How the Ukraine War Transforms the Northeast Asian Security Agenda

Richard Weitz 통일연구원 2022 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.31 No.1

This article reviews the novel challenges to Northeast Asian security that have arisen since the Russian invasion of Ukraine and related developments, especially the growing military capabilities, foreign policy ambitions, and malign policy coordination of North Korea, Russia, and China. Not only does each authoritarian state present an independent challenge to South Korea, Japan, and the United States, but in collaborating, North Korea, Russia, and China amplify these dangers. In particular, Beijing and Moscow are pressing for curtailment of U.S.- allied cooperation regarding missile defenses, nuclear deterrence guarantees, and missile deployments. They also manifest more tolerance of DPRK provocations, even as these have intensified in frequency and intensity. Despite these challenges to international peace, the remarkable speed and scale of Western democratic solidarity in support of Ukraine and other trends have provided the new South Korean government with opportunities to enhance regional security in cooperation with other powerful democracies.

US Security Challenges in Northeast Asia After Bush

Richard Weitz 통일연구원 2008 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.17 No.1

The next US administration will need to pursue a vigorous shaping and hedging strategy to manage several adverse security challenges in Northeast Asia. First, many people in the region perceive the George W. Bush administration as excessively preoccupied with the Middle East at the expense of its East Asian interests. Second, North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs remain unconstrained by a formal six-party agreement. Third, China has taken advantage of these trends to bolster its position in East Asia, sometimes at Washington’s expense. Finally, developments in North Korea and China have stimulated concerns that Japan might eventually loosen its tight security ties with the United States. American policymakers urgently need to rebalance their energies between the Middle East and East Asia. ASEAN in particular warrants much more attention in Washington. In addition, US officials must reaffirm their commitment and capacity to protect Japan and South Korea. Managing China’s rise also requires a more vigorous American engagement with Beijing’s neighbors. Finally, the United States should employ more creative strategies to affirm its unique security role in Northeast Asia.

Beijing and Moscow`s Grapple with Pyongyang`s Nuclear Missile Provocations

( Richard Weitz ) 한국국방연구원 2016 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.28 No.4

Beijing and Moscow pursue similar goals and policies toward the Democratic People`s Republic of Korea. They want to end North Korea`s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests, since these activities spur further proliferation, complicate China`s and Russia`s outreach toward the Republic of Korea, and strengthen the U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia. Yet, Beijing and Moscow oppose military responses or strong sanctions since both parties fear that coercive measures could precipitate regime change in Pyongyang, which alarms them more than a nuclear-armed North Korea. Hence, Beijing and Moscow seek to wean Pyongyang off of its nuclear addiction through foreign assistance and security assurances that promote an international climate favorable toward internal reforms and improvements in North Korea`s external behavior. They argue that dialogue and negotiations leading to the denuclearizing of the Peninsula would best promote the interests of all parties in terms of regional peace and stability. Nonetheless, there are important differences between China`s and Russia`s policies. For example, Beijing has more economic tools to apply against the DPRK, while Moscow seems more open to Korean reunification, under certain conditions, as an enduring solution to the Pyongyang problem.

Demise of Russian-Chinese Arms Relationship and Its Korean Implications

Richard Weitz 통일연구원 2009 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.18 No.2

China and Russia share a concern with the evolving political, military, and economic situation on the Korean peninsula, which borders both countries. In terms of relative influence in Pyongyang, however, Beijing enjoys a clearly dominant role, while Moscow often struggles to maintain even a supporting position. One development that might further increase this gap is the abrupt decrease in recent Chinese purchases of Russian defense technologies and weapons systems. The major reason for this transformation has been that the Chinese defense industry has become capable of producing much more sophisticated armaments. Moscow now confronts the choice of either accepting a greatly diminished share of the Chinese arms market or agreeing to sell even more advanced weapons to Beijing. In addition to threatening existing force balances in East Asia, such transfers could further strengthen China’s ability to compete for sales on third-party markets. Thus far, surging Russian arms sales to other countries have allowed Russian policy makers to accept the decreasing Chinese military purchases rather than risk the transfer of new technologies. Even so, the threat to Russian arms exports presented by the global recession may cause more Russians to seek short-term profits by allowing the sale to China of even their most advanced systems, which would make China and even more formidable competitor for sales to North Korea and other third-party markets. China and Russia share a concern with the evolving political, military, and economic situation on the Korean peninsula, which borders both countries. In terms of relative influence in Pyongyang, however, Beijing enjoys a clearly dominant role, while Moscow often struggles to maintain even a supporting position. One development that might further increase this gap is the abrupt decrease in recent Chinese purchases of Russian defense technologies and weapons systems. The major reason for this transformation has been that the Chinese defense industry has become capable of producing much more sophisticated armaments. Moscow now confronts the choice of either accepting a greatly diminished share of the Chinese arms market or agreeing to sell even more advanced weapons to Beijing. In addition to threatening existing force balances in East Asia, such transfers could further strengthen China’s ability to compete for sales on third-party markets. Thus far, surging Russian arms sales to other countries have allowed Russian policy makers to accept the decreasing Chinese military purchases rather than risk the transfer of new technologies. Even so, the threat to Russian arms exports presented by the global recession may cause more Russians to seek short-term profits by allowing the sale to China of even their most advanced systems, which would make China and even more formidable competitor for sales to North Korea and other third-party markets.

Challenges and Opportunities Facing Middle-Power Nonproliferation Overachieverss: The Republics of Kazakhstan and Korea

Richard Weitz 국방대학교 국가안전보장문제연구소 2022 The Korean Journal of Security Affairs Vol.27 No.2

This article analyzes how certain non-nuclear weapons states have become prominent contributors to the global nuclear nonproliferation regime despite their absence of such weapons. The first section of this manuscript reviews the achievements of Kazakhstan in countering the vertical and horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. These contributions include eliminating it’s the nuclear arsenal Kazakhstan inherited from the Soviet Union and discouraging other countries from seeking nuclear weapons. The second section compares the Kazakhstan case to that of the Republic of Korea (ROK), which has also hit above its weight in the nuclear proliferation domain, especially regarding enhancing the security of nuclear materials. The next part reviews some of the challenges facing each state’s nonproliferation policies. These include Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and resulting nuclear dangers and renewed great-power rivalries that establish an unfavorable environment for nuclear progress and have even elevated interest among some South Koreans in acquiring nuclear weapons. The next part then suggests possible areas for joint initiatives between Kazakhstan and South Korea, such as measures to strengthen nuclear security in general and the security of nuclear facilities in potential war zones in particular. The concluding session analyzes the diverging and common drivers explaining the two countries’ behavior, such as their alliance ties and nuclear histories.

Why Moscow Has Escalated Its Territorial Dispute with Tokyo

Richard Weitz 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2011 Pacific Focus Vol.26 No.2

Four reasons likely explain why President Dmitry Medvedev and other Russian officials have decided to escalate their 65-year old dispute with Japan over the Southern Kurils/ Northern Territories. First, Tokyo’s relations with China, North Korea, and other countries are poor. Furthermore, Russia is eager to raise its profile in East Asia more generally. In addition, the Japanese have become increasingly open to expanding economic ties with Russia despite the dispute. Finally, Medvedev himself has domestic political reasons to adopt a more aggressive posture toward Japan regarding the disputed islands. Neither outcome seems likely to occur in the next few years. In the long term, the Japanese will probably prove more amenable to making the most concessions because China’s continuing rise is presenting a greater threat to Tokyo’s interests. In addition, Russia has succeeded during the past few months in solidifying Moscow’s hold over the islands.

Russian Policy toward North Korea: Steadfast and Changing

Richard Weitz 통일연구원 2015 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.24 No.3

This paper reviews how, during the last few years, Russia has undertaken a sustained campaign to bolster its economic presence and diplomatic influence in Pyongyang. This campaign has resulted in many bilateral agreements and the launching of several economic projects. However, Russia has found it as difficult as the other DPRK interlocutors to develop influence in Pyongyang, while many of the economic projects remain unimplemented, underdeveloped, or underperforming. If successful, Russia’s commercial and diplomatic engagement could temper Pyongyang’s problematic external and internal behavior by reassuring its leadership, while also discouraging the DPRK from testing more nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles for fear of alienating Moscow. Or Russian support could boost North Korea’s military-industrial potential, weaken the DPRK’s diplomatic isolation, embolden more Pyongyang’s provocations, reduce Beijing’s willingness to pressure Pyongyang due to North Korea’s having alternative Russian options, and delay unification by helping prolong the existence of an odious regime that tortures its own people and threatens the world.

China, Russia, and the Challenge to the Global Commons

Richard Weitz 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2009 Pacific Focus Vol.24 No.3

During the second half of the twentieth century, the United States enjoyed unfettered freedom to use the global commons—those domains that remained outside the territory of any single nation state but provide the means for connecting much of the world. The most prominent of these realms are the world’s oceans (still the main thoroughfare for trading goods between countries), outer space (the domain used by most long-distance communications and broadcast media), and the Internet (increasingly the most effective media for storing and moving large quantities of information great distances at low cost). Billions of people access these domains each day, but they are especially important for commercial and military actors. China and Russia have launched major campaigns to contest the American presence in the global commons. These initiatives include challenging U.S. surveillance operations in international waters, trying to constrain American military access to outer space, and enhancing their capacity to disrupt U.S. use of the Internet. Overcoming Chinese and Russian anti-access efforts are essential for preserving the security of the United States and its allies. In particular, as the U.S. military has reduced its forward bases in Japan, South Korea, and other Asia-Pacific countries, it has become increasingly dependent on the global commons to rapidly deploy forces based in the United States to potential conflict regions. A failure to overcome anti-access threats could lead Asian Pacific countries to call into question U.S. security guarantees.

Enduring difficulties in China-U,S, defense diplomacy

( Richard Weitz ) 한국국방연구원 2009 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.21 No.4

Despite decades of military-to-military talks and the creation of several China- U.S. defense confidence-building measures, clashes between Chinese and American military units operating in the international waters and airspace near China have repeatedly disrupted their bilateral relations. Since the mid-1990s, the two defense communities have negotiated a series of bilateral defense and security agreements and confidence-building measures seeking to reduce mutual tensions and advance their common security interests. These measures have promoted a better understanding of each party`s security concerns, but they remain highly constrained and vulnerable to disruption from external shocks. Several factors have impeded their development. The most important obstacle has been the underlying contentious nature of the Chinese U.S. relationship, which is manifested most acutely by tensions over Taiwan. As leaders of the weaker power, moreover, Chinese policymakers fear that excessive transparency could provide Americans with insights into their military vulnerabilities. Influenced by a strategic tradition that emphasizes deception, many Chinese strategists also believe that opaqueness assists in deterring potential adversaries by complicating their military planning. Furthermore, Chinese policymakers do not want to draw foreign attention to their continued military buildup. Finally, defense policymakers in both countries have generally resisted measures that constrain their military operations and capabilities.

The South Korean-U.S. Nuclear Alliance: Steadfast and Changing

( Richard Weitz ) 한국국방연구원 2015 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.27 No.3

Nuclear-related issues remain at the core of the Seoul-Washington partnership. These include shared nuclear weapons threats to both partners from North Korea, tussles between South Koreans and Americans regarding how to deter and defeat these North Korean threats without antagonizing the other regional nuclear powers, and managing the transformation of the Republic of Korea (ROK) into a major civilian nuclear energy producer and exporter. Whatever the changes in the Northeast Asian security environment, the enduring goals of the South Korean-U.S. defense alliance remain unchanged-to deter North Korean aggression, maintain South Koreans` security and welfare, contribute to regional and global stability, and work toward Korean reunification. But the shifting nature of the regional security environment has required difficult adjustments by both partners to sustain a robust and effective partnership.