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MEASURING THE FISCAL BURDEN OF FINACIAL RESTRUCTURING
JOOSUNG JUN AND JINWOO HWANG 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회) 2001 공공경제 Vol.6 No.2
THIS PAPER PRESEINTS ESTIMATES OF THE ACTUAL FISCAL ASSOCIATED WITH FINANCIAL SECTOR RESTRUCTURING IN KOREA, CALCULATED ON AN ANNUAL CASH-FLOW BASIS. THE FISCAL COSTS OF FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING PRIMARILY CONSIST OF THE ANNUAL INTERST PAYMENTS ON THE NET DEBT AND THE REALIZED LOSSES FROM THE SALE OF COLLATERAL, SHARES, AND ASSETS OF RESTRUCTURED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. ACCORDING TO OUR RESULTS, THE TOTAL FISCAL COSTS OF RESOLVING THE NON-PERFORMING ASSETS, WHICH SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE BUDGET OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS, MAY REACH SOMEWHERE BETWEEN 79 TRILLION WON AND 110 TRILLION WON, WHICH AMOUNT TO 15.4% AND 21.4% OF THE CURRENT GDP. FISCAL COSTS OF THOSE MAGNITUDES ADVERSELY AFFECT THE FISCAL BALANCE AND THE DEBT POSITION. WHILE THE GOVERNMENT DEBT IN KOREA IS LIKELY TO BE SUSTAINABLE AS LONG AS HIGH TO MODERATE ECONOMIC GROWTH CONTINUES, GREATER RESTRUCTURING FUND LOSSES AND AN ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN COULD WORSEN SUSTAINABILITY.
전주성(Joosung Jun),황진우(Jinwoo Hwang) 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회) 1999 재정논집 Vol.13 No.2
The restructuring of the financial sector in Korea involves substantial government actions, which can have strong fiscal implications. Estimation of the actual fiscal burden will provide a basis for considering potential fiscal response measures to the crisis. However, most discussions on this subject do not distinguish the total size of the initially raised funds from the actual fiscal burden borne by the annual government budget. This paper presents estimates of the actual fiscal costs associated with financial sector restructuring in Korea, calculated on an annual cash-flow basis. The fiscal costs of financial restructuring primarily consist of the annual interest payments on the net debt and the realized losses from the sale of collateral, shares, and assets of restructured financial institutions. According to our results, the total fiscal costs of resolving the non-performing assets of 100 trillion won, which should be reflected in the budget over the next several years, may reach somewhere between 44 trillion won and 63 trillion won, which amount to 10.4% and 15.0% of the current GDP in 1997. This range is estimated based on an optimistic as well as a pessimistic set of assumptions about underlying economic conditions. If the amount of the non-performing assets to be resolved increases to 200 trillion won, the fiscal costs involved will be 79 trillion-113 trillion won.
전주성(Jinwoo Hwang),황진우(Joosung Jun) 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회) 1999 재정논집 Vol.14 No.1
The evidence presented in this paper supports the claim that a U.S. tax hike can cause foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States to increase by affecting the relative tax advantage of certain foreign firms and domestic firms. If a foreign firm can credit all U.S. taxes paid against its home tax liability on the income earned in the U.S., an increase in the U.S. tax rate may not affect the total tax burden on this firm’s investment in the United States. This firm may rather benefit from an increase in the pretax rate of return on U.S. assets caused by reduced investments by domestic firms. Our empirical analysis draws on the experience of fluctuating tax incentives and FDI in the United States during the 1980s. The estimated equations, which relate industry-level variations in the effective tax rate and net capital expenditures and control for the effects of exchange rates and U.S. business conditions, indicate a robust and significantly positive tax effect on FDI across various specifications. This result provides a more convincing support to the Scholes-Wolfson type of argument since the role of tax-induced FDI in U.S. capital accumulation can be more adequately investigated using the comparable measures of investments by foreign and domestic firms.