상키야(samkhya) 철학의 自我(purusa) 개념에 대한 고찰

김경춘(Kim, Kyung-choon) 한국요가학회 2010 요가학연구 Vol.3 No.1

리그베다의 purusa-sukta에서 유래한 상키야 철학의 自我인 purusa는 인더스 문명 또는 Veda의 父權 사상에 기초한 原質에 반대되는 비활동적인 自我(purusa) 로 남는다. 또한 Brh, KU, SU 등의 우빠니샤드의 自我인 atman은 SK의 自我와 가장 근접한 형태의 purusa를 제시한다. puru/puru에서 파생된 purusa는 SK에 의해서 인간, 개인, 영혼, 정신을 의미하는 전문용어로 채택된다. 이와 같이 RV에서 Up에 이르는 自我 개념을 통합하는 purusa는 고전 상키야 철학에서 다음과 같이 인식된다. 첫째, 상키야 철학에서 自我는 본질적으로 각 개체의 인식의 주체로서 나타난다. 둘째, 自我는 본성상 순수한 의식이고, 빛과 같이 존재한다. 셋째, 상키야 철학은 육체적.정신적.도덕적 차이를 모든 살아있는 존재에게서 발견하고, 추리에 의해서 다수의 自我가 있다고 주장한다. 넷째, 상키야 철학의 윤리학 에서 自我는 최상의 목표가 된다. 그러므로 상키야 철학의 自我 개념은 한편으로 인도철학사에서 Carvaka 철학이나 불교처럼 物質의 실재를 인정하고, 다른 한편으론 정통파처럼 自我의 실재를 주장하면서, 정통파와 비정통파의 두 극단의 철학적 경향들을 조화시킨다는 것에 의의가 있다. 또한 상키야 철학의 自我는 물질원리인 原質과 정신원리인 自我의 동등한 가치를 인정함으로써, 양자의 부조화를 조화로 이끈다. Purusa of the Samkhya philosophy from the purusa-sukta in RV is traslated variably according to modern Samkhya scholars. Weeringhe held that the thought of the Indus civilization or the dyaus pitar and Siva linga would form the basic Self(purusa) conception of SK(Samkhyakarika). Macdonell translated the Self of SK on a basis of the dyavaprthivi of RV. According to him, the personification of the sky as god never goes above and beyond the basic phase in RV and is limited almost completely to the patripotestal idea. Such a property of the dyaus of Veda remained the inactive Self(purusa) against the elemental substance(prakrti) full of energy as the universal Mother. Grassman described that he traslated the etymology of purusa related to the puru/puru representing the human being and purusa was adopted to the technical term meaning the human being, the individual, the soul and the sprit by SK. It was explained the epistemological aspect about purusa in Brh.Up. For KU, it gave the closest purusa s form with SK s Self. Purusa like a thumb mentioned in SU and this is used as the enjoyer meaning the soul in the western philosophy. Such a purusa as the Self of the Samkhya had unified the Self conception from RV to Up. The main reason to notice the classical Samkhya holds very the Self of majority . It is the Self of majority that appreciates the Self s differing with and not differing with the Indian orthodoxy. The Samkhya recognizing the Self of majority expresses clearly the value of Self existing with the matter to the human beings that attach the matter world in the world developed of the matter and the Self. This requires the development of balance between the matter and the Self that the human being has to aim for the value, also protects the Self s existence from the materialism and the Buddhism criticizing the social condition to get extreme toward only the matter, and at the same time by denying the Self as the One appears the thought of human equality that all beings have the equal value. Relating this, Vacaspati Miśra said the absurd on the universal uniformity of the human being s action is avoided by the Self of majority. Such a ecdysis of the uniformity symbolizes that the salvation depends on each of the individual. This suggests the Isolation(kaivalya) meaning the liberation in the classical Samkhya. It is said that the Isolation is to be entirely cut off from the other. The relation between the Self of majority and the Isolation accompanies a cool vision on the absent of communication among the human society. The absent of communication among the persons represents not only the cognition about the subject and the object as the matter and the spirit, but also cognitional difference between a person and a person implies. So the absent of communication among living beings remains still in the state of Isolation. Finally as the experience of suffering is contributed to each of the individual, such of that in the Isolation also remains each of the individual s. Therefore the Self in the Samkhyaphilosophy is the cool intuition on the essence of the human being and connotes the skepticism on the human society not to unify spiritually and psychologically as the one. As the manifested world is only the difference of matter s manifestation, So the Samkhya philosophy maintains the human equality recognizing the Self that has the equal nature in all beings.

일반 논문 : 진체(眞諦)의 상키야 용어번역에 관한 소고 -한역(漢譯)『김칠십론(金七十論)』을 중심으로-

강형철 ( Hyong Choi Kang ) 한국불교선리연구원 2009 禪文化硏究 Vol.6 No.-

인도와 중앙아시아 각지에서 중국으로 건너간 초기 역경가들에게는 인도의 언어를 어떻게 중국어로 번역해야할지가 고민거리였다. 여러 역경가들을 거치면서 많은 한역 용어들이 일부는 계승되고 일부는 변경되면서 변천사를 만들어 가게 되었다. 그리고 그와 같은 용어번역이 문제시될 수 있는 것은 비단 불교 용어에서뿐 만의 일은 아니었다. 한역된 방대한 불전들 중에는 불교 외부의 사상, 즉 소위 외도라고 불리던 다른 학파들의 사상이 인용된 수많은 사례가 있으며, 이들 학파 내에서 고유하게 사용되었던 전문용어들 또한 한문용어로 번역되어야 했다. 그 중에서 상키야(Samkhya) 학파는 불전에서 자주 인용되던 학파로서, 그 인용된 사례들은 원본이 현존하지 않는 내용을 담고 있는 경우가 다수 포함되어 있어, 상키야의 연구에 있어서도 귀중한 자료가 된다. 그 중 가장 체계적이고 방대한 서술을 담은 것이 진체(眞諦)(Paramartha, 499~569)가 번역한 『김칠십론(金七十論)』이다. 『김칠십론(金七十論)』은 범본(梵本)으로는 현존하지 않는 주석서를 번역에 포함하고, 그것이 이 Samkhya-Karika의 가장 오래된 주석서로 추측되기 때문에 상키야 교학의 성립사를 연구하는 데 있어서도 중요한 가치를 지닌다. 본고에서는 진제 이전의 역경가들이, 그들이 역술한 불전 내에서 상키야의 학설이 인용되는 부분에 있어서 상키야 학파의 전문용어들을 번역했던 단편들을 살펴보고, 진제의 역서들, 특히 『김칠십론(金七十論)』 내에서 어떻게, 그리고 어떤 이유에서 새롭게 번역되고 있는지를 고찰하고자 한다. 아울러 진제 이후의 역경가들이 그러한 진제의 번역을 어떻게 받아들였는지를 살펴보고자 한다. It was an outstanding problem for the early Buddhist translaters from India and the Central Asia to translate the Indian language into Chinese adequately. The history of the Buddhist Chinese translation had been molded through the translated terms which had been inherited and altered. The terminology of different schools called heretics 外道had also been needed to translate for the reason that varied thoughts from the schools are cited in the many places of vast Buddhist literatures. The 金七十論, the translation of the Samkhya-Karika and its commentary, translated by Paramartha(眞諦) remains only in the Buddhist Chinese collections without any extant Sanskrit version, This the oldest commentary of Samkhya-Karika is a crucial text for studies of Samkhya`s history as well as philosophy. In this paper, I have firstly observed how the main technical terms of Samkhya had been translated and secondly examined how and why the they were retranslated in versions by Paramartha, particularly, in the 金七十論. Furthermore, how other translaters subsequent to Paramartha had taken his works has lastly been studied.

인도 철학에서 자아 개념의 공유와 차별 -베단타의 일원론과 상키야의 이원론을 중심으로-

정승석 ( Seung Suk Jung ) 인도철학회 2012 印度哲學 Vol.0 No.36

The refection on the ``I`` from the ancient time in Indian philosophy is just a quest of the self. Speaking in a broad way, it is also a part of reflecting on and investigating human personality. Its origin may be traced in the Veda as aja, tanu, and Sarira, which are three constituents of human personality connected closely with Upanisadic speculations in a later period. Of these we are inclined to attach weight to aja and tanu as the preceding notions corresponding to the self and the soul respectively. Aja corresponds to Atman identified with Brahman. By the way, this aja together with aja, or the feminine of aja described in Upanisads are also regarded as scriptural authorities in support of Samkhya dualism. In this case, Purusa is compared to aja, and Prakrti is compared to aja. Therefore aja is a constituent of human personality corresponding to the predecessor of the self called Atman or Purusa. Meanwhile, according to the Veda, the subtle structural unit which carries the mental faculties of the personality is called tanu. Moreover tanu is characterized as what is restored to man when he has died and his physical body has been burnt and his personality dissolved. Thus it accords with the so-called soul, and also we can consider itas the notion corresponding to the predecessor of jiva, or the individual self. Besides, to the extent that tanu is the subtle structural unit which carries the mental faculties of the personality, it may also be the predecessor of the transporting (ativahika) or subtle (suksma) body which is held by Samkhya. Lastly, sarira is what is composed of the five gross elements, and refers to the body which is the visible and tangible physiological organism. Of three layers of human personality as above, we may say that aja tallies further with the self of Vedantic notions and tan? Tallies further with the subtle body of Samkhya notions. While in the case of the monism of Ved?nta materiality is not in consideration at all about the notion of the soul, in the case of the dualism of Samkhya the notion of the soul which belongs to the categories of materiality is taken into consideration. However, we cannot say that the cognition relating to the self between Vedanta and Samkhya is different remarkably. Though the difference of both is caused by each ontology between Vedanta and Samkhya, it also can be weaken by the theory of reflection at the level of epistemology. In other words, the self of Vedanta can act as if it were an individual self, and Buddhi of Samkhya can cognizes as if it were Purusa. This is possible through the theory of reflection. After all, what reveals itself definitely as a common idea between Vedanta and Samkhya is just Buddhi. The individual pseudo-self is represented in both sides by that Buddhi which is the consciousness of activity. The Buddhi is not only the knowing subject which serves as the soul, but also can be called as another names, that is to say vijnanatman, anta atman, jivatman, and so on. Meanwhile, as far as the notion of the self is concerned, the subtle body of Samkhya is a typical idea to be differentiated from Vedanta. But based on the advaita of vedakara, the subtle body is nothing but the result of ignorance (avidya), and it is only upadhi of the self. Atman identified with Brahman, namely a state of liberation in Vedanta, is realized by being free from ignorance mistaking the upadhis for the self. The isolation of Purusa, namely a state of liberation in Samkhya, is realized by being free from ignorance mistaking the Buddhi which leads the subtle body for the self. The logic for liberation held in whether Vedanta or Samkhya is the same. We can say that the different ideas between Vedanta and Samkhya revert back into the same logic for liberation. Accordingly, however vehemently the different ideas have been discussed, what can be weaken by the common ideas behind them would be the notion of the self in Indian philosophy.

『카타 우파니샤드』의 Purusa 개념에 대한 고찰

임혜정 ( Lim Hye Jeong ),정승석 ( Jung Seung Suk ) 인도철학회 2017 印度哲學 Vol.0 No.49

『카타 우파니샤드』에서는 Purusa와 Atman을 동의어로 혼용하면서도 Purusa에 비중을 두어 자아에 대한 차별 관념을 드러내고 있다. 그리고 일원론적인 자아관의 지향점은 Purusa가 Brahman임을 인식하는 것이다. 이러한 지향점을 표방하는 과정에서 Purusa는 상당히 혼잡스러울 정도로 다양하게 설명되어 있지만, 그 정점에는 `속성이 전혀 없는 Purusa`가 있다. 그리고 이것은 고전 상키야에서 순수한 정신의 원리로 상정한 Purusa와 합치한다. 『카타 우파니샤드』에서 `엄지 크기의 Purusa`는 `내적 자아`인 동시에 `생명으로서의 Atman`이다. 개아 또는 영혼으로 불릴 수 있는 이것이 『카타 우파니샤드』의 일원론에서는 Brahman의 별칭인 최고아로서의 Atman 또는 Purusa와 동일한 것으로 귀결된다. `엄지 크기의 Purusa` 또는 내적 자아에 상당하는 대아(위대한 Atman)도 이와 마찬가지이다. 그러나 상키야의 이원론에서 `엄지 크기의 Purusa`는 미세신(suksma-sarira)에 상당한다. 『카타 우파니샤드』에서 대등한 위상으로 언급하는 통각, 순질, 지아(인식의 Atman)가 고전 상키야에서는 통각으로 병합되었으며, 끝으로 범아일여의 범(Brahman)에 해당하는 적정아(적정의 Atman)는 고전 상키야의 Purusa와 상응한다. 이상과 같이 『카타 우파니샤드』의 Purusa 개념은 자아에 대한 다양한 인식을 포괄함으로써 고전 상키야의 Purusa 개념이 애초에 함축하고 있었던 원천적 관념을 시사해 준다. 『카타 우파니샤드』는 비교적 간결한 문헌이지만, 이를 통해 상키야의 Purusa가 일부 주석자들 사이에서 또는 후대에 Atman과 동의어로 당연시되었던 배경을 한눈에 파악할 수 있다. The terms Purusa and Atman are used synonymously in the Katha Upanisad, but the concept of Purusa is emphasized to reveal discrimination toward the notion of Self. Moreover, with regrad to the inclination of Self in the monistic realms, there seems to be an intent to interpret the term `Purusa` as equivalent to `Brahman.` In the process of expressing this point of view, Purusa has been described in various ways to be quite congested, but at its apex is Purusa, which has no property at all. Consequently, this coincides with Purusa, which is assumed to be the principle of pure spirit in the classical Samkhya. The Self-concept in the Katha Upanisad combines the process of intensification of meditation with the object or subject in the cognitive process. It is revealed in the following three suggestions: ① indriya → artha → manas → buddhi → mahan Atman → avyakta → Purusa ② indriya → → manas → sattva → mahan Atman → avyakta → Purusa ③ →van-manas → jnanatman → mahan Atman → santatman On the other hand, the Bhagavad-gita suggests this process as a stage of indriya → manas → buddhi → Atman. According to classical Samkhya, the subject of recognition evolves from indriya → mind → ahamkara → buddhi → Purusa. Therefore, it can be said that the Katha Upanisad contains the Self-concept that can be covered by Purusa from the Bhagavad-gita to classical Samkhya. The notable concept here is the `thumb-sized Purusa`, likened to a dwarf. In the Katha Upanisad, the thumb-size Purusa is indicated as an `inner self` just as, at the same time, it indicates `Atman as life.` Thisconcept, which can be identified as the individual self or spirit, is ultimately identical to Atman or Purusa as the supreme self―the alias of Brahman ―in the monism of the Katha Upanisad . It is likewise true of the `thumb-sized Purusa` corresponds to the `supreme Atman,` the inner self. The term `thumb-sized Purusa,` however, also corresponds to `suksma-sarira` in the dualism of Samkhya. In the Katha Upanisad , the terms of Buddhi, sattva, and `Atman of awareness`, which are referred to in an equilibrium phase, have been incorporated into the `buddhi` in classical Samkhya. Finally, `Atman of titration`, which corresponds to Atman, or one`s true self (Atman), which is identical to the transcendent-self `Brahman` (Brahman of `Brahman-Atman-aikya`)―corresponds to the term `Purusa` in the classical Samkhya. To sum up the matters, the concept of Purusa in the Katha Upanisad, encompasses various awareness of the concept `self` that the concept of Purusa in the classical Samkhya suggests the foundational ideas originally implied Even though the Katha Upanisad is a relatively concise literature, this text can provide for later commentators and later generations a glimpse into the contextual background of the term `Purusa` in classical Samkhya, revealing that it is used with as a synonym for `Atman`.

상키야 사상에 대한 라마누자의 비판

이거룡 ( Geo Lyong Lee ) 인도철학회 2009 印度哲學 Vol.0 No.26

Criticism of other viewpoints is as necessary as exposition of one`s own viewpoint. A philosopher cannot be content with the bare exposition of his standpoint. He must not only be familiar with the views of others but must also be in a position to point out the shortcomings and defects, if any, in them. Further, it is also necessary for one to take note of the evaluation of one`s position in the light of the objections raised by them. Ramanuja is at his best not only when he elucidates the Visistadvaita position, but also when he examines and criticizes the views of others. I propose to consider in this paper the manner in which Ramanuja in his Sribhasya criticizes the Samkhya philosophy. Samkhya philosophy as described by Isvarakrsna is dualistic and non-theistic in outlook and affirms satkaryavada (the doctrine of the pre-existence of the effect). According to Samkhya, the effect pre-exists in its material cause. The effect is the essence of its material cause and as such identical with it. In Samkhya, the material cause of the universe is the unconscious prakrti which is wholly independent of another spiritual principle, i.e. Purusa. The transcendent nearness (sannidhanam) of the intelligent purusa is sufficient to move prakrti to act, although it remains unmoved. The principal objection to the Samkhya raised by Ramanuja is directed against the possibility of the evolution of prakrti. According to Ramanuja, the process of evolution could not have been started by non-intelligent prakrti on its own accord because a non-intelligent entity cannot evolve itself in such a perfect order without being regulated by an intelligent agent. Another point criticized by Ramanuja is as to the possibility of the mere transcendent nearness (sannidhanam) of Purusa, which causes the initial disturbance (udreka) to the equilibrium in prakrti for creation to take place. In spite of Ramanuja`s criticism of Samkhya, there are some important similarities between the two. Therefore, I also inquire into these similarities minutely centering on the follow three points; 1) polarity of Brahman and dualism, 2) tattva-traya and 25 tattvas, and 3) individuality of emancipated atman and plurality of purusa.

고전기 이전 상키야 철학에 대한 Yuktidipika 저자의 역사 인식

강형철 ( Hyong Chol Kang ) 인도철학회 2016 印度哲學 Vol.0 No.47

본 논문은 Samkhyakarika의 주석서인 Yuktidipika의 서두 게송에 담긴 고전기 이전 상키야 철학의 역사적 기록에 관한 분석이다. 현존하는 가장 오래된 문헌인 Samkhyakarika가 이전의 역사에 대해서 거의 전하고 있지 않은 반면에, Yuktidipika는 수많은 선대 논사들의 단편들을 인용한다. 그 중에서 Yuktidipika의 서두 게송(arambhasloka)에 나타난 내용에 주목하여, 거기서 확인되는 저자의 역사 의식을 살펴볼것이다. 서두 게송에서는 4가지 문헌을 구분하여 서술한다. (1) 상키야의 개조인 Kapila가 Asuri에게 전한 교의서(tantra), (2) 그것을 성인들이 제자들을 위해서 요약한 소책자(alpagrantha), (3) 스승들이 반론자들에 대항하여 조성한 사유의 밀림인 Sastitantra, 그리고 (4) 그것을 압축한 Samkhyakarika이다. YD의 저자는 다른 주석가들과는 달리, Kapila가 저술한 tantra가 있었다고 파악하며, ST의 저자가 Pancasikha가 아니라 다수의 저자에 의해서 형성된 문헌으로 본다. 또한 Samkhyakarika의 권위를 Sastitantra와의 연관성에서 확보하고자 했던 Isvarakrsna의 의도를 넘어서서, Kapila의 교의서의 내용을 온전히 담은 논서로서 자리매김하고자 했다. 상키야의 초기 역사에 관한 한, YD의 저자는 SK의 다른 주석가들과 궤를 달리한다고 할 수 있다. This paper deals with the establishment background of Pre-classical Samkhya literature portrayed by Yuktidipika-kara, the unknown author of the Yuktidipika. The Yuktidipika opens with Arambhasloka(beginning stanza, introductory verses) that narrates the formation process of Samkhya literatures from the Kapila``s tantra to the Samkhyakarika of Isvara-krsna. The aim of this study is to reveal Yuktidipika-kara``s perspective about early history of Samkhya and his underlying motive to describe genealogy of Samkhya literature. At the outset, in the present paper, it is imperative to perform textual observations on Arambhasloka of the Yuktidipika. Chakravarti(1951/1975), the first editor of the Yuktidipika(published in 1938) reports that Kapila is credited with authorship of Sastitantra(『六十科論』, System of Sixty Categories), according to the author of the Yuktidipika in Arambhasloka. But I think it should be viewed with reservation, and this point is worth considering for the sake of historical perspective of Yuktidipika-kara. Consequently, Yuktidipika-kara looks at three topics dif-ferently from other commentators on the Samkhyakarika. Firstly, Yuktidipika-kara believes that Kapila wrote the great textbook(mahat tantram) for Asuri, the first and only disciple of this sage. So that he thinks that "tantra", a tech-nical term in the Samkhykarika(70d) and Arambhasloka of the Yuktidipika means "textbook" or "treatise", equal to "sastra". This is opposite opinion about views of other commentaries. As for most of commentators, this term means "philosophical system[of Kapila]". Secondly, Yuktidipika-kara thinks of the Sastitantra as a text was written by several authors, so-called acaryas. In Samkhya tradition, it was the generally accepted fact that the philosophical system of Samkhya was expanded by Pancasikha. And furthermore, a number of commentaries on the Samkhyakarika regards Pancasikha as the author of the Sastitantra. Finally, Yuktidipika-kara explains that the Samkhyakarika is, like an image of mirror, possessed of all the characteristics of the Kapila``s great textbook, not of the Sastitantra. More to the immediate point, he intends to organize authori-ty of the Samkhyakarika, or to create new authority type by means of finding a connection between Kapila``s text and the Samkhyakarika.

바수반두의 찰나멸 논증을 둘러싼 몇 가지 해석상의 문제들 __Yuktidipika와의 관련성을 중심으로__

강형철 ( Hyong Chol Kang ) 인도철학회 2015 印度哲學 Vol.0 No.43

이 논문에서는 바수반두의 찰나멸 논증을 이해하는 데 있어서 제기되는 문제들을 다룬다. 이에 대한 해결을 위해서 우선적으로 바수반두의 찰나멸 논증을 둘러싼 역사적 전후사정을 다룬다. 첫 번째 문제는 바수반두의 찰나멸 논증이 논리적인 문제를 지니고 있다는 카츠라(桂)의 지적에 관한 것이다. 2장에서는 바수반두의 찰나멸 논증 전반을 논리적으로 분석한다. 이를 위해서 당시의 논리적 배경과 사회적 상식을 활용하는 방법을 취할 것이다. 그것을 통해 카츠라의 해석에 대한 비판적 검토를 진행한다. 또 다른 문제는 바수반두의 찰나멸 논증을 겨냥하고 이에 대한 반론을 펼친 것으로 보이는 상키야학파의 논서 Yuktidipika에서 지엽적인 주제라 할 수 있는 불꽃·소리·인식 따위의 비순간성에 대해서 지나치게 집중하고 있다는 점이다. 3장에서는 이에 관한 논리적 배경을 탐색하고자 한다. 이 두 가지 문제는 긴밀한 상호관련이 있으며, 한 쪽 문제가 다른 쪽 문제를 풀어주는 매개 역할을 한다. 최종적으로는 이를 통해서 바수반두의 찰나멸 논증이 지니는 논리학상의 의의에 관해서 다루었다. 바수반두의 논증이 이전의 논증들과 구분되는 점들을 지적하고, 그가 배치하고자 했던 논리적 설정들을 파악한다. 이를 통해서 바수반두가 찰나멸을 논증함에 있어서 취했던 선택과 의도를 추출하고자 한다. The aim of this paper is to analyze Vasubandhu``s Proof of Momentariness. To start with, this paper seeks to address the following questions: 1. Is the proof of Vasubandhu an error? 2. Why does the writer of Yuktidipika deeply attach to dispute on momentariness of flame etc.? The notion ‘All the existence in the real world is impermanent’ underlies the ideas of Indian philosophical schools. However, regarding the signification and application scope of anitya, various interpretations have been raised. Answers to how such impermanent things are able to maintain their appearance widely vary based on the assumption that everything in the world is impermanent. Anitya is a notion that is commonly accepted by Indian philosophical schools, yet an understanding of the phenomenal world varies depending how differently the anitya is viewed varies. Historically, thus, there have been a lot of disputes between schools with different views. Buddhism on the basis of anitya as key doctrine suggested the most strict standards regarding the application scope of anitya. Basically, Buddhism does not accept either immortal gods nor eternal and fundamental cause for the creation of all things. Particularly since Abhidharma doctrines had the system, in the Buddhist schools, the doctrine of momentariness (ksanikavada) that saw that all things and facts were created and became extinct repetitively every single moment played an important role in explaining anitya theoretically. Disputes on the doctrine of momentariness in Yuktidipika proceeds in a different way from rebuttals to it by the Nyaya School or Vatsiputriya on which many studies have been conducted. Vatsiputriya and the Nyaya school do not accept the changes every moment claimed by Sarvastivadin, Sautrantika, Yogacara and the Samkhya-Yoga school. To them, things continue to exist with self-identity and are destroyed by external causes only. Thus, in the disputes on the momentariness relating to Vatsiputriya and the Nyaya School, the changes every moment is the important subject of argument. The theory of momentariness is the core tenets that define anitya in Buddhism. The stance of the Samkhya school on momentariness has undergone transitions through the historial process. The discussion in Yuktidipika 10 is placed in the last stage of that historical process. The reason why Samkhya could not accept the momentariness while claiming the changeableness was because the notion of Buddhism and the casual relationship and the notion of the extinction did not correspond with each other, which incurred the big difference in the stance on the significance of the existence between them. This is the reason why both Buddhism and Samkhya explain the flow of time in different ways. Samkhya in the disputes in Yuktidipika explains the reason the phenomena in front of our eyes disappear because they are melt into the origin, prakrti. Samkhya claims that the existence perpetually continues through changes, not accepting the extinction of existence. In the disputes of Yuktidipika 10, this stance of Samkhya is identified in various manners.

아트만(atman)과 푸루샤(purusa) 개념의 교차점

강형철 ( Hyong Chol Kang ) 인도철학회 2014 印度哲學 Vol.0 No.40

아트만(atman)과 힌두 전통에서 윤회의 주체를 구성하는 핵심적인 요소로 간주된다. 반면 푸루샤(purusa)는 상키야-요가 학파에서 아트만을 대체하는 용어로 사용되며 영아(靈我)ㆍ순수정신 등으로 번역된다. 아트만과 푸루샤는 상키야 학파 내외에서 동일한 개념으로 통용되었다. 본 논문의 목적은 상키야 학파가 힌두전통에서 일반적으로 사용되는 아트만이라는 용어 대신에 푸루샤라는 용어를 사용하게 된 경위를 소묘하는 데 있다. 특히 명상을 통해 지각되는 대상으로서의 아트만과 푸루샤의 묘사하는 서술들에 맞추었다. 아트만과 푸루샤가 명상의 대상으로 취급되면서 중요한 분기점을 맞는 것으로 생각되기 때문이다. 초기 우파니샤드에서는 심장의 빛을 아트만이라고 간주하는 계열이 있으며, 그 개념이 고전 요가 체계에도 통용되고 있다. 푸루샤와 아트만은 우파니샤드에서 서로 다른 개념으로도, 동일한 개념으로도 사용되는데, 그것은 생리학적 측면과 표현법의 측면이 각각 두 가지씩 분기점을 지닌다. 또한 수행론적인 측면에서도 상반되는 두 가지 실수론이 우파니샤드에서 공존한다. 마하바라타에서 나타난 푸루샤와 아트만에 관한 기술이 큰 개념적 차이 없이 사용된다. 다만 마하바라타에서 푸루샤와 아트만을 구분하는 맥락은 기본적으로 우파니샤드의 존재-인식 분류법과 동일하다. 그리고 마하바라타의 일부 구절에서는 고전 상키야와 거의 흡사하게 아트만과 푸루샤가 지각될 수 없는 존재라는 것을 명확하게 서술하는 부분이 있으며, 반면 요가를 통해서 지각할 수 있는 존재라고 설명하는 부분도 발견된다. 그리고 그것은 상키야와 요가와 구분되는 사정과 관련이 있으나, 고전 상키야에서 아트만이라는 용어를 폐기하고 푸루샤라는 사용한 경위와는 무관하다는 점을 확인할 수 있다. Atman and purusa was regarded as soul by Hindu tradition in India. In special, purusa occupies one of the principles in Samkhya System. This paper is intended as an investigation of early concept of atman and purusa. The concept of the purusa is from the Samkhya Philosophy which is traced to the rg-veda. It seems to be an interpolation into the rg-veda since it is out of character with the other hymns dedicated to nature gods. In this paper, I will look closely at some of the important features of atman and purusa. Especially this report confines itself to the concept concerned with meditative experience. In first, I attempt to look at atman as light in the heart (hrdaya) as a whole. In view of early type in Brhadaranyaka and Chandogya Upanisad, I consider passage in Yogasutra which explain the way to obtain perception of buddhi by concerntration on the heart. Secondarily, I consider the early Upanisadic concept of purusa. Before turning to a loser examination of purusa in Mahabharata, a few remarks should be made concerning several specific examples in early Upanisads in the context of illustrations on meditation. Finally, I discuss the change of concept of purusa in Mahabharata. I focus on the link between classical Samkhya and it in detail. In this regard, cognitivity of purusa is heavily related.

롤플레잉게임(RPG)상의 세계 경험 -인도 이원론의 관점을 통해-

최지연 ( Ji Yeon Choe ) 인도철학회 2008 印度哲學 Vol.0 No.24

본 논문의 목적은 롤플레잉게임이라는 가상세계에 대해 인도 이원론의 관점에서 이해하고자 하는 것이다. 인도 이원론은 순수정신인 푸루샤와 순수물질인 프라크리티라는 두 원리를 완전히 다른 영역으로 분리하고 이 둘은 절대 혼합될 수 없다고 하면서도 푸루샤는 붓디라는 물질을 매개로 물질세계를 경험할 수 있다고 설명한다. 이러한 이론은 컴퓨터 속 가상세계와 현상적 물질세계가 완전히 다름에도 불구하고 현실세계의 인간이 가상세계의 게임캐릭터를 경험하는 것과 유사하다고 보인다. 현실세계의 게임 플레이어는 캐릭터에게 지성을 조명하는 푸루샤이자 직접 인식과 판단을 행하는 붓디이다. 플레이어는 캐릭터에게 지성을 부여하고 그 행위 결과를 감수한다. 그리고 그는 이 모든 작용과 상관없는 현실세계의 주체이지만, 게임을 하는 동안에는 자신과 동일시된 캐릭터의 기쁨과 분노, 슬픔을 향수한다. Role Playing Game(RPG) means Game Genre that player performs duty assigned by Game storytelling through Game-character(avata). Some players have confused virtual reality of the Game with reality of genuine world. In this paper I have tried to understand the reality of RPG that is virtual reality. To accomplish this study, I made a tool of Samkhya system characterized by dualism in the Indian philosophy. In Samkhya system the university is composed of two original sources Purusa(mental) and Prakrti(matter). Purusa will not mix with Prakrti but enjoy the material world to which Prakrti transforms. This system has a intermediation between Purusa and Prakrti, that they call Buddhi. Buddhi is a material factor reflects Purusa(mental). Because the quality of Buddhi is illuminant, material factor can reflect pure mental factor Purusa. This theory of Samkhya could applies to the virtual reality of RPG. This reality is not the phenomenal world but the computer world. Nevertheless Game-player could experience virtual reality as if he experiences the real world by Game-character. While applying dualism of Samkhya to RPG, Game-player could be divided to two aspects those would compare to Purusa and Buddhi respectively. Game-character is endowed with intelligence by Game-player. This resembles that Buddhi reflects Purusa` intelligence. During playing the Game, player is the subject who recognizes and determines events in the computer world. This role of player would agree with the role of Buddhi. One hand Game-player endows Game-character with intelligence and willings to undergo the effect of Game course. The other hand Game-player who does not play the Game, is the subject of reality who does not participate events in the computer world. During playing the Game, player is enjoying pleasures, angers, and sorrows of Game-character identified to himself.

‘낙(樂) 등’의 심리현상에 대한 불교인식론의 논증(Ⅱ)

박기열(Park Ki Yeal) 한국불교연구원 2015 불교연구 Vol.43 No.-

다르마키르티는 『프라마나바르티카』, 「직접지각」장에서 ‘낙 등’의 심리현상을 둘러싸고 타 학파의 견해를 검증하고 있다. 이 중에서 본고는 상키야 학파의 견해에 대한 다르마키르티의 이해와 검증을 다룬다. 그는 ‘낙 등’이 외계에 있다고 주장할 경우, 사람들이 푸른색을 공통적으로 푸른색으로 인식하는 것과 마찬가지로 ‘낙 등’의 심리현상도 사람들에 있어 동일하게 인식되어야 하는 모순을 지적한다. 즉 요가행자의 수습의 단계에 따라 ‘낙 등’의 심리현상이 다르게 나타나는 것을 설명할 수 없다는 것이다. 그러므로 ‘낙 등’은 마음 내부의 현상이어야 한다고 한다. 한편 다르마키르티는 인과관계는 동일한 성질을 가진 것들 사이에서 일어나는 것임을 전제로 하며, 인식행위는 파악되는 측면과 파악하는 측면에 의거한다는 견해를 고수한다. 그러나 상키야의 푸루샤와 통각 또는 인식대상은 각각 정신적인 것과 비정신적인 것이기 때문에 본질적으로 동일한 성질을 가진 것이라고 할 수 없다. 이와같은 논지로 인식주체인 푸루샤와 인식수단인 통각과 인식대상 사이에는 인과성이 없음을 논증하고, 푸루샤의 무용론을 주장한다. 나아가 다르마키르티는 ‘낙 등’의 심리현상은 대상에 대한 직접경험이라는 점을 내세워, 굳이 ‘낙 등’을 인식하는 인식수단으로서의 통각을 설정할 필요가 없다고 말한다. 즉 ‘낙 등’의 인식수단은 직접 지각 그 자체이므로 그것들을 인식하기 위한 다른 인식수단의 불필요성을 논증한다. 그러나 다르마키르티의 논증 중에서 통각에 관한 내용은 『상키야카리카』와 『유크티디피카』에서 통각을 결정지라고 정의하는 것에 대한 본격적인 고찰은 보이지 않는다. 결정지는 다르마키르티 이래 불교인식론에서도 ‘지각판단“ 또는 간접적 결정 등으로 번역되는 개념으로, 직접지각과 추리 사이의 점이지대를 형성하는 논란의 소지가 있는 개념이다. 다만 상키야의 통각의 정의인 결정지는 다르마키르티의 직접지각의 정의에 위배되는 개념이다. 따라서 상키야의 통각과 다르마키르티의 직접지각은 동일시될 수는 없을 것이다. Dharmakīrti examines other schools’ views in respect of psychological phenomena such as pleasure etc. in the pratyakṣapramāṇam, Pramāṇavārttika. This paper focuses on his understanding and examination against Sāṃkhya’s pleasure etc.(PV Ⅱ 268-280) comparing with Sāṃkhya’s theory in Yuktidīpikā. In the case that there is pleasure etc. in the outside world, Dharmakīrti indicates the contradiction which people cognize pleasure etc. as same as the way they cognize the blue color in common with one another. but the cognition for pleasure etc. comes out as different degree depending on yogi’s practice stage. Pleasure etc., namely, is a psychological phenomenon that has to be risen in the inside world.. Meanwhile, Dharmakīrti keeps his opinion in that cognition has the two aspects of cognition: the appearance of object(grasped, grāhya) and appearance of itself(grasper, grāhaka), and then criticizes on a causal relationship between Saṃkhya’s epistemological elements on the base of a cause-and effect has to premise to occur between two things that have the same quality. However, in contrast to Saṃkhya’s puruṣa is the mental, buddhi and the cognitive object that are the non-mental, so that they do not essentially have the same quality. Therefore, there is not a cause-and effect between puruṣa as the cognitive subject and both of buddhi as cognitive means and cognitive object. To conclude, puruṣa does not play any role in cognition. On the other hand, Dharmakīrti says there are not any reason to set up buddhi as cognitive means when pleasure etc. is cognized because pleasure etc. is the direct experience(anubhava) to the cognitive object. That is, the cognitive means for pleasure etc. is the direct perception(pratyakṣa) itself, and thus, we do not have to bring in buddhi as the other cognitive means for the successful cognition to pleasure etc. However, in Dharmikīrti’s demonstration of pleasure etc., we cannot find the examination to the concept of 'adhyavasāya', which uses the definition of buddhi in Sāṃkhya. The word, 'adhyavasāya', in the Buddhist epistemology, can be translated into ‘perceptual decision’, which means the word is classified as a kind of conceptual construction(kalpanā). For Dharmakīrti at least, Saṃkhya’s 'adhyavasāya' is against his definition of direct perception. Therefore, we may not treat Sāṃkhya’s pratyakṣa and buddhi as the same concept as Dharmakīrti’s direct perception.