembly passed the amendments of the National Assembly Law that would recognize the direct control of the National Assembly over the administrative regulations on 29 May 2015. However, the National Assembly Law that grants these rights to the National Assembly has caused controversy over whether it complies with the Constitution or not. The National Assembly stressed the need for the above scheme as justification for strengthening the legislative power but the President who represents the administration opposed as a violation of the Constitution, ie the violation of the principle of separation of powers and the infringement of rights and interests of People.
In this paper, I reviewed constitutionally whether the grant of the direct control of the administrative regulations to the National Assembly is right or not. To this end, I referred to South Korea which adopted a presidential form of government as the primary mechanism of the constitutional checks and balances and a congressional veto of the United States that the control of delegated legislation became a constitutional issue. Establishment, processes and limitations of the congressional veto system were examined. Based on this, I examined expected constitutional issues when the legislative veto regarding the administrative regulations was conferred to the National Assembly. And in conclusion, I argued that direct control of the National Assembly can not be allowed due to violation of the principle of separation of powers, constitutional legislative procedure and potential infringement of judicial power.

참고문헌 (Reference)

1 성낙인, "헌법학" 법문사 2014

2 정하명, "행정입법의 국회제출제도" 한국공법학회 32 (32): 427-446, 2004

3 김대현, "행정입법에 대한 의회통제에 관한 연구 : 미국의 경우를 중심으로" 중앙대학교 대학원 2010

4 김춘환, "행정입법에 대한 국회의 사전적 통제기준" 유럽헌법학회 (5) : 2009

5 장영수, "행정입법에 대한 국회 통제의 가능성과 한계-국회법 제98조 제3항 개정의위헌 논란을 중심으로"

6 이광진, "미국헌법상 입법권을 둘러싼 행정부와 입법부의 관계- 행정부와 입법부의 권력공유관계를 중심으로 -" 한양법학회 25 (25): 299-316, 2014

7 권태웅, "미국의 입법절차와 사법심사" 법제처 (599) : 2007

8 방승주, "국회의 시행령수정요구(청)권을 도입하는 국회법개정안 제98조의2 제3항은과연 위헌인가?"

9 김용섭, "국회법상 행정입법검토제도의 현황과 법정책적 과제" 행정법이론실무학회(行政法理論實務學會) (33) : 1-25, 2012

10 김용섭, "국회법 개정안을 둘러싼 공법적 쟁점"

11 김선택, "국회법 개정안 합헌론-매를 피하려다 독수리를 만난다"

12 이인호, "국회는 행정입법을 직접 수정하는 권한을 헌법상 가질 수 없다"

13 宇賀克也, "議会拒否権条項違憲判決と今後の動向" 812 : 1984

14 御幸聖樹, "議会拒否権の憲法学的考察(四)-権力分立の観点から" 京都大学法学会 174 (174): 2014

15 御幸聖樹, "議会拒否権の憲法学的考察(三)-権力分立の観点から" 京都大学法学会 174 (174): 2013

16 李圭正, "美國 聯邦議會의 拒否權에 관한 硏究" 경희대 대학원 1993

17 田中祥貴, "委任立法と議会" 日本論評社 2012

18 広瀬淳子, "アメリカ連邦議会の行政監視-制度と課題" 国立 国会図書館 255 : 2013

19 "http://www.ssrn.com/en/"

20 "http://likms.assembly.go.kr"

21 "http://home.heinonline.org/"

22 Peter L. Strauss, "Was there a Baby in the Bath Water? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision" 32 (32): 1983

23 E. Donald Elliott, "The Supreme Court Review: 1983" University of Chicago Press 1984

24 Murray Dry, "The Presidency in the Constitutional Order" The State University of New Jersey 2010

25 John Kent Pearson, "The Legislative Veto : Is It Legislation?" 38 (38): 1981

26 Arthur S. Miller, "The Constitution Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework" 52 (52): 1977

27 James Abourezk, "The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives" 52 (52): 1977

28 Edward Hirsch Levi, "Some Aspects of Separation of Powers" 76 (76): 1976

29 Alexander C. Dill, "Scope of Review of Rulemaking after Chadha: A Case for the Delegation Doctrine?" 33 (33): 1984

30 William N. Eskridge, Jr., "Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State" 8 (8): 1992

31 Jacob K. Javits, "Congressional Oversight and Legislative Veto : A Constitutional Analysis" 52 (52): 1977

32 Harold H. Bruff, "Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation : A Study of Legislative Vetoes" 90 (90): 1977

33 H. Lee Watson, "Congress Steps Out : A Look at Congressional Control of Executive" 63 (63): 1975

34 Laurence H. Tribe, "American Constitutional Law" The Foundation Press 1988