In this paper we have investigated what factors influence on the adoption of K-IFRS (Korean International Financial Reporting Standards), the effects of the adoption of K-IFRS on audit fees and the effects of agency costs on the relationship between t...
In this paper we have investigated what factors influence on the adoption of K-IFRS (Korean International Financial Reporting Standards), the effects of the adoption of K-IFRS on audit fees and the effects of agency costs on the relationship between the adoption of K-IFRS and audit fee.
We used data concerning non-financing firm from Korean listed companies for the period of 2009-2010. We selected 57 firm-year sample data of firms early adopting K-IFRS, matched with 57 firm-year control data of firms not adopting K-IFRS. Sample firms are matched with control firms, based on the year, industry, firm size and audit quality criteria.
Our empirical results are as follows:
Firstly, we find that debt ratio is positively associated with the voluntary adoption of K-IFRS focusing on agency costs. Creditors can specify in Debt Covenant about measure restricting action of stockholders and managers. Most of Debt Covenants are based on Financial Report. As debt increases, creditors may have incentive to monitor the accuracy of financial reporting. For improvement of the quality of accounting information and accounting transparency, firms are more likely to voluntarily adopt K-IFRS. Moreover, firms with higher debt ratio are more likely to voluntarily adopt K-IFRS to reduce the cost of capitalizing. We also find that voluntary adoption of K-IFRS is positively associated with the stockholding ratio of foreign investors and Big accounting firms. This result implies that foreign stockholders are more inclined to demand the adoption of K-IFRS to increase of international comparability and accounting transparency to effectively monitor management. And since Big accounting firms are able to audit financial statements on K-IFRS and consult about adoption of K-IFRS, firms that hire external audit from Big Accounting firms are more likely to voluntarily adopt K-IFRS.
Secondly, we have found out that audit early adapting firms are charged more than those firms not adopting K-IFRS for audit fees. This is interpreted that external auditors tend to demand substantial amount for audit fees because those firms early adopting K-IFRS have higher risk of control resulting in higher audit risk, and also greater effort and time consumption are expected.
Thirdly, it has indicated that the adoption of K-IFRS affects change in agency costs in minor shareholders and major shareholders to have negative effects on audit fees. Because managers of large companies strive to reduce agency costs by the internal monitoring of head quarters, audit risk is reduced as a result and external auditors tend to charge fewer amounts of fees on the adoption of K-IFRS.
The importance of this research is that it has observed the cause of K-IFRS adoption basing on agency costs when K-IFRS were widely introduced in 2011, and carried out empirical analysis on the effects of the adoption of K-IFRS on audit fees. Moreover this research provides evidence and information for K-IFRS related policy-making authorities to apply aspects of early adopting firms to policy making. Additionally, it also shows empirical evidences of the adoption of K-IFRS by analyzing the economic effects of the adoption with changes in external audit fees. Lastly, it can be a trigger to scrutinize roles of K-IFRS adoption as a factor to deciding audit fees by auditors. These foundings assist to understand factors that should be considered when deciding and negotiating audit fees between firms and auditors.