http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.
변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.
Geopolitics and South Korea`s Economic Success
( Jonathan Krieckhaus ) 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 2017 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE Vol.41 No.1
This article deepens our understanding of the South Korean economic miracle in three ways. First, using the most recent economic data, I demonstrate that the South Korean economy continues to impress when evaluated in comparative perspective. Second, I argue that geopolitics, such as the country`s unique relationships with the United States and China, heavily shaped South Korean economic success during the Cold War years. Third, geopolitics and economic growth continue to intersect in South Korea`s current strategy regarding free trade agreements.
US Trade Policy, President Trump and the KORUS FTA
Jonathan Krieckhaus 한국학술연구원 2018 Korea Observer Vol.49 No.4
President Trump criticized the KORUS FTA and in 2018 South Korea and the United States renegotiated the KORUS. What explains Trump’s antipathy? Why has he departed so radically from prior US free trade policy? I answer these questions by making four arguments. First, President Trump’s protectionism is a surprising reversal given the range of US interests, institutions, and ideology supporting free trade. Second, while conceding that economic interests of low-skilled workers interacted with the electoral mechanisms of democracy to facilitate Trump’s anti-KORUS position, I argue that the most important explanation is Trump’s personal economic ideology. Third, trade policy during the Trump presidency is explained by the extent to which President Trump’s cabinet has—or has not—been able to constrain his personal protectionist instincts. Fourth, the institutional process of renegotiating the KORUS FTA further constrained Trump’s protectionism.
How Democracy Facilitates South Korean Interest in Free Trade Agreements
A. 쿠퍼 드러리,Jonathan Krieckhaus,Chika Yamamoto 한국학술연구원 2014 Korea Observer Vol.45 No.1
In recent years South Korea has been unusually active in signingfree trade agreements (FTAs), which is usually seen as a sign of thecountry’s economic interest in expanding trade. We argue thatKorean foreign economic policy also follows a political interest,namely that Korea prefers to pursue FTAs with fellow democracies rather than with authoritarian regimes. This preference for democracieshas three complementary origins: 1) democratic dyads arepeaceful dyads, such that Korea need not worry about empoweringrival nations through FTAs, 2) democratic regimes are more accountable,such that FTAs are more likely to be enforced in a democraticregime, and 3) democratic countries are more likely to see a nationalinterest in FTAs, further increasing the chances of Korea pursuing aFTA. We test this argument with an original dataset on Korea’s FTAconsideration from 2000 to 2011, using Cox Proportional Hazardsmodels.