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        Physical Protection and Consequences Assessments at Research Reactor Facility Via Radiological Threat

        Mahdi Trabelsi,Said Agamy,Hanaa Abou‑Gabal,Amir Abdel‑Wadoud 대한전기학회 2020 Journal of Electrical Engineering & Technology Vol.15 No.1

        The main objective of a Physical Protection System (PPS) in a nuclear facility is to protect against possible malevolent human attack. Failures of that PPS could lead to radiological consequences, so that, radiation dose calculations have been performed for a radiological sabotage event in a Hypothetical Research Reactor Facility using an atmospheric dispersion modeling (HotSpot code) and compared with the annual regulatory limits for the public as set in Schedule III in IAEA Safety Report Series (GSR part 3). To mitigate those efects, a PPS for a hypothetical research reactor facility has been designed and evaluated, before upgrading the PPS, the Probability of Efectiveness (PE) is for a regular PPS, thus a high values of risk are associated, however after modifcation of the PPS, the security system becomes high since the probability of efectiveness is greater than 90% which is by far excellent in order to interrupt and deter any adversary.

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