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정광화(Kwang Hwa Jeong),이동현(Dongheun Lee),정석우(Seok Woo Jeong) 한국경영학회 2013 經營學硏究 Vol.42 No.2
This study investigates the relation between the accuracy of preliminary earnings announcements and costs of debt capital. Preliminary earnings announcements consist of mandatory timely disclosure and voluntary fair disclosure. Mandatory timely disclosure has a predetermined threshold and managers are required to disclose preliminary earnings when the earnings change is beyond the threshold. Managers, on the other hand, can voluntarily disclose preliminary earnings regardless of the threshold. Prior research documents both types of preliminary earnings announcements have information contents in stock market, respectively. In other words, previous studies did not consider the difference of both types of disclosure. Recent study finds that preliminary earnings of fair disclosure are more accurate than those of timely disclosure. In addition, Jeong and Jeong (2012) reports that the information contents of fair disclosure are larger than those of timely disclosure. Using cumulative abnormal return (CAR), they assert that these findings result from the different accuracy of fair and timely disclosures. This study provides empirical evidence to investors in bond market. We contribute to extant research by investigating the association between preliminary earnings announcements and commercial paper credit ratings. The main results are as follows. First, commercial paper credit ratings of the companies that voluntarily disclose preliminary earnings are higher than those of the companies to mandatorily disclose. Second, credit ratings of the firms that disclose preliminary earnings are positively related with preliminary earnings accuracy. It means that the mechanismin capital market functions well, penalizing the distorted information. And the last, commercial paper credit ratings are more sensitive to the accuracy of fair disclosure than that of timely disclosure, which suggests that capital market demands relatively more accuracy for voluntary disclosure. The result of this study suggests that the preliminary earnings announcements are effective only when the information accuracy can be secured. Our results provide implications to potential investors and managers who have intention to opportunistically disclose preliminary earnings