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Non-controlling Large Shareholders and Firm Performance in China
Caiyu Yan,Hongqu He 한국증권학회 2018 Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies Vol.47 No.3
This paper examines the determination of non-controlling large shareholders (NCLSs) on firm performance and investigates the impacts of NCLSs on tunneling and investment efficiency. We use three attributes of NCLSs (ownership, identity, and relational board/management representation) to fully capture the governance effects of NCLSs. We find robust evidence that NCLSs are associated with higher firm performance. Furthermore, we also document that NCLSs promote investment efficiency. However, except for individual investors, the other items in NCLSs deteriorate tunneling. Additionally, except for mutual funds, we find that the other governance effects of NCLSs are stable under different circumstances.
Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm Performance: Evidence from China
Juan Li,Caiyu Yan,Xuefei He,Hongqu He,Tianping Ao 한국증권학회 2023 Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies Vol.52 No.3
Agency theory has shown that multiple large shareholders have competing monitoring and entrenchment governance effects. Therefore, this paper studies the governance effects of multiple large shareholders to determine the dominant effect in the Chinese setting. A panel data model and F-test demonstrate that a significant positive relationship exists between multiple large shareholders and firm performance, but the positive relationship between multiple large shareholders and firm performance will be weakened by state-owned enterprises and politically connected enterprises. Furthermore, our findings suggest that multiple large shareholders can enhance firm performance by mitigating the agent–principal problem and the principal–principal problem. Additionally, a threshold model is introduced to explore the impact of other governance mechanisms on multiple large shareholders’ governance, and our findings show that enhancing controlling shareholder governance and board size significantly weakens multiple large shareholders governance, but increasing the proportion of independent directors strengthens the positive relationship between multiple large shareholders and Tobin’s Q and weakens the positive relationship between multiple large shareholders and ROA.