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RISS 인기검색어
- 검색키워드
- 저자 : ( Niv Farago ) (검색결과 3 건)
- 무료
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- 유료
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The Next Korean War: Drawing Lessons From Israel`s Experience in the Middle East
( Niv Farago ) 한국국방연구원 2016 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.28 No.1
What would an armed conflict between the two Koreas look like? The following analysis examines this question by drawing lessons from the history of military clashes between Israel and its Arab and Palestinian adversaries. Firstly, it suggests that an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula would be limited in its scope. Although qualitatively inferior, the North Korean military could conduct a limited ground maneuver south to the DMZ by employing Egypt’s strategy in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. A South Korean counterattack would also be limited. Advancing too deep beyond the DMZ would provoke Pyongyang to go on a nuclear alert and encourage Chinese and American pressure on Seoul to pull back. A South Korean refusal to comply could invite foreign intervention, similar to the American intervention in the 1973 War. Secondly, this paper explores the challenge of guerrilla warfare (both above and below ground) that ROK forces are likely to encounter if they cross the DMZ. Israel’s experiences in the 2006 Lebanon War and in Operations Cast Lead (2008) and Protective Edge (2014) illustrate that in facing such a challenge, even an indisputably superior force may have to pay a heavy price in casualties. Given that North Korean nuclear deterrence would prevent ROK forces from implementing reunification war plans, South Korea should consider stopping its counterattack at the DMZ, rather than pursuing the enemy into a terra incognita of topographical and subterranean traps.
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Government-Military Relations in Israel: Who’s the Boss? Lessons from the Six-Day War
( Niv Farago ) 한국국방연구원 2017 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.29 No.4
In recent years, prominent voices in the Israeli academic and political arenas have increased their criticism of the Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF) dominant role in policy and decision-making processes in the country. The 1967 Six-Day War is perhaps the bedrock upon which IDF critics’ fears of a dominant military rest upon. They disapprove of the pressure that the military’s high command put on the government to go to war and argue that the IDF was overly dominant in determining its goals and strategic moves on the battlefield. The following analysis debunks the claims of IDF critics by presenting historical evidence that shows how political considerations overrode military calculations on the way to and during the war. It also highlights the vital contribution of the IDF’s high command to decision-making at significant crossroads. In this regard, the analysis uses organizational theory logic to question the suggestion of IDF critics to empower the National Security Council (NSC) so it could provide the government with alternative analyses and courses of action to those suggested by the IDF. Significantly, the analysis concludes that by empowering the NSC at the expense of the IDF, the government might invite confusion rather than clarity and efficiency to policy and decision-making processes, especially in times of crises and war―when quick decision and action are necessary.
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The Civil War in Syria in View of the Iranian Challenge in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective
Farago Niv 한국국방연구원 2019 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.31 No.3
This article examines the civil war in Syria and Iran’s military buildup in that country through the lens of senior Israeli politicians, military ofcers, and security pundits. Most of them agree that the Netanyahu government’s policy of striking Iran–linked targets in Syria hard while encouraging Europe to impose, like the United States, debilitating sanctions on Iran has severely damaged the ayatollahs’ plans. By interrupting Iranian efforts to establish a Hezbollah-like force in Syria and equip it with precision-guided missiles, Israeli policy has also decreased, some pundits believe, the likelihood of regional war. However, this article suggests that although Israel’s policy has hindered Iranian entrenchment in Syria, the danger of regional war has increased. Debilitating sanctions could cause Iran to discard the 2015 nuclear deal, thereby provoking an Israeli strike on its nuclear installations, and increasingly bolder strikes in Syria may spur the ayatollahs to retaliate harshly. Reliant upon Iran to secure Assad’s victory, but determined to deny the ayatollahs control over Syria, Russia is allowing Israeli strikes to continue as it rehabilitates Assad’s forces and rearms them with advanced weaponry. This weaponry, including S-300 defense systems that threaten Israeli planes, could embolden Syria to attempt recapturing the Golan Heights in the future.
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