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      • SCOPUSKCI등재

        INTERNATIONAL SHAREHOLDINGS AND STRATEGIC EXPORT POLICY

        MIYAGIWA, KAZ 한국국제경제학회 1992 International Economic Journal Vol.6 No.3

        If either (ⅰ) domestic residents hold shares of the foreign firm or (ⅱ) foreigners hold shares of the domestic firm, an export subsidy can reduce rather than increase national welfare within the Brander-Spencer model. Two sufficient conditions for such a case are presented. Also discussed are the optimal export policies in the presence of international cross shareholdings.

      • SCOPUSKCI등재

        ON THE IMPOSSSIBILITY OF IMMISERIZING GROWTH

        MIYAGIWA, KAZ 한국국제경제학회 1993 International Economic Journal Vol.7 No.2

        Propositions 1 through 3 presented in the present study together with the results cited in the introduction complete all the possible cases which are obtained by relaxing Johnson's classic work on immiserizing growth. The table below summarizes the results. There, HO stands for the Heckscher-Ohlin model (mobile capital), and RV^m and RV^e indicate the Ricardo-Viner model in which expanding capital is specific to the import-competing sector and the export sector, respectively. The sign (+) means a welfare improvement, (-) a welfare reduction, and superscripts n and s indicate the existence of necessary and sufficient conditions for the indicated prediction to hold, respectively. This table shows the impossibility of immiserizing growth in the presence of an import quota. In the case of a tariff, we have the necessary and sufficient conditions for immiserization to arise in the three cases; those considered by Johnson, Brecher-Alejandro and Srinivasan. In addition we have found that an increase in the stock of domestic capital specific to the import-competing sector can reduce welfare: however, the sufficient condition for immiserization not to arise is stated in Proposition I . In the remaining cases, immiserizing growth is impossible. In addition, it has been shown that when foreign capital inflows are endogenous any growth or technical progress that affects GDP favorably will also raise host country welfare in the presence of a quota. In contrast, if a tariff is imposed an increase in welfare depends crucially on sector specificity of foreign capital. We have also shown that in the presence of a given import quota the optimal rate of taxation of foreign capital is zero for a small country whereas it is positive in the presence of a tariff. Our final remark is that our analysis has shown the impossibility of immiserizing growth in the presence of a quota under the assumption that it is the only distortion in the economy in consideration. This result need not hold in the presence of another distortion or externalities in the economy, as a recent paper by Chao and Yu (1991) demonstrates.

      • SCOPUSKCI등재

        Strategic Export Subsidies under a Budget Constraint : Ad Valorem versus Specific

        Hwang, Hong,Miyagiwa, Kaz,Wong, Kar-yiu 세종대학교 국제경제연구소 1997 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.12 No.1

        This notes shows that in the Brander-Spencer model of export subsidy, if there is no cost of financing subsidies, either a specific export subsidy or an ad valorem export subsidy can be used to achieve the same maximum welfare level. If, however, there is a binding budget constraint, a specific subsidy dominates an ad valorem subsidy.(JEL Classification: F13)

      • SCOPUSKCI등재

        Strategic Export Subsidies under a Budget Constraint: Ad Valorem versus Specific

        ( Kar Yiu Wong ),( Hong Hwang ),( Kaz Miyagiwa ) 세종대학교 경제통합연구소 1997 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.12 No.1

        This note shows that in the Brander-Spencer model of export subsidy, if there is no cost of financing subsidies, either a specific export subsidy or an ad valorem export subsidy can be used to achieve the same maximum welfare level. If, however, there is a binding budget constraint, a specific subsidy dominates an ad valorem subsidy. (JEL Classification: F13)

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