종교학분야 학술지 분석에 따른 연구경향과 과제 -대학부설 연구소 발간 학술지를 중심으로-

박종수 ( Jong Soo Park ) 한신대학교 종교와문화연구소(구 한신인문학연구소) 2014 종교문화연구 Vol.- No.22

본 연구의 목적은 대학부설 종교학 관련 연구소에서 발행하는 학술지를 대상으로 그 연구경향을 분석하여 향후 발전을 위한 과제를 제언하는 것이다. 연구대상 학술지는 서울대와 한신대 부설 연구소에서 각각 발간하고 있는 『종교와 문화』와 『종교문화연구』이다. 본 연구는 거시적 측면에서 두 학술지의 내용을 분석했으며, 수록논문 426편을 대상으로 연구주제, 연구목적, 연구범위, 연구방법에 따른 특징을 분석하였다. 연구결과, 두 학술지는 각 대학부설 연구소의 설립목적을 반영하고 있어서, 『종교와 문화』에는 종교학이론 및 종교전통 관련의 논문, 『종교문화연구』에는 종교학 및 종교문화 관련의 논문이 많은 비중을 차지하고 있음이 밝혀졌다. 연구범위는 종교학의 전통적 범주에서부터 인접 학문분야까지 다양하게 나타나고 있었다. 연구방법으로는 문헌연구, 사례연구, 비교연구 순으로 사용되고 있었다. 두 학술지는 대학부설 연구소의 특성상 대학의 지원, 대학 내 구성원의 다수 참여, 해당 대학연구소의 특성 반영이라는 공통된 특징을 갖고 있다. 이러한 특징은 학회들의 학술지와 다른 차원의 의의와 한계를 갖는다. 연구결과를 바탕으로 다양한 연구주제의 개발, 대학부설 학술지의 특성 부각, 연구 분석단위의 다양화, 연구방법론의 정교화를 제언으로 제시하였다. The purpose of this paper is to analyse research trends of religious studies in journals published by university institutes and to suggest tasks for their development. I took two journals into analysis: Journal of Religion and Culture (JRC) published by Hanshin University and Religion and Culture (RC) by Seoul National University. I analysed the general contents of 426 articles in these journals in terms of subjects, purposes, ranges and methods. The research shows that JRC specializes in religious studies and religious culture, RC in theories of religious studies and religious traditions, which explains that each journal reflects the purpose of establishment of the respective institutes. Research ranges vary from typical subjects of religious studies to interdisciplinary subjects. The most popular method of research is literature analysis followed by case analysis and comparative analysis. The two journals share the following features: financial support from its university, the majority of authors being its own members within the relevant university, and the reflection of the characteristics of the pertinent institutes. These features display different significances and limitations in comparison to journals published by academic societies. Finally, this papers suggests developing various research subjects, emphasizing the characteristics of the relevant institutes, having more varieties in research levels, and elaborating research methods.

龍-그 꿈과 해석

장정해 한신대학교 한신인문학연구소 2001 한신인문학연구 Vol.2 No.-

빈도 조사에 의한 기능어의 특성 파악과 영어 독해 증진을 위한 활용 방안

최천택 한신대학교 한신인문학연구소 2000 한신인문학연구 Vol.1 No.-

100여년 전의 여성들 : 규장각 소장 '檢案'으로 들여다 본 민중의 삶

김호 한신대학교 한신인문학연구소 2000 한신인문학연구 Vol.1 No.-

Striving to Understand 9/11 : Some Religious Dimensions of the Attack

Hodges, Horace Jeffery 한신대학교 한신인문학연구소 2002 한신인문학연구 Vol.3 No.-

Thus, orthodox Islam has generally maintained that the so-called "sword verse" of Sura 9: 598) "annuls the 124 verses that originally encouraged tolerance."99) Those hadith stating that Muhammad himself led Muslims in battle and forcibly converted the Meccans when he finally conquered the city would, moreover, tend to support the usual position that the Medinan sword verse abrogates the early Meccan verse of tolerance. We can, however, raise a fundamental question about this. Can we know for certain that the early history of Islam was so violent as many of the hadith portray? These traditions were collected some 200 years after Muhammad’s death, more than enough time for false traditions to have been invented.100) Bukhari and other compilers recognized this and established principles intended to distinguish authentic from inauthentic traditions by reviewing the reliability of the isnad (i.e., chain of narrators). Yet, the existence of ‘authenitc’ hadith that contradict each other suggests that new principles are needed, as many scholars have already argued. For instance, one might apply a principle used in Biblical scholarship, the principle of dissimilarity, which holds that a tradition is likely authentic if it is dissimilar to what the early church might have invented. If we apply this principle to early, imperialistic Islam, then those hadith that report violence and military jihad on Muhammad’s part are questionable since they could easily have been invented to justify the imperial conquest by which Islam spread so rapidly and the unequal status that imperial Islam accorded to Muslims and non-Muslims. Ye’or acknowledges this same point: Those hadith [concerning jihad ideology and the dhimmi rules] were composed during the period of the Islamic conquest in the eighth or ninth century, at a time of strong military confrontation between Christianity and Islam, giving them a militant orientation.101) Even the very conservative Muslim apologist Ruqaiyyah Maqsood102) recognizes that many false hadith are in wide circulation among Muslims: It is commonplace to read numerous very weak and highly suspect hadith in countless Muslim articles and publications, often copied from one modern article to the next, without the least concern for scholarship or the veracity of the hadith.103) Maqsood, nevertheless, accepts the traditional "rules for deciding whether a hadith was sahih(authentic), da’if(weak), or maudu’(doubtful),"104) but if contemporary Muslims use hadith without concern for their authenticity, then early Muslims probably did the same, and we have already noted that the principles applied for establishing the authenticity of an isnad have not eliminated contradictory hadith. Maqsood herself admits of early Islam that it is "a well-known fact that false hadith were soon in circulation, however pious the intentions of those who fabricated them."105) The more liberal Muslim Cyril Glass? even asserts: Hadith have [sometimes] been invented in order to justify some legal opinion or school of thought.106) Assuming such a state of affairs - i.e., the existence of hadith recognizably fabricated for juridical purposes and the need for legal rules applicable to the new conditions of a rapidly expanding Islamic empire - then a hermeneutics of suspicion is justified, and one could therefore also justifiably ask if the sword verse has been illegitimately used to abrogate the tolerance verse.107) Of course, the radical Islamists who urge military jihad are unlikely to be swayed through questions of hermeneutics raised by non-Muslims - probably not even by those non-Muslims willing to turn a critical eye upon American foreign policy. Bin Laden, for instance, has said, "We do not care what the Americans believe,"108) and he does not qualify this statement. Nevertheless, there are a few encouraging signs in some parts of the Muslim world. According to a recent article from Egypt: The 12 leaders of the militant al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya… Egypt’s bloodiest and most ruthless Muslim group, were pictured in a popular weekly news magazine voicing remorse and promising that there would be no return to the violence of the past 20 years… They were quoted as saying that they had misinterpreted the Islamic concept of jihad to justify killing Christian Egyptians, tourists, and police officers, and [were also quoted] as renouncing their use of violence to force women to respect Islamic dress codes.109) Some militants, it seems, can moderate their views, and it would be interesting to know what changed their minds. There is also the case of Iran, which is having second thoughts about its Islamic radicalism.110) As noted by Daniel Pipes, one of radical Islams severest public critics: Militant Islam is on the ascendant almost everywhere around the globe - except in the nation that has experienced it longest and knows it best. In Iran, it is on the defensive and perhaps in retreat.111) Significantly, this is occurring not just because a new generation has grown up that "wants freedom from a regime that bullies them personally, tyrannizes them politically, depresses them economically and isolates them culturally"112) but also because some in the ruling elite itself have become disillusioned. The Ayatollah Jalaleddin Taheri, who had played a role in overthrowing the shah and establishing the Islamic regime’s intolerance, has resigned from his important position as prayer leader because the Islamic Republic has only brought "crookedness, negligence, weakness, poverty and indigence."113) Pipes suggests: Muslims who have suffered from the full debilitation inflicted by militant Islam over a period of decades, it seems, are immune to the charms of this totalitarianism and prepared to take on the challenge of finding an alternative vision to it.114) He attributes this to "a maturation of the Iranian body politic" resulting from the fact that by overthrowing the Shah, "the Iranian population realized that it had control over and responsibility over its destiny" and that from this more mature perspective, it "has looked at its choices and… [has] come… down in favor of democracy and a cautious foreign policy."115) Thomas Friedman agrees that the Islamists are losing in Iran: because the young generation in Iran today knows two things: (1) They’ve had enough democracy to know they want more of it. (2) They’ve had enough theocracy crammed down their throats to know they want less of it.116) Friedman adds that this younger generation: will force a new balance in Iran, involving real democracy and an honored place for Islam, but not an imposed one.117) John L. Esposito and Ahmed Rashid, among others, would seem largely to agree with this assessment.118) For perhaps similar reasons, it would appear, Pipes agrees that "there is nothing in Islam that necessarily contradicts democracy," though he holds that for Muslims to achieve democracy, they must also secularize ? by which, he seems primarily to mean that Muslims must separate religion and state and subordinate the former to the latter.119) That, of course, is a big question: Can the Islamic world, in this sense, truly secularize? More to the point, can this huge community that considers itself to have been founded by a religious leader to replace all previous religions and civilizations, this community convinced of its own cultural superiority and obsessed with its great weakness, this community afflicted with a homing sense of shame and deeply wounded honor120) for the historically superior status that it has lost - can this community secularize, especially when the impulse toward secularization comes from a distrusted West that has undergone an Enlightenment era that the Muslim world has never experienced,121) a West that has at times used the instrumental, secular rationality stemming from this Enlightenment to dominate much of the Islamic world?122) And this leads to a second big question: Even if the Islamic world can secularize, can it succeed in secularizing the militant mind of radical Islamists? The fact that millions of evangelical Christians in America are not comfortably reconciled with secular modernity strongly suggests that we should not be especially optimistic about Islam successfully, comprehensively, and profoundly secularizing itself. We have perhaps even less reason for optimism given the fact that historically, the most authoritative Islamic thinkers have never recognized the genuine legitimacy of an enduring, legal separation between religion and state.123) We thus have considerable reason for concern that at least some percentage - and therefore potentially a large number - of radical Muslims will perhaps never come to satisfactory terms with secular modernity.124) If so, then for a fearfully long time, we may have to live with radical Islamists - and increasingly die with them.125)

高麗時代 儒·佛의 對立과 調和

오지섭 한신대학교 한신인문학연구소 2002 한신인문학연구 Vol.3 No.-

Schein und Sein : Analyse des Dramas 'Der Spiegelmensch' von Franz Werfel

PAK, Schoro 한신대학교 한신인문학연구소 2001 한신인문학연구 Vol.2 No.-

임노월 문학비평 연구

유문선 한신대학교 한신인문학연구소 2001 한신인문학연구 Vol.2 No.-

언어 감각, 흥미와 동기 유발을 위한 언어 게임의 활용 방안

최천택 한신대학교 한신인문학연구소 2002 한신인문학연구 Vol.3 No.-

채만식 소설에 나타난 도시성

김용희 한신대학교 한신인문학연구소 2000 한신인문학연구 Vol.1 No.-