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RISS 인기검색어
- 검색키워드
- 저자 : Zulfqar Khan (검색결과 4 건)
- 무료
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Pakistan`s Evolving Strategic Outlook: Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence
( Zulfqar Khan ) 한국국방연구원 2016 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.28 No.1
It is argued that, Pakistan’s “full spectrum” nuclear strategy is based upon the concept of proportionate calibration against the perceived threat of a limited strike by the conventionally much superior military forces of India. Pakistan’s strategy is emitting robust signaling vis-a-vis the apparent strikes with the objective to deter the adversary from operationalizing its flawed limited war doctrine. Moreover, its strategic nuclear forces would perform the function of a dynamic reserve asset and as an ultimate deterrent against India. Most significantly, it would convince India of consequences in the case of deliberate escalation of a crisis or plan of a limited military operation. In essence, it also sufficiently reflects Pakistan’s preparation and “willingness to fight.” In the absence of a conflict resolution mechanism, diplomatic dialogue, both countries’ nuclear deterrent capabilities are expected to perpetuate the element of uncertainty especially during crises.
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India–Pakistan, Limited War and Lopsided Deterrence: A Perspective
Zulfqar Khan 한국국방연구원 2018 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.30 No.1
The paper analyzes India–Pakistan’s lopsided nuclear deterrence and military strategies. India plans to deliberately escalate a limited war against Pakistan. Pakistan is determined to neutralize India’s schema on different planes, a limited conventional, limited nuclear to strategic nuclear wars. It is destabilizing and complicating South Asia’s nuclear deterrence matrix. Pakistan’s threshold has depleted due to its “two-frontal” security dilemma. It has considerably increased Pakistan’s reliance on nuclear weapons. It is deduced that, India–Pakistan’s inflexible and egocentric cultural mooring is inhibiting them from stepping back from perilous military strategies, which can trigger miscalculations, enhance misperceptions, or may lead to the outbreak of accidental/inadvertent limited conventional or nuclear war. Both countries need to recognize the imperative of a stable nuclear deterrence and peaceful coexistence instead of crafting unpredictable and dangerous strategies. The shared risks of nuclear catastrophe should motivate them to pursue rational and realistic policies.
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Regional-centric Deterrence: Reassessing its Efficacy for South Asia
( Zulfqar Khan ),( Rizwana Abbasi ) 한국국방연구원 2013 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.25 No.4
It is generally believed that a stable nuclear deterrence averts wars between nuclear adversaries, and makes peace secure. This conceptual argument has merit in terms of the prevention of all-out war; but it does not fully address the need to prevent the outbreak of a limited war between two nuclear weapon states. India and Pakistan have already fought one limited war, Kargil, in a nuclear environment. These two relatively new nuclear weapon states rely on nuclear deterrence to address the external threats. While frequently occurring conflicts demonstrate this, a recurrence of limited war cannot be ruled out in this crisis-ridden region, which would be fraught with significant dangers of escalation. Using a qualitative research approach and deploying a structural deterrence theory as a conceptual guiding tool, this paper investigates the nuclear future of the region, including the prospects of war, conflict termination strategy, escalation control, escalation dominance mechanisms, and finally suggests some pertinent lessons for crisis stability.
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KCI
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