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      • Leveraging Certificate-less Public Key Cryptosystem for Node ID Assignment in Structured P2P Systems

        Dengqi Yang,Jian Yang,Benhui Chen 보안공학연구지원센터 2015 International Journal of Security and Its Applicat Vol.9 No.8

        The security of node ID assignment scheme is the foundation of solving security problems in structured P2P systems. However, existing researches on the node ID assignment mechanism present one or more following problems: (1) Schemes just only focused on individual attack, but did not comprehensively analyze the security requirements of node ID assignment mechanism. (2) Schemes needed complex certificate management or met key escrow problem. (3) Almost all existing schemes required a trusted center to act as the single signer of node IDs, but it is very hard to find an absolutely trusted node in structured P2P system. As a result, none of existing schemes can prevent the single signer from being compromised or launching active attack. This paper firstly designs a threshold signature scheme based on secret sharing and certificateless public key cryptosystem without paring (CL-PKC-without-P). Based on that, it proposes a node ID assignment protocol which eliminates the three problems listed above. Using secret sharing technology, this protocol is able to resist the active attacks launching by less than t signer, where t is the threshold value. The results of analysis and simulation show that this protocol is more secure, efficient and scalable.

      • KCI등재

        One-round Secure Key Exchange Protocol With Strong Forward Secrecy

        ( Xiaowei Li ),( Dengqi Yang ),( Benhui Chen ),( Yuqing Zhang ) 한국인터넷정보학회 2016 KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Syst Vol.10 No.11

        Security models for key exchange protocols have been researched for years, however, lots of them only focus on what secret can be compromised but they do not differentiate the timing of secrets compromise, such as the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. In this paper, we propose a new security model for key exchange protocols which can not only consider what keys can be compromised as well as when they are compromised. The proposed security model is important to the security proof of the key exchange protocols with forward secrecy (either weak forward secrecy (wFS) or strong forward secrecy (sFS)). In addition, a new kind of key compromise impersonation (KCI) attacks which is called strong key compromise impersonation (sKCI) attack is proposed. Finally, we provide a new one-round key exchange protocol called mOT+ based on mOT protocol. The security of the mOT+ is given in the new model. It can provide the properties of sKCI-resilience and sFS and it is secure even if the ephemeral key reveal query is considered.

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