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      내부회계관리제도의 회계·공시전문인력이 이익조정, 조세회피 및 감사품질에 미치는 영향 : 회계이익·과세소득 차이 정보를 중심으로 = (The) effect of In-House accounting-disclosure expert of internal accounting control System on earnings management, tax avoidance and audit quality : using the book-tax difference Information

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      https://www.riss.kr/link?id=T13073230

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

      Large-accounting frauds as Enron and so on in the early 2000s revealed the limitations of supervision by external audit and increased the demand that firms should set up its own supervision function. In the United States, Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in 2002 to reinforce the responsibilities of the manager and external auditor for internal control. In Korea, Act on Extern Audit of Stock Companies was revised in December, 2003 and led to the implementation of internal accounting control system in the fiscal year starting on January 1, 2004. Especially, Due to the mandatory adoption of IFRS to listed companies on KSE and KOSDAQ in 2011, firms should consider flexibility of the IFRS allowing for alternative accounting methods, which means management's discretion will increase and managements should take more responsibility. Therefore, the importance of in-house accounting-disclosure expert is expected to increase in the forseeable future. However, there are a few studies reporting the importance of the role of in-house accounting-disclosure expert. This study investigates empirically whether the in-house accounting-disclosure expert introduced to increase the transparency of accounting would be effective to improve the quality of accounting information. Especially, I classified the in-house accounting-disclosure expert according to the expertise and analyzed whether each expert group would be effective to improve the quality of accounting income. The purpose of this study are as follows ; first, to investigate whether the in-house accounting-disclosure expert would be effective to control the earnings management. second, to investigate whether the in-house accounting-disclosure expert would be effective to control the tax avoidance. Third, to investigate the effect of the in-house accounting-disclosure expert on audit quality.
      The proxy for accounting earnings management are Book-Tax Difference(below BTD) and Discretionary Accruals(below DA) that were estimated by Dechow et al(1995) and Kothari et al(2005) respectively. And the real earnings management(REM) was estimated by Roychowdhury(2006). The proxy for tax avoidance is discretionary BTD that was estimated by Desai and Dharmapala(2006) and the proxy for audit quality are audit fees and audit hours. Empirical analysis covered data from 2004 to 2008 over a period of five years for which data on the in-house accounting-disclosure expert of the internal accounting control system. were obtainable. There are four categories of samples to improve the accuracy of the analysis. The main category included 2,528 companies listed in the stock market, closed accounts as of December 31. The variables relevant to this study are the number of in-house accounting-disclosure expert. The dependent variables are earnings management(BTD, DA, REM), tax avoidance(Discretionary BTD), and audit quality(audit fees, audit hours). The main control variables influencing the earnings management, tax avoidance, and audit quality include SIZE, LEV, CFO, GRW, YEAR dummy, IND dummy and so on.
      The major findings of this study are as follows. First, the in-house accounting-disclosure expert and earnings management has a significant negative relevance. Specifically, It would be expected that in-house accounting-disclosure expert can be helpful to control earnings management. Second, the in-house accounting-disclosure expert and tax avoidance has a significant negative relevance. It would be expected that in-house accounting-disclosure expert can be helpful to control tax avoidance. Third, the in-house accounting-disclosure expert and audit quality has a significant positive relevance. It could be expected that in-house accounting-disclosure expert can be helpful to improve audit quality. Especially, these results were supported by the CPA and related expert. on the contrary, it was not the case in lawyer. On the one hand, these results were supported by additional analysis that excluded sample didn't hold in-house accounting-disclosure expert and controled the effect of company size. Therefore, It can be expected that the in-house accounting-disclosure expert introduced to increase the transparency of accounting would be effective to improve the quality of accounting information.
      The implications of this study are as follows. First, these results provide insights into the question of why holding and training in-house accounting-disclosure expert on the job improve the effectiveness of the internal accounting control system and enhance accounting transparency. Also this study can provide government authorities with some implications in policy and encourage firms to hold in-house accounting-disclosure expert whin business organization. Second, this study expanded prior studies, in which used lump-sum data such as several in-house accounting-disclosure expert information and earnings measurements. Instead, this study classified these lump-sum data into sub-category as CPA, lawyer and related expert, and BTD, DA, REM in earnings management, audit fees and audit hours in audit quality, and utilized respectively.
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      Large-accounting frauds as Enron and so on in the early 2000s revealed the limitations of supervision by external audit and increased the demand that firms should set up its own supervision function. In the United States, Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacte...

      Large-accounting frauds as Enron and so on in the early 2000s revealed the limitations of supervision by external audit and increased the demand that firms should set up its own supervision function. In the United States, Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in 2002 to reinforce the responsibilities of the manager and external auditor for internal control. In Korea, Act on Extern Audit of Stock Companies was revised in December, 2003 and led to the implementation of internal accounting control system in the fiscal year starting on January 1, 2004. Especially, Due to the mandatory adoption of IFRS to listed companies on KSE and KOSDAQ in 2011, firms should consider flexibility of the IFRS allowing for alternative accounting methods, which means management's discretion will increase and managements should take more responsibility. Therefore, the importance of in-house accounting-disclosure expert is expected to increase in the forseeable future. However, there are a few studies reporting the importance of the role of in-house accounting-disclosure expert. This study investigates empirically whether the in-house accounting-disclosure expert introduced to increase the transparency of accounting would be effective to improve the quality of accounting information. Especially, I classified the in-house accounting-disclosure expert according to the expertise and analyzed whether each expert group would be effective to improve the quality of accounting income. The purpose of this study are as follows ; first, to investigate whether the in-house accounting-disclosure expert would be effective to control the earnings management. second, to investigate whether the in-house accounting-disclosure expert would be effective to control the tax avoidance. Third, to investigate the effect of the in-house accounting-disclosure expert on audit quality.
      The proxy for accounting earnings management are Book-Tax Difference(below BTD) and Discretionary Accruals(below DA) that were estimated by Dechow et al(1995) and Kothari et al(2005) respectively. And the real earnings management(REM) was estimated by Roychowdhury(2006). The proxy for tax avoidance is discretionary BTD that was estimated by Desai and Dharmapala(2006) and the proxy for audit quality are audit fees and audit hours. Empirical analysis covered data from 2004 to 2008 over a period of five years for which data on the in-house accounting-disclosure expert of the internal accounting control system. were obtainable. There are four categories of samples to improve the accuracy of the analysis. The main category included 2,528 companies listed in the stock market, closed accounts as of December 31. The variables relevant to this study are the number of in-house accounting-disclosure expert. The dependent variables are earnings management(BTD, DA, REM), tax avoidance(Discretionary BTD), and audit quality(audit fees, audit hours). The main control variables influencing the earnings management, tax avoidance, and audit quality include SIZE, LEV, CFO, GRW, YEAR dummy, IND dummy and so on.
      The major findings of this study are as follows. First, the in-house accounting-disclosure expert and earnings management has a significant negative relevance. Specifically, It would be expected that in-house accounting-disclosure expert can be helpful to control earnings management. Second, the in-house accounting-disclosure expert and tax avoidance has a significant negative relevance. It would be expected that in-house accounting-disclosure expert can be helpful to control tax avoidance. Third, the in-house accounting-disclosure expert and audit quality has a significant positive relevance. It could be expected that in-house accounting-disclosure expert can be helpful to improve audit quality. Especially, these results were supported by the CPA and related expert. on the contrary, it was not the case in lawyer. On the one hand, these results were supported by additional analysis that excluded sample didn't hold in-house accounting-disclosure expert and controled the effect of company size. Therefore, It can be expected that the in-house accounting-disclosure expert introduced to increase the transparency of accounting would be effective to improve the quality of accounting information.
      The implications of this study are as follows. First, these results provide insights into the question of why holding and training in-house accounting-disclosure expert on the job improve the effectiveness of the internal accounting control system and enhance accounting transparency. Also this study can provide government authorities with some implications in policy and encourage firms to hold in-house accounting-disclosure expert whin business organization. Second, this study expanded prior studies, in which used lump-sum data such as several in-house accounting-disclosure expert information and earnings measurements. Instead, this study classified these lump-sum data into sub-category as CPA, lawyer and related expert, and BTD, DA, REM in earnings management, audit fees and audit hours in audit quality, and utilized respectively.

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      목차 (Table of Contents)

      • 제1장 서 론 1
      • 제1절 연구배경 및 연구목적 1
      • 1.1.1 연구배경 1
      • 1.1.2 연구목적 3
      • 제2절 연구방법 및 논문의 구성 4
      • 제1장 서 론 1
      • 제1절 연구배경 및 연구목적 1
      • 1.1.1 연구배경 1
      • 1.1.2 연구목적 3
      • 제2절 연구방법 및 논문의 구성 4
      • 제2장 이론적 배경, 선행연구 및 가설설정 6
      • 제1절 이론적 배경 6
      • 2.1.1 내부회계관리제도의 내부 회계공시전문인력 6
      • 2.1.2 이익조정 10
      • 2.1.3 조세회피 13
      • 2.1.4 외부 감사품질 15
      • 제2절 선행연구 18
      • 2.2.1 이익조정 관련 선행연구 18
      • 2.2.2 조세회피 관련 선행연구 22
      • 2.2.3 외부 감사품질 관련 선행연구 24
      • 2.2.4 선행연구와의 차별점 27
      • 제3절 연구가설 29
      • 2.3.1 내부 회계공시전문인력 및 인력의 전문성과 이익조정 연구가설 30
      • 2.3.2 내부 회계공시전문인력 및 인력의 전문성과 조세회피 연구가설 32
      • 2.3.3 내부 회계공시전문인력 및 인력의 전문성과 외부 감사품질 연구가설 34
      • 제3장 연구 설계 36
      • 제1절 연구모형 36
      • 3.1.1 내부 회계공시전문인력과 이익조정 검증모형 36
      • 3.1.2 내부 회계공시전문인력과 조세회피 검증모형 38
      • 3.1.3 내부 회계공시전문인력과 외부 감사품질 검증모형 40
      • 제2절 변수의 조작적 정의 41
      • 3.2.1 독립변수 : 내부 회계공시전문인력의 조작적 정의 41
      • 3.2.2 종속변수 : 이익조정의 조작적 정의 41
      • 3.2.3 종속변수 : 조세회피의 조작적 정의 51
      • 3.2.4 종속변수 : 외부 감사품질의 조작적 정의 53
      • 3.2.5 통제변수의 조작적 정의 54
      • 제3절 자료수집 및 표본선정 61
      • 3.3.1 자료수집 61
      • 3.3.2 표본선정 62
      • 제4장 실증분석 64
      • 제1절 기술통계량 64
      • 제2절 상관관계 66
      • 제3절 실증분석 결과의 해석 68
      • 4.3.1 내부 회계공시전문인력과 이익조정 68
      • 4.3.2 내부 회계공시전문인력과 조세회피 78
      • 4.3.3 내부 회계공시전문인력과 외부 감사품질 81
      • 제4절 추가분석 86
      • 4.4.1 전문인력 보유 기업만을 대상으로 추가분석 86
      • 4.4.1 기업규모를 통제한 추가분석 91
      • 제5장 결 론 98
      • 제1절 요약 및 결론 98
      • 제2절 연구의 공헌점 99
      • 제3절 연구의 한계점 및 미래 연구방향 100
      • 참고 문헌 101
      • 1. 국내문헌 101
      • 2. 국외문헌 104
      • Abstract 109
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