혼합결합의 경쟁제한성 판단기준에 관한 연구 = A Study on the Standards for Competition Restrictiveness of Conglomerate Mergers

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This dissertation is to provide an overview of anticompetitve effect of conglomerate mergers and aims to review and analyze the contents of standards for competition restrictiveness of conglomerate mergers presented at the current korean competition law and merger guidelines.
Conglomerate mergers are between firms that are in a relationships which is neither horizontal(as competitors in the same relevant market) nor vertical(as supplier and customer). Within the category are three distinguishable subcategories: a market extension merger(mergers between firms that produce the same product in different geographic market), a product extension merger(mergers between firms that make different products but have similar production or distribution channels) and a pure conglomerate merger(mergers with neither of these complementaries).
Generally it is acknowledged that conglomerate mergers will not cause any competition concerns, but in certain specific cases there maybe harm to competition. Especially certain product extension and market extension mergers regarded as theoretically and actually anticompetitve. Thus competition law searches for ways to identify those mergers that threaten competition. These are condemned, even though they may create significant economies.
According to korean competition law, the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, mergers violate article 7, (1) if they are likely substantially to lessen competition. In practice, conglomerate mergers may be evaluated by the Korean Fair Trade Commission(hereinafter the KFTC) based on Merger Guidelines.
At the present time, Merger Guidelines stated that three categories of conglomerate mergers will be regulated; mergers which may eliminate a potential competitors or exclude competitors(foreclose market) on the relevant markets or reduce future competition by increasing barriers to entry. These three standards for evaluating illegality of merger should be applied independently.
In assessing whether a conglomerate merger is likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition in a relevant market, some related factors of the merger to be taken account. For example, the level of concentration in the market, market power(or market position) of the parties, the height of barriers to entry to the market, the degree of countervailing power, etc. The Guidelines set forth structural thresholds to identify merger transactions that give rise to a competition concerns. Under the guidelines, the KFTC is unlikely to find any competition problems in conglomerate mergers, where the market share of the parties in the relevant market is less than 25% and the HHI is under 2500, or the entity is not one of the three largest firms in each markets(so-called 'safe harbour' standard). KFTC will use the preceding HHI and market share thresholds as an initial indicator of the absence of competition concerns.
In a case where the markets in question are highly concentrated and each markets are closely related(neighboring or complementary), conglomerate mergers may cause significant competition problems. Moreover if one of the parties to a merger already holds a leading or dominant position on one or more of the markets, the abilities and incentives brought together by the merger may immediately create conditions allowing the merged entity to leverage its way so as to acquire, in the relatively near future, a dominant position on the other market or exclude competitors on each markets through tying, bundling and direct foreclosure. In the light of the effect of potential competition, a merger can be anticompetitve by eliminating the prospect of independent entry by a firm whose pre-merger presence on the fringe of the market was perceived and constrained oligopolistic behavior on the part of market participants(perceived potential competition). And a merger can be also anticompetitve which eliminate the potential competition that would have resulted had the acquiring firm entered on its own(actual potential competition). Lastly conglomerate merger may increase the firm's ability to deter entry with it's financial power. If entry barriers to the market strengthened after meger, it could dissuade the smaller firms from aggressively competing or potential entrants entering the market.
However the Merger Guidelines fail to define some core terms(concept) of anti-competitiveness of conglomerate mergers and the other major shortcoming of these Guidelines is their failure to consider the important element of competition. Thus, it needs more discussion for designing appropriate liability rules for conglomerate mergers, as well as the content, form, usefulness of conglomerate merger guidelines.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 제1장 서론 1
• 제1절 연구의 목적 1
• 제2절 연구의 범위 및 방법 5
• 제2장 독점규제법상 경쟁제한성 판단기준의 분석과 외국의 입법례 8
• 제1절 혼합결합의 경쟁제한성에 관한 논의의 기초 8
• I. 혼합결합의 개념 8
• II. 혼합결합의 경쟁제한성과 규제근거의 채용 10
• III. 혼합결합의 유형과 분류기준 13
• 제2절 혼합결합 규제제도와 기업결합심사기준의 분석 21
• I. 결합의 일반적 금지기준과 관련규제제도 22
• II. 기업결합심사기준상 경쟁제한성 판단기준 분석 29
• III. 문제의 소재 44
• 제3절 경쟁제한성 판단기준에 관한 외국의 입법례 47
• I. 개요 47
• II. 미국 48
• III. EU 57
• IV. 독일 76
• V. 일본 90
• 제4절 소결 94
• 제3장 경쟁제한성 판단기준에 관한 법리분석 98
• 제1절 개요 98
• 제2절 잠재적 경쟁저해 효과의 논거와 해석 100
• I. 잠재적 경쟁이론 100
• II. 해석 및 적용상의 쟁점 118
• III. 잠재적 경쟁이론에 대한 평가 및 시사점 125
• 제3절 경쟁사업자 배제효과 기준의 논거와 해석 128
• I. 시장참호이론 128
• II. 포트폴리오 효과이론 140
• 제4장 우리나라의 규제사례 분석 173
• 제1절 개요 및 규제현황 173
• 제2절 하이트맥주(주)-(주)진로 기업결합건 175
• I. 사안의 개요 175
• II. 공정위의 경쟁제한성 판단 176
• III. 쟁점사안별 분석 180
• IV. 시정조치의 적절성 191
• 제3절 SK 텔레콤-하나로 텔레콤 기업결합건 196
• I. 사안의 개요 196
• II. 공정위의 경쟁제한성 판단 198
• III. 쟁점사안별 분석 202
• IV. 시정조치의 적절성 216
• 제4절 소결 218
• 제5장 경쟁제한성 판단기준의 해석 및 개선방안 220
• 제1절 개요 220
• 제2절 경쟁제한적 혼합결합에 대한 차별적 심사의 필요성 220
• I. 경쟁제한적 혼합결합의 표지 221
• II. 혼합결합의 유형에 따른 차별적 규제 227
• 제3절 세부 심사기준의 해석 및 입법적 보완방안 229
• I. 잠재적 경쟁저해 효과 기준 230
• II. 경쟁사업자 배제효과 기준 248
• III. 진입장벽의 증대효과 기준 263
• 제4절 경쟁제한성 추정제도의 개선방안 267
• I. 추정요건의 변경을 통한 입법취지의 확보 267
• II. 구체적 요건사실의 수정 269
• 제6장 결론 271
• 참고문헌 278
• 영문초록 286