美國과 蘇聯의 少數民族 政策比較

金炯燦 단국대학교 미소연구소 1991 미소연구 Vol.5 No.-

The present study compares national policy of the Soviet Union towards its nationality minorities with that of the United States towards its racial minorities. The purpose of the study is to describe points of similarity and difference between the two nations in terms of the past and present treatment of their minority people, and to analyze social and ethnic stratification. The study has identified a number of similarities and differences between the two nations in their treatment of minority people who are culturally different from the majority people of both nations. A major point of difference discussed has to do with the political system of the two nations. While the soviet Union’s federal political system was devised in order to accomodate distinct racial and/or ethnic boundary lines, the American federal governing system did not take into consideration the various ethnic or racial divisions. Of the differences noted in the study two deserve mentioning here. First, both nations have pursued the assimilation policy. The Soviet Union has continued to make an effort to assimilate culturally different people in order to Russify them. By the same token the United States has followed an assimilation policy under various names all dedicated to Americanize millions of immigrants. The two nations have, however, failed to create egalitarian societies in their respective countries as their societies are plagued by ethnic stratification. Both nations have created a political and economic structure that favors the majority members of their society who are white. The present study has found that ethnic stratification in both nations is systemic and social unrest will continue to plague them until they can effectively deal with inequality of people due to their racial or ethnic origin.

冷戰時代 美蘇外交의 比較

金辰雄 단국대학교 미소연구소 1991 미소연구 Vol.5 No.-

The intent of this study is to compare American and Russian diplomacy in the Cole War. It could be argued that the main similarity between U.S. and Soviet diplomacy in the conflict-ridden era was the quest for legitimacy. It means that both nations were hoping for recognition as the leading successor state to the European “world empire” that began to collapse after World War Ⅰ. Stalin’s one bloc “isolationism,” on the other hand, contrasted sharply with the “Pax Americana Technologica” that arose with Roosevelt’s commitment to building a huge air force and navy in World War Ⅱ. Actually, Russia’s emergence out of bloc isolationism was facilitated most of all by America’s failures in the “Third World.” More specifically, the two great nations sought in the unstable international environment to satisfy their particular needs and ideas, to expand their divergent interests and principles. Americans were universalist on behalf of an ideology linking peace, prosperity, democracy, and the open door policy. Russians, on the other hand, preached a universal message of inevitable proletarian revolution. Americans reached for foreign outposts and markets to meet their strategic-economic needs. The Soviets found as well that their security and economy required expansionism. The United States held impressive and influential power-economic, political, and military-on a global scale. The Soviet Union also commanded regional authority in Eastern Europe through the power of the Red Army. In the pursuit of their objectives, leaders in Washington and Moscow conducted diplomacy with a personality and style that annoyed their opposites and obstructed negotiations. American and Soviet diplomats who eyed one another across the bargaining table harbored strong dislikes, betraying considerable suspicion and distrust. And the american and Soviet political systems were such that diplomacy rested in the hands of Truman and Stalin and their immediate advisers, who faced few domestic restraints and were thus able to define the character of the postwar confrontation.

韓國의 對東歐圈 經濟交流 增進을 위한 方案 : 蘇聯을 中心으로 with the Soviet Union

朴宗漢 단국대학교 미소연구소 1988 미소연구 Vol.2 No.-

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, speaking in the Siberian city of krasnoyarsk on Friday, September 16, 1988, said the Soviet union would not increase the amount of nuclear weapons in the region and reiterated the Soviet position that a radar station at Krasnoyarsk did not violate the ABM treaty. The Soviet leader also announced plans for an economic initiative in the Far East to bring the Soviet Union into greater contact with Japan and other industrialized and prosperious far eastern nations. He mentioned that he was considering creating “special enterprise zone’s” on Soviet far eastern territory, a sort of tax trading heaven similar to Hong Kong, to revive the economy of that region in the Soviet union. Gorbachev said that “possibilities can open up for forming economic relations with South Korea.” Soviet officials have privately signalled Moscow’s interest in developing direct economic links with Seoul. South Korea-Soviet trade, totalling about US$ 150 million annually, currently takes place through third countries such as Japan. But diplomatic links between Seoul and Moscow, despite the establishment of ties between South Korea and Hungary, were seen as unlikely in the near future. By the above recent developments, South Korea which has no diplomatic relations with USSR, has much interest in forming economic relations with the Soviet Union. In expanding economic relations with them, we may consider export-import and joint ventures. A successful exporting operation requires effective organization designed to enlarge the market share of the company. Above all, it must be profitable and well paid personnel of a high calibre are instrumental in attaining this objective. The size of the company, the nature of its products, and the scale of its export business are the main factors which influence the nature of export organization. For market entry into the Soviet Union, we must have good organization and well trained prersonnel who speaks Russian fluently. At the present time South Korea can offer the USSR general consumer goods and consumer electronic goods such as color TV, VCR, refrigerators, and we can possibly import logs, natural gas and crude oil from the Soviets. The area that I would like to concentrate on will be that relating to joint ventures. I think that joint ventures can, under certain circumstances, provide interesting opportunities for Korean companies to lead and participate in major projects in the USSR, particularly in the eastern areas of the country. In stating this potential opportunity, a mutually acceptable relationship would have to be established between Korea and the USSR, both commercially and politically. At the same time I would not wish to give the impression that joint ventures will always be the right solution and their merits need to be examined on a case by case basis. In particular, these types of joint venture will provide the following benefits. First and foremost the Soviets see that the involvement of capitalist countries will improve management efficiency. Decades of centralisation and bureaucracy have ensured that there are little or no management decision-taking and initiatives at the plant site. They also wish to see the economy decentralised as far as possible with decision-taking being made to a far larger degree by the on-site managers. One of the greatest problems facing the Soviet economy at the present time is lack of hard currency earnings to pay for the major investments which are needed to improve their economy. In addition, many of the Soviet manufacturing facilities are badly operated, a situation which leads to manufacturing of the wrong products; poor quality; and significantly reduced output. In particular they see capitalist countries as being able to improve their performance by being involved in the operation of plants. In many ways. The success story which has taken place in Korea is one which I am sure the Soviets envy and they would welcome the experience and expertise that Korean compaines now have. The criteria that the Soviets will have for those joint ventures they will wish to give the highest priority, will include the following factors: Those industries which have a value added element, particularly in relation to the earning of hard currency. This will include projects which convert gas into down-stream petrochemical products; the processing of food; and down-stream timber projects. Those projects which will improve existing tools; better control systems; and instrumentation will fall into this category. One of the major problems that the Soviets are facing is in the agricultural sector, particularly relating to storage and transportation. They will, therefore, be looking at food processing and distribution systems. As already mentioned, they will wish to find new investments, or modernize/upgrade existing investments, in semi finished and finished products. These will include, in particular, products in the light industries, which not only have the potential to earn foreign currency, but also improve the domestic standard of living. For the first time the Soviets are beginning to understand the benefits of the service industries and they will, therefore, be looking at value added in hotels, tourism and engineering industries. The Soviet parties are now, however, attempting to promote more substantial joint ventures in an effort to speed up the economic restructuring within the USSR. I do feel that there are real opportunities for Korean companies in this market. I accept that the USSR is not a market well known by Korean companies, but the combination of good partners, particularly in Europe and the US, who know the Soviet market well, should overcome these potential difficulties. Presently, we may consider joint ventures with the soviets, particularly in Siberia and its far eastern area, in the field of timber business and furniture manufacturing, fishing industry, processed fish products, hotel development projcets and road construction for free ways. Moreover, we hate to seek an investment protection agreement with the Soviets to set the way for investment by Korean enterprises in the USSR. Also trade insurence systems, marine transport route to the Soviet and new banking systems are required for doing business with the Soviet Union.

2. 그루지아 共和國

金富起 단국대학교 미소연구소 1992 미소연구 Vol.6 No.-

韓國에 있어서 蘇聯硏究의 實態 및 傾向과 展望 : trends and prospects

李命植 단국대학교 미소연구소 1987 미소연구 Vol.1 No.-

Soviet studies in Korea witnessed, in the 1960’s, a continuing folw of the Soviet case, as indeed of other cases. In the 1970’s and the 1980’s it also witnessed a folw of studies of another, newer, and broader type-studies of theoretical bent concerned with the construction of general analytical models of Soviet studies. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to review and examine the general trends and problems of Soviet studies in Korea. In order to cahieve the purpose, the reviewer consider in three parts firstly, what was the basic motive of Soviet studies in Korea, especially in the 1960’s; secondly how Soviet studies in Korea developed during the 1970’s and the 1980’s; finally, what are the problems to study Soviet Affairs in Korea. In terms of the difficult problems to study soviet affairs in Korea, the reviewer insisted that one of the most urgent tasks confronting the field of Russian studiesin korea be the identification and preservation of the primary source materials that document the domestic and external affairs.

2. 몰도바 共和國

鄭漢求 단국대학교 미소연구소 1992 미소연구 Vol.6 No.-

美國經濟의 環境變化와 政策對應의 問題點

申龍鶴 단국대학교 미소연구소 1987 미소연구 Vol.1 No.-

The U.S. economic performance of the 1970’s shattered the buoyant optimism if the 1960’s. And with the economy, the economic consensus also lost its sheen. The attempts to formulate a post-Keynesian position have been many, but none has been wholly satisfying nor borne out by the events of recent years. If none of the analyses and prescriptions have proven adequate to the demands of the moment, they have nonetheless made trenchant contributions to our way of viewing the world situation. This article powerfully argues the continuing importance of maintaining the U.S. role in world economy. This study notes that American economy cannot ignore the importance of its role in world trades. Nor can questions of U.S.growth be ignored. The recent instability of world financial operation grew out of a widespread fear that American economy would have difficulty managing the transitional tasks without the active efforts of government. To help meet the challenge of steady growth, U.S. government must use all practicable means to promote maximum employment, production and purchasing power. On a whole range of key presentation of this study, the American economy performed very well during the first two decades after the war, but fell off noticeably during the decade of the seventies. And in spite of some recent talk about the economy entering a new era of growth, this work suggests that today’s policies have not reversed the 1970’s pattern of uneven growth and persisting problems in American economic structure. On the other hand, the strong performance of the American economy in the two decades after the war was neither an accident nor matter of purely private initiative. Instead, this enormous growth during this period was the product of good fortune in American economic circumstances combined with good sense in public policy. The failure of conventional policies in meeting the challenges of the 1970’s led to some extraordinary experimentation in public policy. Faced with significant inflation, the lid policies of active demand management appeared helpless. Traditional macroeconomics, trapped by the dismal logic of several theories offered no cure for stagflation. Economic theories reminiscent of the economic philosophy of the 1920s were supported by some apparent new departures in economic thinking. although monetarism and supplyside economics contradicted each other in crucial respects, they were fused into the theoretical foundations of the new economics. this radical departure has had some significant successes. But these successes were purchased at a huge price. Inflation was brought down, but, despite the predictions of monetarism, only at the price of a recession longer and deeper than any since the 1930’s. And, the recovery from the recession was purchased with unprecedented increases in both budget and trade deficits, not the hugh outpouring of growth and investment predicted by supply-side economics. In the face of this mixed record, there is no point in rehashing the 1980 debate about economic policy. The important question before us now is: “Where do we go from here?” We must disregard old debates, comfortable solace and over own ideology, and face the fact that since the mid 1970’s the economy has grown at a slower pace than before and neither theories seem to have mastered the art of designing economic policies that will produce maximum employment, production and purchasing power without inflation. The need to find a new set of economic policies has been dramatically intensified and signalled the wide spread recognition that todays policies have not been living up to their promises. America can no longer paper over problems with mountains of debts and trade deficits. This work provides to re-open the real debate about economics and economic policy in a democratic society.

北韓의 蘇聯 및 東歐外交

閔丙天 단국대학교 미소연구소 1988 미소연구 Vol.2 No.-

The basic objective of North Korea’s foreign policy according to Minju Chosun, is independence, friendship, and peace. Apart from its desire for survival and independence, North Korea’s foreign policies were also designed to isolate the South internationally and promote its claim for legitimacy in attaining national unification in tis own terms. North korea has forged special ties with its two northern neighbors, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. It was under the aegis of the former that the North Korean regime came into being; more important, Kim Il Sung’s rise to power in the 1940s was possible primarily because of the conspicuous patronage of the Soviet occupation authorities. The principle of Juche(self-reliance) notwithstanding, North Korea has consistently sought Soviet cooperation in these respects. Despite its early dependence on the Soviet union and China, over the next several decades North Korea, under the leadership of Kim Il-Sung, evolved a relatively independent foreign policy. Key to this independence has been Kim’s extraordinary ability to manipulate his country’s posture of “equidistance,” siding with one or the other of its Communist neighbors on particular issues but aligning with neither. From the North Korean perspective, objectively the Soviet union is perhaps the DPRK’s most crucial ally. The Soviet Union is also the only country that can satisfy North Korea’s need for sophisticated advanced weaponry. More over, among socialist nations the Soviet Union is most capable of providing the North with substantial economic and technological assistance. Because North korea’s economic development and military build-up have been largely dependent on Soviet aid. North Korea’s policy toward East European countries(Poland, West Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Rumania) is to improve technical and economic cooperation. Because North Korea’s economic diplomacy has been directed at the East European countries. Active efforts for trade expansion and economic cooperation will be increase between North Korea and Eastern Europe in the near future.

新 Detente 國際秩序와 한국의 東北亞 安定追求 : 한반도 平和體制를 중심으로 Focused on the Inter-Korean Peace System

朱秀基 단국대학교 미소연구소 1990 미소연구 Vol.4 No.-

There are periods of history when profound changes occur all of a sudden, and the acceleration of events is such that much of what experts write is obsolete before it gets into print. We are now in one of those periods, which obliges the Republic of Korea to probe carefully into the environmental changes of global international politics, particularly those in the foreign policy attitude of the Soviet Union, and to reassess the political situation on the Korean Peninsula and the regional settings of Northeast Asian sub-system as well. Men, and states as well, have to live within the boundary of their environment, with which they continuously interact. When they fail to respond aptly to the environment and its changes, hardly they are expected to promote self-development and self-preservation. This is, what we call, the principle of natural selection and the interrelation of challenge vs. response in history. Thus, the on-going changes in international politics and its direction can be either a plus or a minus to the delicate inter-Korean relations. The departure point of this study is concerned with the afore-mentioned historical characteristics of present period and its impacts upon the Korean peninsula. In the decade of 1990s, the international politics is clearly directed toward the rapprochement and cooperation, and a new international order appears to replace the widely known cold war structure of bipolarity. Assuming that the Republic of Korea pursues her national interests in terms of the national security, the national unification, and the economic prosperity, the present study intends ⅰ) to scrutinize the sudden transition of American-Soviet relationship from a Cold War to a Detente; ⅱ) to analyze the implications in the main driving force-the Gorbachev's diplomacy of New Thinking, i.e., Novoye Mysblenie; ⅲ) to focus on the great transformation of Eastern Europe and the reshaping of European international politics; ⅳ) to evaluate three important factors in the changes of Northeast Asian politics; ⅴ) to evaluate the consequences of newly emerging international detente on the Korean peninsula; and ⅵ) to discuss the strategic settings and policy conditions of the peace system on the Korean peninsula in order to induce the opening of North Korea and to reduce the probability of inter-Korean conflict. From the dichotomy of Cold War vs. Detente, the advent of second detente plainly characterizes the American-Soviet relations with the emergence of Mikhail S. Gorbachev in 1985. This great transition from a cold war to a detente seems so have been influenced by the three factors: the changes of leadership in the both countries, the evolution of their respective relations with China and Japan, and the urgencies of their economic hardship. Quite different from the detente of 1970s, the new form of rapprochement and cooperation appears to be initiated by the Soviet Union and the New Thinking diplomacy by Gorbachev. The end of tense cold war system and the emergence of new international order are obviously witnessed by the total collapse of Eastern European communist countries and the recomposition of European politics. Needless to say, without the Eastern European communism, the existence of bipolarity looses its real intensity and extensity as well, and it can not help but change to a new system of different quality. The detente climates of arms reduction in the NATO-WTO negotiation and the German unification have emitted some great heats to the iciness of Cold War structure. In the international scene of Northeast Asian, the Sino-Soviet rapprochement, the Korean-Soviet normalization of diplomatic relations, and the North Korea's approaches to Japan and the United States seem to encroach on the pillars of cold war arrangement. The international order of Northeast Asia, bipolarized into the rivalry of Southern vs. Northern triangular relationship, was resulted from the American-Soviet confrontation. However, in the midst of new detente climate, it is characterized as a process of realignment of bilateral relationship among the concerned parties in the structure of crossing cooperation. Thus, the following properties are more likely to characterize the Northeast Asian international politics: ⅰ) the reciprocal-multilateral relations, ⅱ) the peaceful co-existence replacing the inter-bloc hostility in a zero-sum strategy, ⅲ) the national economic interest in preference to the ideological affinity, ⅳ) the incrementing structural plurality, ⅴ) the stable regional transformation of international relations, ⅵ) the increasing economic interdependence. The inter-Korean relations have been those of counter-production due to the Korean War, the confrontation of zero-sum pattern, and the military tension between the two. Therefore, it is quite desirable to turn the age of mutual loss into the age of mutual benefit, based on the peaceful co-existence and reciprocal cooperation-which become the essential parts of inter-Korean peace system. In reality, there are plainly two governments-two societies on the Korean peninsula. At the same time, there is only one nation-one people in perception. Thus, both the realization of perception and the perceptualization of reality have to be carried out in the pursuit of peace system. In addition, there are two factors required in the inter-Korean peace system: one is the reciprocal opening and exchange between the two, the other is the elimination of war potentials on the Korean peninsula. Since the Korean peninsula is considered to be a security lynchpin in the strategic region of Northeast Asia where the four major powers are criss-crossing, the inter-Korean peace system in the post-Cold War structure will contribute to the tranquility of Northeast Asian region-and to the detente and cooperation in the global international politics.

韓國의 對共産圈外交에 對한 北韓의 對應態度 및 戰略

全正煥 단국대학교 미소연구소 1988 미소연구 Vol.2 No.-

The purpose of S.Korea’s Nord Politik or Northern diplomacy is to improve hitherto ideological enemy with China and the Soviet union by exploring some non-political cooperative relation, and eventually to reduce tension in the Korean peninsula by promoting the prospect of peaceful coexistence with North Korea. South Korean began to envisage its Nord Politik from the early 1970s when it announced what is called “june 23, 1973 declaration” in which it showed for the first time an willingness to open door to Communist countries. The back gound of this declaration could be traced as follows. First, detente between the united States and the Soviet Union from the late sixteens encouraged South Korea’s ‘New Look’ at the Soviet bloc; second, with the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine South Korea feared possible withdrawal of US forces in the country; third, West Germany’s success of Ostpolitik tempted the S. Korean leadership for a dramatic breakthrough in its antagonistic relationship with the North; south Korea began to feel a sense of economic strength in initiating cooperative relationship with Communist countries. In sum, all these factors reinforced each other and thus provided the rationality of a ‘New Look’ policy toward the Communist countries in the north. In doing so, the Korea government had in mind the following objectives. First and most important, peace must be secured at the cost in the korean peninsula through the reduction of tension with North Korea, and for that matter, to improve the prospect of eventual unification. Second, South Korea wanted to further its growing economic strength by exploring trade partnership with Communist countries. Third, by opening door, it could pursue ‘all round diplomacy’ away from hitherto a self-isolated cold war diplomacy. Since the mid 1980s South Korea’s northen diplomacy has scored some success in certain aspects. First, there has been a remarkable progress in its relations with the PRC and the USSR; second, for that matter, trade & economic relations with them have in cheased to a considerable degree and likely to grow further; third, as already shown with the case of Hungary, South Korea would try to upgrade its trade partnership with communist countries into normal diplomatic relationship although North Korea would strongly oppose and attempt to prevent such a movement. It may be said that South Korea’s somewhat embolden attitudes and policy towards the Communist base especially over last couple of years can be explained by economic self-confidence and post-Seoul olympic national self-assertion in the course of political democratization. It is no surprising that North Korea watches all this development with uneasiness and frustration. North Korea regards such positive changes as South Korean attitudes would not only prolong the division of Korea but also hinder its own design of national unification by arms. In addition the North Korean leadership think that South Korea’s open door policy might bring some adverse effects within the tightly controlled North Korean society. Therefore North Korea would most likely to response South Korea’s increasing by successful northern diplomacy in following ways. First, North Korea will try every effort to prevent S.Korea’s close ties especially normal diplomatic relationship with communist countries; second, N.Korea might attempt o improve its closed relations with the US and japan providing that it would not necessarily develop into either a state of cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the big powers or joint UN membership of the two; third, North Korea would continue to insist a free zone in Korea through the withdrawal of ‘all’ US forces in Korea; fourth, N.Korea would try to explore existing channels of dialogue with the South for its own strategic purpose by adherring to its pronounced terms of politico-military negotiation. In conclusion, while N.Korea will not abandon its own terms of national unification by persistantly attempting to disrupt South Korea’s success in northern diplomacy in the foreseeable future the fluidity security environment in and around the korean peninsula is likely to constrain North Korea’s room of maneouver in the long run.