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( Mikhail Karpov ) 국민대학교 유라시아연구소 2012 Eurasian Review Vol.5 No.-
In summer 2004 Hong Kong based famous economist Lang Xianping (Larry Lang) made a number of harsh critical statements regarding state property reform in Mainland China. This critic provoked big discussion among leading Chinese economists (perhaps the biggest one in the recent decade) and seriously polarized public opinion. The core of the discussion were the questions concerning economic nature and socio-political consequences of the state assets passing via semi-legal ways into private hands, managers` “moral hazard”, state sector efficiency and trustful corporate governance in today`s China. Many observers, irrespective whether they agree or oppose to Lang Xianping`s critic, tended to recognize the current “property transition” at Chinese state assets as privatization. The article below argues that the processes going on and even accelerating in the recent couple of years in Chinese state sector are by no means a privatization in the strict sense. They represent a sort of a contract between the party-state organs and state assets` management allowing the latter to dispose of the assets in the already existing setting of “multiple-track” contract pricing which took shape by mid-90s. Although not a classical privatization these steps constitute an important and perhaps unavoidable stage prior to it.